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Abstract
This thesis sets out to research the phenomenon of political assassinations. Political 
assassinations are not random acts of folly which defy analysis but are well planned 
and discriminate acts of violence which, like terrorism, need to be further researched. 
The central argument of the thesis is that political assassination cannot be justified 
and the following research questions will be addressed:
• Can the assassinations analysed in the thesis be categorised as political 
assassinations?
• Can the justifications that are analysed within the thesis offer justifications for 
these political assassinations?
• Are political assassinations only successful as existential acts?
The thesis will begin by trying to clearly state what constitutes a political 
assassination and how it is different firom terrorism. It will then analyse the various 
justifications that can be used to justify political assassinations. The thesis will 
illustrate three theoretical approaches that can be used. These are the instmmental 
justification, the non - utilitarian justification and terroristic justification. It will then 
examine the three cases of political assassinations which include that of Anwar Sadat 
of Egypt, Yitzhak Rabin of Israel and Rajiv Gandhi of India. Each case study will 
analyse the questions stated above and attempt to find the answers. The thesis will 
then explore the political assassination regime by assessing the advantages and 
disadvantages of prohibition and will also raise some interesting questions about 
potential legal fi-amework for the phenomenon. The thesis will then conclude my 
examining similarities and differences between the cases by focusing on three main 
factors. These are target, ideology and motives and finally aims.
Ill
Introduction
In the field of political violence, little has been written on the 
phenomenon of political assassination. This lack of research has meant 
that political assassinations are not well understood. This in itself is 
strange. Political violence, in all its forms, attracts a great deal of 
attention from some sections of society, for example academics and 
policy makers. It is something we read about in the papers on a daily 
basis and academics are constantly trying to grasp the issues concerned. 
Despite this general fascination with political violence it is difficult to 
understand why the area of political assassinations has not generated 
more scholarly attention. In the aftermath of September 11^ *, there have 
been a number of events that have turned world attention towards 
political assassinations. The War on Terrorism has raised the question of 
the political desirability of assassinating particular individuals. The 
United States’ attempt to find Osama Bin Laden has raised important 
questions about whether he should be assassinated once found or whether 
the United States should put him on trial and jail or execute him with due 
legal process. The intention of the United States to topple the regime in 
Iraq raised the question about the desirability of assassinating Saddam 
Hussain.^
Whether or not the United States has got a right to consider 
carrying out such an act is debatable. The world has been made to
' Although this is not the focus of this thesis as the assassination of Saddam 
Hussein would fall under state assassination. The analyses o f such an act would 
have an impact on the phenomenon of political assassinations.
question whether political assassinations are reasonable means to achieve 
goals and especially whether political assassinations can be considered 
ethical. Also, if a country like the United States decides to attack Iraq, as 
a country which is considered a danger to the international community, 
one needs to keep in mind that there are other countries within the 
international community that can pose similar dangers. At what point 
does one draw the line to stop actions such as toppling a regime? 
However, there is more to the debate and it cannot be seen in such simple 
terms. Attacking a country is not just about the country being a danger to 
the international system - it is primarily about countries thinking about 
their own interests. For example, the United States concerned itself very 
little with Afghanistan and the Taliban regime previously, as they posed 
no immediate threat to the United States even though the United States 
was aware of links between Bin Laden and the Taliban, and the 
probability that Bin Laden was living in Afghanistan. In view of the lack 
of research on political assassinations and the enormous interest that is 
being generated as a result of recent events, this thesis attempts (a) to 
develop an understanding of the phenomenon of political assassination 
and (b) to examine the ethical justifications for political assassinations.
Definitions of Political Violence
In short.
political violence, roughly defined, is a 
considerable destroying use of force against 
persons or things, a use of force prohibited by law, 
directed to a change in the politics, personnel or 
system of government, and hence also directed to 
changes in the existence of individuals in the 
society and perhaps other societies^
The degree of violence is different in developed, less developed and 
under-developed countries. This is because the causes of violence can be 
different amongst different countries. This, however, does not imply that 
political assassinations are less likely in developed countries as opposed 
to less developed and under-developed countries, or vice versa. In 
developed countries with higher standards of living, the public may be 
unhappy with certain reforms and policies, which may stir violence. The 
only way to improve the situation is the elimination of the person 
considered responsible. For example, the attempted assassination in 
Brighton by the IRA of Margaret Thatcher with whom some of the 
British people were very dissatisfied. On the other hand, in a less or 
under-developed country people might be subject to intolerable 
conditions. Such situations may instigate violence and even lead to 
political assassinations. A couple of examples of such situations might
2  T?------T?-----------/TT---------------------------------J ---------------^  ™ __________- r .  1 ITed Honderich, Violence For Equality. (Harmondsworth: Penguin Books Ltd, 1980) 
p23.
be; first the Tamil Tigers fighting against the Singhalese government in 
Sri Lanka and secondly the Palestinians fighting against Israel.
This leads us to question on a broader level whether violence can 
be right, that is, whether we can justify violence under any 
circumstances. In the words of Virginia Held “to justify a position or an 
action is to give reason for its acceptance or performance which a 
reasonable person ought to find persuasive”.^  There are a number of 
different forms of justification that can be found. These include political 
justification, legal justifications, religious justification and moral 
justifications. Held points out that each of these justifications “occurs 
within a relevant system”."^ This thesis will concentrate on moral 
justifications, but will also pay due attention to the religious and political 
justifications that can be found for war and political violence. It is 
possible to have overlap in terms of justifications found, because “in a 
sense all decisions are moral decisions”.^
Definition of Political Assassination
It is true that
politics always involves conflicts over values, 
because leaders come to symbolise political 
virtues and vices, because political leaders are just
 ^Virginia Held, “Justification : Legal and Political”, in Ethics Vol. 86, Issue 1 (Oct., 
1975, l-16)pl.
Ubid. p2.
^Ibid.pl5.
as frail and mortal as anyone else, and because 
there are always some zealots and psychopaths 
about, assassination is obviously a possibility at 
any time.^
A political assassination is a politically motivated act of killing, directed 
against prominent figures in political life. It is not just simply a murder; 
political assassination entails killing individuals of political eminence. 
The motives behind the killings have to be political and the killer has 
particular political aims or goals which could only be fulfilled through 
political assassination.^
Indeed political assassinations can be cai'ried out by a number of 
different people or groups of people. Terrorist groups are specifically 
known for using political assassination as one of their most important 
tools. There are other people who also commit political assassinations 
and these include: religious fundamentalists, lone madmen, hired killers, 
political opposition, military coups and, finally, goveimnents.^ 
Contemporary examples of political assassinations, according to this 
definition, include the killing of the Prime Minister of India, Rajiv 
Gandhi, by the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Elam in 1991. This was aimed 
at disengaging the Indian military from interfering in the Tigers’ struggle 
for independence from Sri Lanka, thus furthering their overall political
 ^Murray Edelman and Rita James Simon. “Presidential Assassinations : their meaning 
and impact on American Society” in Ethics Vol.79. No. 3. pl99.
 ^Political murder is a term is used interchangeably for a political assassination.
® Furthermore, political assassinations can be committed against any type of political 
figure from military generals to religious leaders. However, for the purposes o f this 
thesis political figure will imply only heads o f state.
objectives of national self-determination. Another example is the 
assassination of the Egyptian President Anwar Sadat, in 1981, by 
Lieutenant Khaled Ahmed Shawki al Islambouli, a member of the ‘al 
Jihad’ organisation, an Islamic fundamentalist gi*oup aimed at preventing 
Egypt from moving away from the true path of Islam. Yitzhak Rabin, the 
Prime Minister of Israel, was assassinated by Yigal Amir in order to put 
an end to the Peace Process. The attempted assassination of Margaret 
Thatcher, British Prime Minister in October, 1984, by the hish 
Republican Army was committed for a number of reasons. The Irish 
Republican Army “wanted revenge -  for those ten dead IRA hunger 
strikers; partly for the prestige that would accrue, in their head hunting 
subcultures, from the acquisition of so spectacular a scalp; and partly in 
order to frighten other British politicians”.^  In each of these cases, the 
victim was a political figure, there was a political motive behind the 
assassination, and it had political consequences. There is a problem with 
people not being able to distinguish between political assassinations and 
tenorism. There is big difference between the two. The historical 
background will illustrate that, since terrorist groups have advocated the 
use of political assassination for a long time, and continue to use it at 
times a tool, a distinction between the two must be maintained.
Historical Background
 ^Why compromise will not stop the IRA. Connor Cruise O’Brien.
The history of assassination stretches far back into the past. This section 
of the thesis will examine the history of assassination from the ancient 
world to the present. It will also show how assassinations were not 
limited to any particular society but the phenomenon of assassinations 
has been seen all over the world from Ancient Rome to the Indian 
subcontinent.
As Saul Padover states, “assassination is not only common to political 
societies everywhere; it also has a long and not dishonourable history”.^  ^
The Middle East occupies an important place as it “gave birth to 
Mankind’s earliest known efforts at political organisation”.^  ^ This means 
that “it also experienced and with increasing care recorded instances of 
political homicide still able to hold our interest”. Within the Middle 
East, groups like the Zealots and the Assassins used assassination as their 
primary violent strategy. Many of the earliest assassinations, however, 
had strong religious purpose and did not necessarily have strong political 
reasons. There were periods in history when religious purposes were 
responsible for the practice of assassination, and periods when political 
reasons reigned over religious reasons. However, more recently, 
assassinations have been used frequently as a tool to achieve political 
goals.
As mentioned above some of the earliest active groups to use 
assassinations were the Zealots-Sircarii and Assassins (also known as 
Ismailis-Nizari). Essentially, the two groups were terrorist organisations
Saul Padover, “Patterns of Assassination in Occupied Territory”, in The Public 
Opinion Quarterly. Winter 1943. p681.
‘‘_Franklin Ford, Political Murder. From Tyrannicide to Terrorism. (Cambridge: 
Harvard University Press, 1985) p5.
''Ibid.p5.
who used assassinations as a major part of their campaign. These two 
groups are the most frequently cited examples of assassins in history, and 
they are important to this thesis because of their proclivity towards 
committing assassinations.^^ Both the Zealots and the Assassins 
displayed their own distinctive traits and had consequential effects on 
society. The most important aspect of the two groups was that religion 
was the important driving force behind their actions. Additionally, they 
had political objectives behind their struggle. The terror they unleashed 
was portrayed as holy terror and they were known as the Holy Terrorists. 
In order to understand the history of assassinations it would be essential 
to analyse each group separately. Under the strictest sense of the 
definition of political assassination used in this thesis the groups did 
commit assassination, but not political assassinations. Examining the 
history of assassinations would be incomplete without acknowledging the 
groups, as they are viewed in the literature as the earliest groups to use 
assassination as a tool in their struggle.
Thus the tradition of political violence is not new within the 
Israeli context. In fact, violence in Israel dates back to the days before the 
creation of Israel, and fact, political assassinations have always been an 
integral part of Israeli society. The Zealots can be traced back to a 
millenarian Jewish sect who fought against the Roman occupation of 
what is now Israel, between 66-73A.D. The group existed for 
approximately twenty-five years. The Zealots, “...were also inspired by 
the hope for messianic deliverance and believed that those who gave their
Furthermore, since the term assassination has Arabic roots which subsequently 
entered the western languages also makes it necessaiy to examine the Assassins.
lives in this struggle would gain immorality” The dagger or the sica 
was the main weapon used by them and their aim was to gain maximum 
publicity.
The Zealots would emerge from the anonymous 
obscurity of a crowded marketplace, draw the sica 
concealed beneath his robes and, in plain view of 
those present, dramatically slit the throat of a 
Roman legionnaire or a Jewish citizen who had 
been judged by the group guilty of betrayal, 
apostasy or both^^
The Zealots engaged in both “individual assassination and wholesale 
slaughter” by “employing a primitive form of chemical warfare”. The 
Zealots poisoned Roman wells and granaries and “even sabotag[ed] 
Jerusalem’s water supply”. A  big part of their struggle was directed 
towards the Greek population, as in Judah against the Romans who 
governed them. Thus, there were political motives behind the 
assassinations. The campaign of assassination they launched was all the 
more chilling because its victims included not only occupation officials, 
but also Saduccees and other Jews identified as complaisant toward
David C Rapoport, “Religion and Terror: Thugs, Assassins and Zealots", In 
International TeiTorism. Characteristics. Causes. Controls. (St. Martin’s Press, 1990) 
pl52.
Bruce Hoffman, Inside Terrorism. (London: Victor Gollancz, 1998) p88.
Bruce Hoffman, “Holy Terror: The Implications of Terrorism Motivated By a 
Religious Imperative", in The World Todav. Vol. 52, No 3, Mach 1996. p i.
Rome”.^  ^They committed the murders in broad daylight. Holy days were 
in particular ideal for committing assassinations. Ford, correctly, states 
that “the Zealots gave the world one of its most startling examples of 
murderous certainty in the absolute moral rightness of a cause”. T h e  
tradition of assassinations was well established within the community. It 
can also be noted that the Zealots also practised carrying out 
assassinations in the name of religion, as this would enable the Zealots to 
use their “messianic hopes to seek maximum publicity”. However, this 
reliance on religion can be summed up by saying that the messianic angle 
to their ideology “suggested the object of terror and permitted methods 
necessary to achieve it”.^ ®
Furthermore, there are a number of examples of political 
assassinations in the Tanach (the Hebrew Bible). One of the most famous 
examples was the political assassination of Gedaliah in 586 B.C. or five 
years later, during the rule of Nebuchadnezzar of Babylon in 586 B.C 
who conquered Jerusalem and destroyed the first Jewish Temple. 
Gadaliah was appointed as the governor of Judea and encouraged 
surviving Jews to repopulate empty cities, work the land and resign 
themselves to living under the rule of Babylon. Son of Nethaniah who 
was the son of Elishama, Ishmael was a member of the royal family and 
was not too elated with Gadaliah, as he has become head of state without 
being a member of the royal family. As a result, Ishmael assassinated 
Gedaliah. Political assassination was thus used as a means of social and
Ford, op.cit. p91.
Ibid.
David C Rapoport, “Fear and Trembling: Terrorism in Three Religious Traditions”, in 
American Political Science Review. Vol.78, No.3, September 1984. p668.
Ibid. p669.
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political control, that is, it was used to achieve specific results. For 
example, Gedaliah was assassinated because Ishmael wanted to become 
king.
The Assassins were active between 1090 and 1275 AD. They 
were a radical offshoot of the Muslim Shi’a, who fought the Christian 
Crusaders in the attempt to re-conquer present-day Syria and Iran. This 
was very much a political goal for the Assassins and this meant that “they 
had political objectives’’^  ^ just like the Zealots. They sought to purify 
Islam by making political and religious institutions inseparable. It can be 
seen that “simply using the threat of assassination was often enough for 
the Assassins to cow their potential enemies into submission”.^  ^ The 
name is derived from the Arabic for hashish-eater, as the Assassin would 
ritualistically imbibe hashish before committing the assassination in 
order “to produce dreams of heavenly rewards while removing the fears 
and inhibitions of selected origins”.^  ^ The act of assassination was 
considered as a sacramental or divine duty to hasten the millennium. The 
Assassins wanted to prepare the world for the coming of the Messiah or 
Mahdi who would create the perfect world - the establishment of an 
Islamic society. Their victims were generally prominent figures murdered 
in royal courts or venerated places on holy days. The murder weapon was 
always a dagger which guaranteed the death of the victim.^"  ^The Assassin
Ibid. p664.
International Encyclopedia of Tenorism (Chicago: Fitzroy Dearborn Publishers, 
1997) p40.
^ Ford, op.cit. p i03.
^  It is known that other Muslim cults used other means of killing their victims. For 
example one cult used to strangle their victims with scarves.
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usually made no attempt to escape if he survived. As Hoffman has 
argued:
An additional- perhaps even more compelling- 
motivation was the promise that, should the 
assassin perish in the course of his act, he would 
immediately ascend to a glorious heaven: thus 
fostering an ethos of self sacrifice and suicidal 
martyrdom that is apparent in some of the Muslim 
Terrorist movements today.
Martyrdom holds a special significance for many Muslims because an 
individual dies in order to eliminate Islam’s enemies. The creation of the 
status Martyr for dead Assassins was hoped to encourage more 
individuals to become Assassins. To establish an Islamic society it was 
necessary to wage a Jihad or Holy War against the enemies of Islam. The 
assailants were also described as fiyadeen which indicates that “they 
were considered religious sacrifices who freed themselves from the guilt 
of all sins and thereby gained entry into paradise”.^ *^ Their victims were 
usually orthodox religious men or political leaders who had strayed from 
the path of true religion. The fiyadeen developed a very strong 
relationship with the victim. This was done over years “through devotion 
and skill”. The Assassin “would gain his master’s trust and, then, at the 
appropriate time, the faithful servant would plunge a dagger into his
Hoffman, ‘Holy Terror’, op.cit. p i.
^  Rapoport, Tear and Trembling’, op.cit. p665.
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master’s back”?^ In order “to maximize their psychological impact” and 
the vulnerability of the victim “the assassinations took place in front of 
numerous witnesses in venerated sites like mosques, where sanctity 
provided immunity, or in highly protected sites where loyal supporters 
surrounded the victim”/^ The importance of this was to draw attention to 
their cause. Also, assassinations were considered an attractive means of 
spreading terror. Furthermore, Hodgson points out, “though Muslims 
.. .commonly.. .used an assassination as an expedient, the adoption of.. .a 
regular and admitted [assassination] policy horrified them and has 
horrified men ever since”.^  ^It is interesting to know that, irrespective of 
the fact that assassinations horrified many Muslims, the Assassins 
continued to commit such an act. One important aspect evident here is 
the way the Assassins justified their acts in terms of religion as the acts 
were necessary to purify Islam. The group disappeared by 1275.
Similar to the Zealots and Assassins was an Indian based group 
known as the Thugs. Although the Thugs killed for different reasons this 
group was one of the earliest in the region, and dated from the seventh 
century until the mid-nineteenth century. They existed far longer than the 
Assassins and the Zealots. The Thugs were an Indian religious 
association of professional robbers and murderers who would mislead 
travellers, steal their money and ritualistically strangle them as sacrificial 
offerings to Kali, the Hindu Goddess of terror and destruction. 
Approximately one million people were thought to be victims of the
Ibid. p666.
28 Rapoport, ‘Sacred terror’, op.cit. pl21.
Rapoport, ‘Fear and Trembling’, op.cit. p666.
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Thugs. This number surpasses the number of killings committed by 
modem day terrorists. However, the group cannot be compared to the 
Zealots or the Assassins as they lacked any political strategy to their 
campaign. The Thugs, unlike the Assassins or the Zealots did not target 
specific individuals. The murders committed by the Thugs were 
motivated purely by religious, not political, reasons; this was unlike both 
the Zealots and the Assassins, who did have some political motives 
involved in their stmggle. Due to the commitment of each to Judaism, 
Islam and Hinduism, these groups illustrate the importance of religion in 
their campaigns. The three groups show that assassinations were a part of 
certain societies in the past and that assassinations have always been an 
aspect of our history.
Examples of political assassination can also be found in the 
Bible. A well- known assassination is that of Sennacherib, King of 
Assyria, in 681BC. Sennacherib invaded Judah but was defeated. He 
went home having lost more than 5000 men and
it came to pass, as he was worshipping in the 
house of Nisroch his god, that Adrammelech and 
Sharezer his sons smote him with the Sword; and 
they escaped into the land of Armenia: and Esar- 
haddon his son reigned in his stead^^
Brian Bailey, The Assassination File. A Case Book of Crime. Conspiracy and VIP 
Victims. (London: W.H Allen, 1991) p4.
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Another case of political assassination can be found in the Tanach: that 
of “Ehud of the tribe of Benjamhi who assassinated Eglon, the King of 
Moab and then won Israel eighty years of freedom”/^ Thus, an 
assassination was seen “as a pragmatic way of getting rid of political 
opponents, and as a tool in struggles for the royal throne”^^  illustrating 
that political motives were an important factor.
Furthermore, there were numerous other political assassinations 
in Europe. Some of the most important political assassinations can be 
found in Ancient Greece and in the Roman Republic. In Ancient Greece, 
the most famous assassination was that of Hipparchus in 514 B.C. When 
Pisistratus, the tyrant of Athens, died he left his three sons Hippias, 
Hipparchus and Thessalus as heirs to the tlirone. Much debate exists 
about how power was also divided amongst the three, but Hipparchus 
was known to be powerful in his own right. Hipparchus was thought to 
be a tyrant and as a result was stabbed to death by local aristocrats 
Harmodius and Aristogiton. The obvious reason behind the assassination 
was to free Greece from being ruled by a tyrant, thus making it a political 
assassination. The significance of such an act was immense and this can 
be seen by the “erection of statues to Harmodius and Aristogiton in the 
city market place, an honour never previously accorded to anyone”.^  ^
Subsequently, Thucydides came up with another explanation, claiming 
that “Harmodius and Aristogiton had been moved neither by patriotism 
nor by love of liberty but by the passions bom of a homosexual
Yehuda, Political Assassinations bv the Jews: A Rhetorical Device for Justice 
(Albany: State University o f New York Press, 1993 p99.
Ibid. p 100.
Encyclopedia o f World Terrorism. ( New York: M.E.Sharpe, INC: 1997) p29.
15
triangle”. Despite such claims it is difficult to ignore that Hipparchus 
was thought to be a tyrant and that political motivations were also an 
important factor, which, along with other reasons, may have led to the 
assassination.
“The Romans’ prolonged success in containing the threat of 
assassination” is often noted but “it was an ability they eventually lost”.^  ^
The Romans survived almost
four centuries without the politically motivated 
slaying of a leading public figure firom well before 
the traditional founding date of 509 B.C. -the last 
king, Tarquin the Proud, having murdered his 
predecessor, Servius Tullius, in 534-until the 
assassination of Sempronius Gracchus in 133^^
The assassination of Servius Tullius was one of the first instances of a 
political assassination in Ancient Rome by Tarquin the Proud. Tarquin 
“first accused him of being an unlawful ruler hoping that the people 
could detlrrone him, but having failed in his purpose, he killed Servius 
and proclaimed himself king”.^  ^ Tiberius Sempronius Gracchus and 
Giaus Gracchus were another two political figures politically 
assassinated in Rome. Tiberius Gracchus, after having seived the 
military, decided to announce his candidacy for election on the ten
Ford, op.cit. p27.
Ibid. p47.
Ibid.
Roma History and Civilisation, 
http://www.mclink.it/n/citrag/roma/doc/historv/est 026.htm
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tribunes of the plebs. His brother followed a similar path and together 
they carried out extensive land reforms. As a result, Tiberius had enraged 
a large number of people and while seeking re-election was publicly 
assassinated on the steps of the Capitol by a mob of senators headed by 
patrician P. Scipio Nasica. Giaus Gracchus furthered his brother’s 
polices and added many of his own. One of the most noted of these was 
his proposal to give “Roman citizenship to Latins and Latin status to 
Italian allies, both to protect them from Roman excesses and to enable 
them to participate in agrarian land distributions”.^  ^ This proved to be 
very unpopular and he was assassinated. He was “formally declared to be 
an enemy of the republic”.^ ^
The most famous of all political assassinations of the Republic 
was that of Julius Caesar. He was assassinated in March, 44 B.C. Ford 
states that “in Caesar the republican government faced a redoubtable foe, 
skilled as a diplomat, politician, and general, conqueror of unnumbered 
Celtic and Germanic foes from Provence to Britain”.'*® Caesar, along with 
Pompey and Crassus, formed the first Triumvirate. While his ten-year 
term as proconsul was coming to an end he decided to seek re-election as 
proconsul, and was elected in 49 B.C. Once elected, Caesar decided to 
hunt down the fugitive Pompey, as his alliance with him had ended and a 
“civil war had broken out between Caesar and Pompey”.'** Both believed 
that they could be dictators of Rome. However, the result was the
Tiberius and Gains Gracchus, http://heraklia.fwsl.com/contemporaries/gracchi/
39 Ford, op.cit. p57.
Ibid. p61.
Encyclopedia of World TeiTorism op.cit. p30.
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assassination of Pompey/^ Caesar returned as a dictator. Soon after 
“even his supporters saw this as a threat to the republic”.'*^  Thus began 
the plot for his assassination by as many as sixty men, a large number of 
whom were nominated for public office by Caesar himself. The political 
assassinations of Servius Tullius, Sempronius Gracchus, Giaus Gracchus 
and Caesar are only some of the famous assassinations to have taken 
place in Rome. In each case there was a specific political figure, a 
political motive and a political consequence to the act.
Great Britain also experienced a large number of political 
assassinations. One of the first was that of Edward II, who “proved to be 
a less than effectual monarch, troubled from without by Robert the Bruce 
of Scotland who defeated English forces on the battlefield and within by 
his own barons who constantly threatened his throne”.'*'* He suffered 
badly ftom trying to secure his hold on Scotland and was left at the 
mercy of the barons and his cousin, Thomas of Lancaster. His own 
powers over appointments and finances was restricted by Ordinances 
which were drafted by the baronial committee in order to curb his 
powers. He eventually regained some power and felt he could revoke the 
Ordinances. However, his wife Isabella and her lover Roger Mortimer, an 
exiled baron, decided to invade England as Edward’s support had 
declined. He was forced to abdicate in 1326, in favour of his son Edward 
III, but Mortimer was in charge. Eventually, Isabella and Mortimer 
decided that it was too dangerous to keep him alive as he might try to
For ftuther details refer to Franklin Ford.
Encyclopedia o f World Tenorism, op.cit. p30.
'’‘^ Carl Sifakis, Encvlopedia of Assassinations. (New York: Check Mark Books, 1991) 
p56.
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rally opponents. These political reasons led to his assassination in 
September, 1327. Another political assassination was that of the King of 
England, William Rufus, who succeeded to the throne after the death of 
his father William the Conqueror in 1098, and was assassinated in 
1100."^  ^ He was “hardly held in such high esteem by others in his 
realm,” *^^ which was evident when an arrow struck him in the back. The 
deadly wound came from the knight, Walter Tirel, under order from the 
King’s younger brother, Henry, who succeeded him immediately. There 
is some debate about whether the death was an accident; however, “it 
seems more likely, perhaps, that he was a victim of political 
assassination,”"^  ^ due to his brother’s succession. Furthermore, Queen 
Elizabeth I faced several unsuccessful assassination attempts on her life. 
The attempts always had a political motive, which was to raise “to the 
throne Mary, the Catholic queen of Scots”."^  ^Likewise, King of England, 
James I faced an attempted assassination by Guy Fawkes as he was 
“angered by the increasing oppression of Roman Catholics in England”.'^  ^
Here again there was a political reason for committing the assassination 
as Fawkes believed that assassinating James I would stop the oppression.
During the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries most of Europe 
was in religious turmoil. As a result, it is not surprising that a number of 
assassinations which occurred were heavily influenced by religion. 
However, the assassinations were mostly of heads of states, and had
It was said that that Rufus died in an accident however it was most likely an 
assassination. For further reference see Encyclopedia o f Assassination by Carl Sifakis. 
p232.
Sifakis, op.cit. p232.
Bailey, op.cit. p22.
Sifakis, op.cit. p58.
'*^Ibid.pl03.
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specific religious inclinations, the hope being that the replacement would 
follow different policies. Two political assassinations, that were very 
important in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, were those of 
William of Nassau, Prince of Orange (also known as William the Silent), 
and King Henri IV of France. William was raised as a Catholic, but later 
adopted Protestantism. This led to the hatred of Philip of Spain. 
Therefore, William fought for the freedom of the Netherlands from 
Spanish domination and “as the prince of the Netherlands, he was 
accused of heresy by the Spanish Inquisition, and his assassination was 
long plotted by Philip and his representative”.^ ® There were 
approximately five attempts on his life, and in 1584 he was assassinated 
by Balthazar Gerard at a private dinner party. This was a political 
assassination as William wanted to unite the Spanish Netherlands into 
one independent nation. At the same time, a strong religious motive 
behind the assassination cannot be denied. Philip of Spain believed the 
“the entire population of the Netherlands to be heretical”^^  and he wanted 
by all means possible to prevent William fi.*om creating a united Spanish 
Netherlands. The result of not being able to create a united Spanish 
Netherlands had important political consequences as “the assassination of 
William the Silent did thus influence the course of European history”.^  ^
Henry IV, also known as Henry of Navarre, “is remembered as 
one of France’s most popular kings, but no less than 20 attempts were
Ibid. p232. 
Ibid. p42.
Bailey, op.cit. p40.
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made on his life during his reign”.^  ^ He was brought up as a Protestant, 
but embraced Catholicism. In 1610 Henry IV was stabbed by Francois 
Ravaillac who was “convinced it was his duty to save France from the 
horror of Protestantism”.^ "^ Furthermore, Ravaillac believed that “the 
King had failed in his Christian duty”.^  ^ The assassination was also an 
attempt to replace Henry IV with someone who would not impose 
Protestant values. This would then imply underlying political reasons 
with strong religious aspects behind the act.
Additionally, within the Jewish context before the creation of 
the state of Israel, a number of political assassinations of Jewish people 
were carried out in Europe. Examples of attempted political 
assassinations before the creation of the State of Israel in 1948 include 
the assassination of von val on May 18, 1902, a county executive who 
ordered the attack on a group of Jewish demonstrators from the Jewish 
ghetto. His assassin was Hirsch Lekert, who shot von Val. The assassin 
was labelled as a martyr. Another is the assassination by David 
Frankfurter Wilhelm Gustloff, leader of the Swiss branch of the Nazi 
party whom David considered a very dangerous person. Thus, on 
February 4, 1936, David shot and fatally wounded Gustloff.
Furthermore, a number of political assassinations (successful 
and attempted) were carried out by Jews in Palestine. Aref El-Arsan was 
assassinated by David Tidhar and Yehoshua Levi on January 17, 1715. 
Aref El-Arsan was actually known as Aref Effendy and served as an aid
Robert J Knecht, The French Civil Wars (London: Pearson Education Limited, 2000) 
p283 
Sifakis, op.cit. p92.
Knecht, op.cit. p283.
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to a Turkish commander by the name of Hassan Back. The assassination 
of Tufik Bay (who was an important police officer during the Turkish 
occupation of Palestine) who carried out by Yerachmiel Lukatcher from 
Hashomer (the Hashomer was dissolved in 1920 and some members 
created a small secret organisation called the Hakibbutz). Additionally, 
an example of an assassination committed by Jews in Israel is the 
assassination of Dr Rudolf Kasztner by Dan Shemer, Ze’ ev Ekstein, and 
Joseph Menkes in Tel Aviv on March 2, 1957. Yehuda in his book 
"Political Assassinations by Jews" very briefly describes the eighty-eight 
political assassinations committed by Jews in Palestine and Israel. He 
thus, illustrates the culture of assassination that already exists in the 
region.^^
In the contemporary world, as mentioned before, assassinations 
became a tool used frequently by terrorists. In most cases, assassinations 
were committed for political motives with political consequences thus 
making them political assassinations. For example, Narodnaya Volya, a 
Russian terrorist group which operated in Russia between January, 1878, 
and March, 1881, aimed to overthrow the tyrannical Tsarist regime. The 
alienation of the Russian masses enabled the group to engage in dramatic 
acts of violence to draw attention to their cause. They used “propaganda 
by deed” by selecting specific individuals who “embod[ied] the 
autocratic, oppressive state” These acts involved planning similar to 
that needed for committing a political assassination. Therefore, it was
All the above examples are taken from Nachmen Ben Yehuda's book. For fiuther 
details see Ben Yehuda, ‘Political Assassinations by the Jews’, op.cit.
Hoffman, ‘Inside teiTorism’. op.cit. pi 8.
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easier to target their victims, who were the Tsar, other members of the 
royal family and senior government officials chosen for their symbolic 
value as representatives of the regime. One of the most important 
political assassinations by Narodnaya Volya was that of Tsar Alexander 
II, in 1881. However, this event led to the group’s demise. Furthermore, 
a successor organisation of Narodnaya Volya tried to assassinate the 
Grand Duke Serge Alexandrovich on a number of occasions and was 
eventually successful. The Anarchists were another organisation who 
carried out a number of assassinations. In fact, the “anarchists were 
responsible for an impressive string of assassinations of heads of state”.^  ^
At around the same time, the Narodna Obrana, a pan-Serbian 
group established to promote Serbian cultural and national activities, 
began to use political assassinations as a means of promoting their goals. 
Narodna Obrana attempted to kill the governor of Bosnia. The Black 
Hand, a radical faction split from the Narodna Obrana, also resorted to 
violent means in pursuit of their objectives. The Black Hand had strong 
links with the Young Bosnians, a group created to unite the Slovenes, 
Croats and Serbs. They wanted to establish a greater Serbia, including 
Bosnia/Herzegovina. Finally, Gavrilo Princip, who was a member of the 
Young Bosnians and the Black Hand, was responsible for the political 
assassination of the Archduke Franz Ferdinand in 1914. The above 
assassinations were political because they all involved either the hoped 
for overthrow of the Russian Tsar or the establishment of a pan-Serbian 
nation.
Ibid. p20.
23
The United States has experienced its fair share of 
assassinations, though not all of them were strictly political. Abraham 
Lincoln was assassinated by John Wilkes Booth in 1865 and although it 
was claimed that the assassin was irrational, and had personal motives, 
there were political reasons for the assassination. As Clarke states “his 
hatred for the President was both personal and political”.^  ^ Lincoln was 
unpopular as a President in the south as well as in part of the north. This 
was because some in the south wanted to keep slavery, and the north 
wanted to end slavery. He also faced vicious opposition within his 
cabinet and the Congress. Furthermore, there was controversy 
surrounding his re-election in 1864.^ ® As pointed out by Clarke, “ to 
ignore the political circumstances and events of the civil war era is to 
miss the most important element in Booth’s motives”.®^ Additionally, 
there was an attempted political assassination of President Truman by the 
Puerto Rican nationalists Oscar Collazo and Griselio Torresola in 1950. 
This unsuccessful attempt was “an expression of resentment about United 
States foreign policy”^^  and “their primary purpose was to awaken the 
American public to conditions in Puerto Rico”.®^
Latin America has experienced a large number of assassinations. 
Ford states “assassinations of a more or less traditional kind had been a 
fairly constant feature of Latin America’s post imperial republics, in 
which at least forty significant political killings occurred between the
James W. Clarke, American Assassin (Princeton: Princeton University Press: 1982)
p28.
®Ibid.pl9-20.
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early nineteenth century and the middle of the twentieth”.^ "^  One of the 
most important political assassinations was that of General Rafael 
Trujillo Molina, a former president of the Dominican Republic, in 1961, 
and “the assassination of the President became the most sensational 
public death of 1961”.®^ He was a dictator and “his rule was cruel and 
senseless; his weapons corruption and terrorism”.^ ® He had even tried to 
assassinate the Venezuelan president in the fifties. As a result of all these 
activities, hostility towards Trujillo grew tremendously and, in May 
1961, Trujillo’s car was ambushed and he was machine-gunned to death. 
In every sense this was a political assassination, hi just one year. Ford 
points out in his book a large number of political assassination have 
sometimes occurred in Latin American countries. Some examples of 
people assassinated in 1971 for instance are: Former Bolivian Director of 
Intelligence, Roberto Quintanilla, shot to death; former Chilean minister 
of Interior and the leader of the conservative Chilean Christian 
Democratic Party; and Guatemalan congressman, Jose Luis Arriaga 
Arriola. In the Philippines Benigno Aquino Jr was assassinated in 1983. 
He planned to oppose President Ferdinand Marcos in the elections. 
Before Benigno’s election plans, Marcos had him put in prison for 
subversion. Aquino was released from prison in 1980 and was allowed to 
travel to the United States for heart surgery. In the United States, Aquino 
qngaged in research and organising political support at home. This 
prompted him to return to the political scene in the Philippines. President
Ford, op.cit. p338. 
Bailey, op.cit. p i23. 
®®Ibid.pl23.
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Marcos saw Aquino as a threat to his reign, and had him assassinated as 
soon as he landed in Manila.
Violence has always been imbedded in Indian society. India has 
witnessed numerous forms of violence during the Indian War of 
Independence, ethnic conflict, wars with foreign countries, religious riots 
and terroristic violence. Violence, and more specifically political 
assassinations, existed in the days prior to colonial rule and can still be 
found in contemporary society. In the pre-colonial days, rulers of 
different provinces fought to oust each other to achieve territorial 
expansion and wealth. This more than often involved the killing of 
innocent people or specifically selected targets like rulers or high 
officials in the kingdom in order to acquire territory, money or even 
revenge. In most cases the assassinations of rulers were politically 
dominated. That is, assassination victims were mostly political figures 
targeted in order to replace them with another. The process was 
essentially about power and prestige. In fact, the Mughal period of Indian 
history provides enough evidence to show how rulers were very often 
targets for murderers. For example, Shah Jahan, one of the greatest 
Indian rulers, while pursuing his Deccan policy whereby he wanted to 
acquire territory in the south, continued to annihilate rulers. Furthermore, 
in the event of any disagreement over policies initiated or pursued by 
rulers, there was a tendency amongst the people to attempt to assassinate 
the ruler. All this clearly illustrates that assassinations, in particular 
political assassinations, have always been a part of Indian political 
culture. In fact, post - independence India has seen political
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assassinations of several Indian leaders. This can be illustrated by a few 
examples.
One of the earliest assassinations was that of the man who played 
a crucial role in the Indian struggle for Independence, Mahatma Gandhi, 
who was shot dead on January 30, 1948 as he was walking through a 
garden on his way to evening prayers in Delhi. His killer was a man 
called Nathuram V. Godse, the editor of a Hindu new spaper.Gandhi 
had always been against the use of violence and questioned the divide 
that existed between the Hindus and Muslims. After the assassination, 
Godse stated that the main reason behind the assassination was that of 
Gandhi’s policy of non-violence towards the Muslims. Furthermore, 
Godse could no longer stand the atrocities committed on the Hindus 
because of Hinduism. The importance of religion as a motivating factor 
comes to the forefront as a result of this assassination. It should not be 
forgotten that the assassination was committed at a time when the entire 
country was crippled with religious turmoil, as the country had just been 
partitioned on the basis of religious differences into India and Pakistan.
Also, Indira Gandhi was assassinated by her Sikh bodyguard in 
1984. It is thought that it was “her concern for Indian unity that led to her 
death”.^  ^ She believed that “India could function as a nomdigious 
democracy, a belief that was not shared by the Sikhs of the India’s 
Punjab state, whose lives and faith were tightly bound”.®^ As a result.
Tliis was not the first attempt on Gandhi’s life. In fact, 10 days earlier a man named 
Madanlal a refugee from Punjab threw a country made bomb at Gandhi while he was 
addressing a prayer meeting.
Ibid. pl50.
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there was an ongoing political conflict with the Sikhs. Therefore, during 
her term, she had to deal with terrorist problems in Punjab which 
contributed to underground Sikh militancy^® The Sikhs were fighting to 1
establish their own nation out of the north-western part of Punjab. Indira 
Gandhi was determined not to give in to the terrorists In the course of 
time, the chief Minister of Punjab, Zail Singh, became sympathetic 
towards the Sikh cause and helped the terrorists establish a base inside 
the Golden Temple^ ^ at Amritsar. This was followed by an order from 
Indira Gandhi for the Indian Army to raid the Golden Temple, the Sikh 
holiest shrine, which was also the headquarters of the separatist 
movement at Amritsar. The entire manoeuvre lasted four days and large 
quantities of arms and ammunitions were seized, and the temple suffered 
significant structural damage. This infuriated the Sikhs further as they 
felt that Indira Gandhi had committed a sacrilegious act. This was a 
m ^or mistake on Gandhi’s part and hundreds of innocent Sikhs were f
killed. What angered the majority of the Sikh population was the 
extensive damage to the Sikhs’ holiest shrine. However, the fact that 
Gandhi had revealed the stockpiling of ammunitions that was taking 
place in the temple, had immense political significance as the Sikhs felt 
they were being targeted by the government. Her assassination was thus 
due to a combination of a history of political conflict with the Sikhs and 
revenge for attacking the shrine.
There have been numerous assassinations throughout history and 
in various different cultures. Assassination is ingrained in society and is
70 The Sikhs received training, arms and ammunitions from Pakistan. 
Sikhs holiest shrine.
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an act which cannot be ignored. A study of history clearly shows how, at 
certain periods different reasons were responsible for assassinations. 
Although not all of them were political assassinations, in most cases 
there were some underlying political reasons. In recent times, most 
assassinations have been political. A large part of this is due to the fact 
that most assassinations today are committed by groups, or individuals 
linked to groups, whose aim is to fulfil political goals. The three political 
leaders analysed in this thesis, Anwar Sadat of Egypt, Rajiv Gandhi of 
India and Yitzhak Rabin of Israel were all assassinated by terrorist 
groups who had their own political visions and were unhappy about the 
political situation in their respective countries.
Methodology
The next section of the thesis needs to address the methodology. The aim 
of the thesis is to contribute to hypothesis - building by answering 
questions like: what is a political assassination? Can the justifications 
that are analysed within the thesis justify the political assassinations? Are 
political assassinations ever successful as a political strategy, or are they 
only successful as existential acts?
There are a variety of methodologies that can be used to explain 
the questions. The single case study method is one of them. For 
qualitative researchers, however, “the intensive but an uncontrolled 
examination of single cases cannot directly result in empirical
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generalisation and cannot be used to test hypotheses’’^ ^ Although a 
single case study would enable the researcher to study the case in every 
detail, it would, however, be impossible to make any sort of 
generalisations from just one case and thus test a hypothesis. As a result, 
this method would not be appropriate for what this thesis aims to achieve.
Comparative analysis seems to be the best suited for hypothesis 
building. Charles Ragin, in his article ‘Using Comparative Methods to 
Study Diversity’, elucidates how “comparative researchers examine 
patterns of similarities and differences across cases and try to come to 
terms with their diversity”.^  ^ One of the main reasons researchers use 
comparative research is to draw out the diversity as well as the 
similarities that exists between cases. Comparative research draws 
commonalities between cases: “comparative researchers consider how 
the different parts of each case- those aspects that are relevant to the 
investigation- fit together; they try to make sense of each case”.^ "^  A 
limited number of cases are used in order to derive common conclusions 
from the research. This is the reason why only three cases have been 
chosen for analysis here. This will enable the researcher to find concrete 
conclusions from the analyses in the limited space available in the thesis. 
As Ragin points out
in comparative research diversity, by contrast, the
category of phenomenon that the investigator is
Arend Lijphart, “The Comparable -Cases Strategy in Comparative Research”, in 
Comparative Political Studies. Vol.8, No.2, July 1975. pl60.
Charles C. Ragin, Constructing Social Research C^alifornia: Pine Forge Press, 
Thousand Oakes) 1994. pl07.
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studying is usually specified at the outset, and the 
goal of the investigation is to explain the diversity 
within a particular set of cases
It is expected that the comparative approach will help identify the 
diversities prevalent in political assassination cases, and these diversities 
will be analysed at length. In conclusion,
in research that emphasises diversity the focus is 
on the similarities within a category of cases with 
the same outcome that (I) distinguish that 
category from other categories and (2) explain the 
outcome manifested by that category. In other 
words, the study of diversity is the study of 
similarities and differences within a given set of 
cases^ ^
One must mention the other comparative methodological approaches that 
lead to theory development, and why they will not be used in this thesis. 
Qualitative researchers search for common statistically accountable 
factors amongst a large number of cases. That is when they “study 
commonalities they usually view multiple cases as many instances of the 
same thing”.^  ^ The focus of the thesis is not just commonalities, but is 
also looking for diversities. Furthermore, the goal of quantitative
Ibid. pl06. 
Ibid. pl07.
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research “is to explain the covariation of one variable with another, 
usually across many, many cases’’/^ This reduces the familiarity between 
cases as the number of cases is too large. There is a limit to the number 
of cases that can be examined in a thesis and also it is necessary to 
remain familiar with the cases in order to find diversity. Thus, both the 
qualitative and quantitative approaches do not suit this thesis, as they 
require many cases to be analysed, which is beyond the scope of the 
thesis and would also reduce the familiarity between cases. Finally, there 
is also the statistical approach whereby the “conceptual (mathematical) 
manipulation of empirically observed data” is used “in order to discover 
controlled relationships among variables”.^  ^ This method involves 
dealing with a large number of cases which can lead to “vague and 
amorphous conceptualisations”.^  ^ Since this thesis will deal with a 
limited number of cases, this approach will not be used.
Unlike the qualitative approach, explaining case studies allows 
the examination of diversity, as well as similarities: study of patterns of 
similarities and differences within a given set of cases.H ow ever, within 
the comparative methodological approaches, structured focus comparison 
seems to suit the thesis the best. This is because according to the 
structured focused comparison approach, “the comparative analysis of 
cases is both structured and focused-focused because it deals selectively 
with only certain aspects of historical case and structured because it
Ibid.
^ A. Lipjhart, “Comparative Politics and the Comparative Method", in The American 
Political Science Review. September 1971, Vol. 65, No. 3, p684.
G Satori, “Concept Misformation in Comparative Politcs”, in The American Political 
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employs general questions to guide the data collection and analysis in the 
historical cases”. T h u s ,  this method will contribute to hypothesis 
building.
Thus, the chosen methodology of research for this thesis is the 
‘structured focus comparison’ approach, which was first developed by 
Alexander L. George in 1979.
This methodology provides structure through 
explicit definitions of key terms, provides focus 
by selecting a set of hypotheses to consider and 
provides comparison through a set of case studies, 
with the intention of discovering causal patterns
Within this thesis the methodology will provide a structure through 
explicit definition of key terms used, such as political assassinations. It is 
necessary to correctly categorise what is meant by a political 
assassination. Furthermore, the thesis will try to analyse whether political 
assassinations can be justified by the typology of justifications offered in 
the thesis. In other words, the case studies analysed in this thesis will be 
tested against the classification of a political assassination and 
justifications offered for a political assassination. There are a number of 
competing methodological approaches. Aside from the structured 
focused comparison, there are the qualitative, quantitative and statistical
Alexendra George, “Case Studies and Theory Development: The Method of 
Structured, Focused Comparison", edited by Lawier in Diplomacy: New Approaches in 
History, Theory and Policy (New York: Free Press, 1979) p61-62.
^  Eric Herring, Danger and Opportunity Explaining International Crisis Outcomes. 
(Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1995) p4.
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approaches. All four approaches will be briefly explained in order to 
establish which method is best suited for this thesis.
The concept of theory development that George discusses in his 
article is very interesting, as this is important in order to arrive at the 
right conclusions. One the first things Alexander George explains in his 
article is that “the task is to convert lessons of history into a 
comprehensive theory that encompasses the complexity of the 
phenomenon or activity in question”. It is important to learn from 
lessons in history in order to develop a theory which would
attempt to absorb the “lessons” of a variety of 
historical cases within a single comprehensive 
analytical framework; it is the task of theory to 
identify the many conditions and variables that 
affect historical outcomes and to sort out the 
casual patterns associated with different historical 
outcomes. By doing so, theory accounts for the 
variance in historical outcomes; it clarifies the 
apparent inconsistencies and contradictions among 
the “lessons” of different cases by identifying the 
critical conditions and variables that differed from 
one case to the other^ "^
83 Ibid. p43.
Ibid. p44.
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This thesis attempts to do just that with political assassinations. The 
attempt is to absorb lessons from political assassinations in history and 
use the methodology to identify the common variables between different 
political assassinations. This thesis will also use the methodology to 
identify the differences in the various political assassinations examined. 
One cannot forget that forms of theory development do suffer from 
problems and “many scientists now believe that a variety of methods, 
qualitative as well as quantitative, must be employed in developing 
knowledge and theory”.^  ^ It is argued by scientists today that it better to 
group similar events in order to develop scientific generalisations and 
laws. However, “historians can offer the objection that to take an instance 
of a certain type of phenomenon out of its individual historical context 
may well distort explanation and understanding of the single case”.^  ^
Many historians believe that it would also lead to false generalisations. 
Furthermore, “the recognition that even unique cases can contribute to 
theory development strengthens, of course, the linkage between history 
and political science”.^ ^
One of the main aspects of the controlled comparison method is 
that it deals with too few cases. Therefore, “ the controlled comparison 
method encounters certain problems having to do with the fact that while 
the investigator is interested in many variables has only a few cases” 
with which to work. However, as Lijphart points out “intensive analysis 
of a few cases may be more rewarding than a more superficial statistical
Ibid. p44.
Ibid. p45.
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analysis of many cases”. This is the aim of the thesis in which only 
three cases are analysed with the aim of formulating generalisations 
regarding the phenomenon.
George notes that there must be prerequisites for single case 
studies or controlled comparisons to contribute to theory development. 
He states it is necessary to first “employ the “disciplined-configurative” 
mode of analysis”.^ ® This means that the types of cases that are chosen 
should have general similarities for the purposes of description and 
explanation. The next prerequisite “is that the investigator define 
adequately the “class” of events/phenomenon for which he is attempting 
to develop explanatory theory”.®^ This will enable the investigator to 
identify the events and help concentrate on the issue. “A third 
prerequisite is that the investigator be selective and focused in his 
treatment of a case,”^^  and thereby the investigator can choose cases from 
which he/she can deduce the theoretical relevance.
Furthermore, George mentions that three phases are involved in 
any study. These phase are:
Phase 1 is the design and structure of the study are 
formulated. In Phase 2 the individual case studies 
are carried out in accord with the design. In Phase 
3 the investigator draws upon results of the case
'"Ibid. p50. 
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studies in order to assess, reformulate, or elaborate
the initial theory stated in Phase 1
According to George, five tasks are involved in the first phase. The first 
task is to establish the research problems and objectives of the study. In 
this thesis the objective of the study is to develop a typology of political 
assassinations. There are a number of existing theories to be examined 
and specific aspects are analysed in further detail. The second task 
involves identifying the conditions and variables to be examined in the 
structured comparison. In this thesis, one of the main conditions to be 
analysed is whether or not political assassinations are justified. The third 
task entails choosing appropriate cases for the study.®"^  For example, the 
case studies in this thesis were chosen because they all took place in very 
different cultures. The fourth task is the identification of “casual patterns 
between various outcomes of the dependent variable and various 
configurations of independent and intervening variables” .^  ^ Finally, the 
fifth task involves the recognition of general questions which are to be 
asked in the study, which in the case of this thesis will entail defining 
political assassination and finding any justification behind political 
assassinations.
Phase 2 involves examining the case studies, in accordance with 
requirements set out in task 5. In this thesis, case studies will thus aim to 
answer the general questions set out in the beginning. Phase 3 involves
"^Ibid.p54.
“appropriate in the light of specifications made in tasks 1 and 2”. George, Ibid. p55. 
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“drawing the theoretical implications of the case studies”. The main 
points of the case studies are examined to establish the casual patterns 
that may appear. As the cases under analysis are from various cultures 
the aim is to find the casual patterns that may exist from case to case.
For George, controlled comparison creates a “rich, differentiated 
theory”.^  ^ Paul Diesing says, “controlled comparison is particularly 
suited for developing typological theory”.^  ^The controlled comparison is 
well suited for classifying political assassinations, as a “variety of 
different causal patterns” can be identified along with “the conditions 
under which each distinctive type of causal pattern occurs”.^  ^This would 
enable a better understanding of each of the cases of political 
assassination under study, as well as for other instances of assassinations. 
Finally, George states that “using a standardized set of questions in the 
controlled comparisons is necessary to assure acquisition of comparable 
data from the several cases”.^  ^ Thus, the aim is that by asking 
standardised questions the cases will reveal similarities among them.
After a brief discussion of the comparative approach it is 
important to remember that the aim of the approach is to identify 
diversities present in all of the cases. It should be noted that “comparative 
researchers usually initiate their research with a specific set of cases in 
mind.” ®^® This is to ensure that the cases selected fit perfectly within the 
study and are of interest to a wide range of audience. However, “it is 
important, for the cases selected to be comparable and to share
Ibid. p59.
""Ibid.
"'Ibid. p60.
""Ibid. p62.
Ragin, op.cit. 113.
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membership in a meaningfiil, empirically defined category”.^ ®' This 
thesis will analyse the political assassinations of Anwar Sadat, Yitzhak 
Rabin and Rajiv Gandhi. All three were from different countries, and 
they all practised different religions: Islam, Judaism and Hinduism 
respectively. The diversity of the cases might also serve to highlight 
similarities that may arise between the three case studies. Comparative 
research is “well suited for the exploring of exploring diversity, 
interpreting cultural or historical significance, and advancing theory”.^ ®^ 
And it is for this reason that the approach is adopted here. Another 
strategy “is to categorize cases according to their different outcomes”.*®^ 
Within the context of this thesis, it is assumed that once the cases are 
analysed there will be a diverse range of conclusions. Thus, “this focus 
on circumscribed categories makes the comparative strategy well suited 
for the goal of interpreting historically or culturally significant 
phenomenon, especially when there is a moderate number of cases”. ^®"^ 
Yet again it can be concluded that the comparative approach is the best 
one to use for this research as it illustrates the differences and similarities 
that exist between the cases examined in this thesis. Finally, the reason 
for limiting the number of cases is to allow for diversity in analysis, yet 
to make sure that the analysis does not get uncontrolled. Three cases will 
allow the results to be varied yet controlled. Apart from the above - 
mentioned reasons for choosing this approach, there are “several basic 
features of the comparative approach make it a good strategy for
Ibid. p i 13. 
Ibid. pl08. 
Ibid. pl09. 
^"'^Ibid.pllO.
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advancing theory”. These include: “its use of flexible frames, its explicit 
focus on the causes of diversity, and its emphasis on the systematic 
analysis of similarities and differences in the effort to specify how 
diversity is patterned”.
Within a comparative framework there is always a specific 
analytical frame, which for this thesis is the classification of a political 
assassination. However, there are a number of other research questions in 
addition to the three hypotheses which will be examined in this thesis. 
For example, what are political assassinations? Can political 
assassinations be justified? These questions can be answered, “by 
altering initial frames in response to evidence”: comparative research 
“refines” and “expands” ideas and “theoretical perspectives” aheady in 
use.^ ®^
Having addressed all the reasons which make this approach the 
most suitable to use for this research it is important to realise that the 
comparative approach also has a few negative points. Przeworski and 
Teune state: “Although the number of differences among similar 
countries is limited, it will almost invariably be sufficiently large to over 
determine the dependent phenomenon” ®^^
This implies that although the cases of political assassinations 
which will be analysed in this thesis will have limited differences, the 
differences will still be large enough to outclass any large similarity. 
“Second, the comparative method is said to lead to no more than partial
Ibid. p i l l .
Ibid. p i 12.
Arend, op.cit. p i72.
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generalisation, while the real need is to fashion generalisation of 
universal scope and validity”.*®^ This is true, but the fact remains that 
limited comparative research offers a starting point for partial 
generalisations which can be stepping stones to wider generalisations. 
“A third criticism, related to the first one, is formulated by Holt aud 
Turner. They argue that closely comparable cases are so rare that the 
research site is likely to dictate the hypothesis.. .”*®^ Holt and Turner are 
correct in saying that it is difficult to find comparable cases. This means 
that a researcher will try to find cases which would prove the hypothesis. 
However, this is not just a problem with the comparative method as it is 
possible for the researcher to choose cases which may suit the hypothesis 
using other methods as well. Although it is possible that the researcher 
could acknowledge this and prevent the hypothesis dictating the research 
site, this is being fairly optimistic. Additionally, the comparative 
approach is considered very similar to the statistical approach. This is 
because this method also involves asking standardised, general questions 
of each case. Furthermore, it involves uncovering controlled relations, for 
instance, similarities and differences amongst cases. The main difference 
between the two approaches is that the statistical method uses a large 
number of cases compared to the comparative method where the numbers 
of cases used are small.
Finally, while examining methodology it is important to point out 
the difficulties that were faced in conducting the research. In most of the 
cases examined in this thesis it was difficult or impossible to carry out
Ibid
109 Ibid. pl72-173.
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research with the assassins, because they were either in prison, dead, or 
they would deny any involvement. As a result all my research had to be 
restricted to secondary sources. Furthermore, it was difficult to find 
enough relevant material on political assassinations that had already been 
carried out. Therefore, once again the research had to rely on secondary 
material. However, carrying out the research was not compromised in 
anyway and it was possible to analyse the cases properly, given the 
difficulties that were faced.
Thesis Structure
Chapter One will explore the variety of definitions and concepts of 
political assassinations found in past and contemporary literature in the 
field. There is some perplexity as to the precise definition of political 
assassination. This chapter analyses the different classifications of 
assassinations put forward by different scholars. Critical examinations of 
these classifications will establish whether or not these classifications can 
truly be referred to as political assassinations, or if they are other forms 
of killing. An effort is made also to define what is meant by an 
‘assassination event’. There has been much debate regarding the 
definition of the actual assassination process. Therefore, it is necessary to 
define the process within the thesis and distinguish it from other types of 
killing. Tyrannicide, for example, is a concept with which assassinations 
have been historically associated. This makes it necessary to properly 
understand what is understood by the concept of tyrannicide. The thesis
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seeks to determine also what is meant by terrorism, in order to make a 
clear distinction between political assassination and terrorism. Terrorist 
organisations commit political assassinations to achieve their political 
objectives but individuals also commit assassinations for political or 
personal reasons. The fact that political assassinations have been used by 
terrorist groups as a tactic is evident from the examples cited in the 
historical section above. For years, since scholars have found it difficult 
to put forward an exact definition of terrorism, this has created confiision. 
The primary intention in this chapter will be to clarify how political 
assassinations have factors that distinguish them from terrorism. It is 
important also to consider the overlapping features between the two. 
Thus, this section will entail the examination of key characteristics of 
terrorism.
Chapter Two will analyse the various justifications that can be 
found for political assassinations. The main theme throughout this 
chapter is to find out whether political assassinations can be justified. 
Thus, an attempt will be made to analyse the moral arguments behind 
committing political assassinations by trying to find a typology of 
justifications that can be offered for political assassinations. This will 
include analysing the different approaches which help to examine the 
justifications for war which may be applied to political assassinations. 
The chapter examines three categories of justifications: the instrumental 
justification, moral justification and terroristic justification.
Chapter Three is the first case study, which will analyse the 
assassination of Anwar Sadat. Chapter Four is the second case study.
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which will analyse the assassination of Rajiv Gandhi, and Chapter Five is 
the final case study which will be the analysis of the assassination of 
Yitzhak Rabin. The first half of each of the case studies will discuss the 
history behind the cases, the immediate causes behind the cases such as 
political, religious and economic reasons, the actual assassination event 
and the consequences of the assassination. The second half of the chapter 
will analyse the cases by trying to answer the three following questions:
• Can the assassinations analysed in the thesis be categorised as 
political assassinations?
• Can the justifications that are analysed within the thesis offer 
justifications for these political assassinations?
• Are political assassinations only successful as existential acts?
Furthermore, this thesis will then briefly examine the assassinations 
regime. This chapter will try to lay out the current position of the 
prohibitions that exist on assassinations. All the international agreements 
on the assassination regime will be analysed by considering the positive 
and negative aspects of each agreement. Finally, the chapter will state the 
implications of weakening and strengthening the regime.
In conclusion, the thesis will also examine the similarities and 
differences between the three assassinations, with particular reference to 
target, ideology and motives and aims. This is important because a proper 
understanding of the case studies would not be complete without looking 
at the above variables. The chapter will also describe what the thesis
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illustrated and how it was done. Finally, the thesis will briefly look at 
some of the questions that the international community needs to address 
in the current climate.
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Chapter 1 
The Study of Political Assassination
Political murder is basically different from other murders 
both in its motivation and in its consequences*^®
The study of political assassination has always been quite restricted. In fact, the 
work done in this field is limited to prominent names such as David C. Rapport’s 
Assassination and Terrorism***. Murray Clark Havens, Carl Leiden and Karl M. 
Schmitt’s The Politics of Assassinations**^. James F. Kirkham, Sheldon G. Levy, 
William J. Crotty’s Assassination and Political Violence**^ and Franklin Ford’s, 
Political Murder**"*. Why is the study of political assassination so restricted? 
Political assassinations, successful and attempted, often become the centre of 
global attention. Certain countries are not considered to be politically, 
economically and geographically important enough to make an impact on the 
world stage and do not attract attention of the same intensity that a political 
assassination elsewhere might. For example, the political assassination of 
Melchior Ndadaye, President of Burundi, did not attract much world attention as 
the political role of Burundi in the global arena is not as significant as, for 
example, the President of the United States. The political assassination of Rabin
Edelman and Simon, op.cit. p i99.
David C. Rapoport, Assassination and Terrorism (Toronto: T.H.Best Printing Company Ltd,
Murray Clark Havens, Carl Leiden, Karl M. Schmitt, The Politics o f Assassinations (New 
Jersey: Prentice Hall, 1970)
James F. Kirkham, Sheldon G. Levy, William J. Crotty’s Assassination and Political Violence.
A report to the National Commission on the causes and prevention o f violence (New York:
Praeger Publishers, 1970)
Franklin L Ford, Political Murder. From Tvrannicide to Terrorism (Cambridge: Haivard 
University Press 1985)
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attracted much more attention because the Middle East has been a centre of 
political turmoil and a focus of the world media for a long time. Although some 
political assassinations attract less attention, most political assassinations draw 
attention on the same level of other episodes of political violence or natural 
disasters. Political assassinations are important events, yet scholars have not 
shown a great deal of interest in promoting research in the field. This is in stark 
contrast to the amount of academic attention lavished upon terrorism. Political 
assassinations are often considered to be just another sub-field of terrorism which 
does not warrant separate study. Furthermore, studies of political assassinations 
are restricted by this lack of literature, which serves as a big disincentive for 
further research. This thesis tries to move beyond these limited parameters. It 
would be impossible, however, to research all aspects of political assassinations. 
Therefore, this thesis aims to answer very specific questions about political 
assassinations.
As Ward Thomas has observed “the issue of international assassination has 
surfaced with stiiking jfrequency”**^  in world history. Political assassination is 
often one of the tactics used by terrorist groups to achieve their goals. But 
individuals acting on their own who have no connection with any group, guerrilla 
groups and hired killers have also committed political assassinations. Therefore, it 
is not correct to assume that political assassinations are only committed by 
terrorists.**^ Whether it is effective as a political tactic is a matter of debate which 
this thesis will try to clarify. It is interesting to note, as Feieraband et al. state, that 
“assassination, no matter how nanowly or broadly conceived, belongs among a
Ward Thomas, “Norms and security, The case o f International Assassination”, in International 
Security Vol. 25, N o.l. Summer 2000. pl05.
’ Thereby distinguishing between political assassination and terrorism.
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larger class of politically aggressive and violent behaviour”.**^  Since 
assassinations are considered to be a sub-group of political violence they exist 
within two universes of aggressive behaviours. The first universe refers to severe 
incidents of internal conflict and lesser acts of political aggression. This includes 
elections, vacation of office, strikes, significant change of laws, arrests of 
insignificant persons, assassination, execution of insignificant persons, terrorism, 
sabotage and civil war to mention a few.**  ^These activities all experience a degree 
of political aggression. The second universe refers to more violent acts of political 
aggression. This includes riots and demonstrations, boycotts, repressive action 
against specific groups, sabotage, revolts, assassination, execution and so on.**^ *^ ® 
Another type of political assassination which needs to be briefly mentioned 
is the assassination of a political figure of one country by a political figure of 
another country. This can also be referred to as state-sponsored political 
assassination. The political figure could be either a governmental figure or a 
person who has acquired eminence by being politically active. This is not 
researched within this thesis, but this type of killing cannot be ignored, especially 
in light of recent events. The United States’ desire for a regime change in Iraq by 
ousting Saddam Hussein has raised the question of targeted killing of a head of 
government. According to international law, however, it is illegal for one country 
to politically assassinate the political leader of another country. Indeed the United 
Nations General Assembly has adopted a resolution called the ‘Convention on the
Ivo K Feierabend, Rosalind L Feierabend, Betty A Nesvold and Franz M Jaggar, “Political 
Violence and Assassination: A Cross-National Assessment”, edited by William Grotty in 
Assassination and Political Violence: A Staff Report. (Washington: Government Printing Press, 
1969) p82.
For further examples see Grotty op.cit. p82.
For further examples see Grotty op.cit. p83.
It should be noted that die term assassination comes up in both universes because it is possible 
to carry out an act o f assassination under each circumstance. This signifies that aggression o f any 
type can motivate the act of assassination.
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Prevention and Punishment of Crimes against Intemationallv Protected Persons, 
including Diplomatic Agents 3166 (XXVIID’ on 5**^ February, 1974.*^* The 
convention is clear about the protection offered to diplomatic persons and 
therefore any attack on such persons will be considered illegal. Furthermore, in the 
United States an executive order was passed in 1976 according to which “no 
person employed by or acting on behalf of the United States Government shall 
engage in, or conspire to engage in assassination”.*^  ^Before this executive order 
was passed “the United States supported a small number of plots to kill foreign 
leaders”. *^  ^ It is therefore important to remember that assassination committed by 
a state is also a political assassinations however, in most cases this type of 
assassination gains legitimacy because the state is a legitimate actor in the 
international system. This creates further confusion with the concept of political 
assassinations as it seems to confer legitimacy if carried out hy a state actor as 
opposed to a non - state actor. It is important to remember that under both 
circumstances carrying out an act of assassination is unjustifiable. As a result of 
such complexities it is essential to understand the concept of political 
assassinations. However, this issue will be tackled only briefly within the thesis as 
it is not the focus of the thesis.
The 1975 National Commission on Assassination and Political 
Violence by the United States gave a list of a number of categories of 
assassination, which they state as:
Robert A. Friedlander, TeiTorism Documents of International and Local Control. Volume 1, 
New York: Oceana Publications, 1979. p499. The complete details o f the convention can be found 
from pages 499-506,
Boyd M Johnson, “Exective Order 12,333: The Permissibility o f an American Assassination of 
Foreign Leader”, in Cornell International Law Journal, Volume 25, 1992. p403.
'""Ibid. p402.
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1. assassination by one political elite to replace without 
effecting any systemic or ideological change;
2. assassination for the purpose of terrorising and destroying 
the legitimacy of the ruling elite in order to effect substantial 
systemic or ideological change:
3. assassination by the government in power to suppress 
political challenge
4. assassination to propagandise a political and ideological 
point of view; or
5. assassination unconnected with rational political goals which 
satisfies only the pathological needs of the mentally disturbed 
attacker.* "^*
Political assassinations do not strictly fit into of any the five categories. However, 
the most accurate classification with regard to this thesis is the second category as 
it ties in with the three main elements, which are political motive, political figure 
and political consequence, required for an assassination to be categorised as a 
political assassination. Although the second category does not state clearly the 
importance of a political figure it is safe to assume that the only way to achieve 
substantial systemic or ideological change is if a prominent political figure is 
assassinated.
Kevin O’Brien, “The Use of Assassination as a Tool of State Policy: South Africa’s Counter- 
Revolutionary Strategy 1979-1992 (Part I)”, in Terrorism and Political Violence. Vol. 10, Summer 
1998, Number 2, p89.
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Definitions
Definitional clarity is crucial in research. The significance of correctly defined 
terms therefore cannot be underestimated. A broad range of definitions of the term 
'assassination' have been put forward by various scholars, fuelling confusion as to 
the distinction between assassination, murder, and terrorism. Due to the large 
number of definitions, it is essential to fully understand terms and concepts which 
ar e going to be analysed or play a key role in the research.
As Kevin O’Brien has argued, “Assassination is a generic term which has 
come to be commonly applied [very loosely in many cases, it must be added] to 
any politically-related killing; it is clear that a narrower definition must be 
found”. It is possible to define assassination in both narrow and broad terms. For 
example, an assassination can narrowly refer to a successful killing of a prominent 
political figure. In broader terms, “assassination” could include successful or 
unsuccessfiil, attempted or unattempted assassinations, assassination threats, 
assassination events, assassinations of prominent political figures or lesser known 
political figures like ministers, judges, generals etc, who have an important role in 
the political arena. Moreover, as Paul Wilkinson has stated, "the term murder or 
political murder is often used interchangeably with assassination".*^^ This is often 
misleading. As a result, this thesis will use a more precise definition of 
assassination excluding most forms of murder. Murders committed for monetary 
reasons for example, or by psychopaths, and assassinations consented to by 
governments or committed through rage or passion remain in the realm of ordinary
'""Ibid. p87-88.
'""Paul Wilkinson, Political Terrorists Always Resort to Political Murder. (Basingstoke:
Macmillan Press, 1974) p4.
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murder, as they are performed for personal as opposed to political (or here, 
religious and political) r easons .Al though  assassinations committed by the 
government are political assassinations, this thesis will concentrate on non-state 
actors who assassinate political actors. Similarly, political assassination should not 
be confused with politically - motivated murder, which entails mass killings and 
genocide.
It is also important to bear in mind that confusion exists on the role of the 
state using political assassination as a weapon. This leads to the blurring of the 
distinction between the use of force by state and non-state actors. After September 
11®' 2001, the United States has revoked its ban on killing any political figure on 
the basis that if there is any chance that the United States could be under threat in 
any formm, then they can assassinate in order to protect themselves. As a result, 
carrying out an assassination as a state actor seems to be permissible and a 
legitimate act. Whereas if the same act were carried out by a non - state actor for 
example, a terrorist group, then the act becomes illegitimate. This demonstrates the 
blurring of the issue of the distinction between state and non-state actors and the 
legitimate uses of force. Although this area is not the main argument within the 
thesis it is important to point out the issue before going any further.
Assassination
Austin Turk defines an assassination as "a politically motivated killing in which 
victims are selected because of the expected political impact of their dying".
The Concise Oxford Dictionary o f Current English, edited by H.W.Fowler and F.G. Fowler. 
(New York: Oxford Uniyersity Press, 1991) p64.
Austin Turk, ‘Assassination’ edited by Sanford H. Kadish in Encyclonaedia of Crime and 
Justice. (New York: Free Press, 1982) p83.
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Turk’s definition overlooks the political consequences of an assassination. As a 
result, this definition by Turk can be seen as not representing a precise definition 
of a political assassination. Wilkinson emphasises that an assassination is "a 
politically motivated act of killing aimed at a prominent political pe r son " . Here  
again, the definition seems not to address the question of political purpose. 
Wilkinson states that the assassination of a person would have political motives 
behind it and would have to involve a political figure but he does not mention the 
need for the assassination to have political repercussions. It seems that Turk, along 
with Wilkinson, confuse the two issues of political motive and political purposes. 
Nachman Ben Yehuda defines political assassination as
a form of violent and aggressive human behaviour, 
focused on taking somebody else’s life against that 
person’s wish to achieve a political goal, behaviour akin to 
murder, killing, blood-revenge, execution and the like.*^ ®
Yehuda’s definition makes no mention of the fact that the assassination should be 
targeted at a prominent political figure. There does not seem to be much point 
assassinating a person with no political importance, as this would not result in any 
political impact. This is essential for a political assassination. It would not 
otherwise achieve the desired political purpose. It is important to have a political 
motive for committing a political assassination, however, Yehuda’s definition 
seems to ignore the importance of a political motive behind a political 
assassination. Once again it makes us wonder whether there is fine line between
Wilkinson, ‘Political Terrorists’ op.cit. p6,
Nachman Ben Yehuda, “Political assassination as Rhetorical Devices: Events and 
Interpretations”, in Terrorism and Political Violence. Vol.2 No.3 August 1997 p324.
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political motive and political purpose, or do some scholars confuse the two issues? 
Saul K. Padover defines assassination as, “the trucidation of a political figure 
without due process of law”.*^ * This definition by Padover seems to completely 
miss what constitutes a political assassination which requires a political motive, 
political goal and a prominent political figure. One important point which he does 
make in his definition occurs that an assassination is without due process of law.
Yehuda has put forward a working definition of a political 
assassination whereby:
political assassination or execution is a rhetorical device 
which is used socially to construct and interpret (that is, to 
make a culturally meaningful account of) the discriminate, 
deliberate, intentional, and serious attempt(s), whether 
successful or not, to kill a specific social actor for political 
reasons having something to do with the political position 
or role of the victim, his symbolic —moral universe, and 
with the symbolic-moral universe out of which the 
assassin/s acts(s). This universe generates the legitimacy 
and justifications required for the act, which are usually 
presented in quasi-legal terms. However, decisions to 
assassinate are typically not the result of a fair legal 
procedure, based on ‘due process’.
_ ^  Padover, “Patterns of Assassination in Occupied Territoiv”, in The Public OniriionOuarterlv. Winter, 1943. p680. --------------------------
Yehuda, “Political Assassinations as Rhetorical Devices”, op.cit. p333-334.
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In this particular definition, rhetorical deviance is explained as a term used 
specifically to describe a particular act of killing. It enables one to extract a 
cultural meaning, that is “the term ‘rhetorical device’ enables us to keep some 
distance firom the event itself and yet give room for a real and indigenous cultural 
interpretation”.*^  ^ The definition explains that political assassinations are 
deliberate, carefully planned, and have a specific target. He does state that the 
target is chosen for political reasons but does not stress the importance of the 
target being a prominent political person. The impact of an assassination of a 
prominent political figure, for example, heads of state, or members of parliament, 
would be greater than if a less - well known political figure was involved. In 
certain cases, there are assassination attempts on lesser known political figures but 
in such cases there is no immediate political goal that needs to be achieved. It may 
succeed in so far as it draws attention to a particular cause. Also, the importance of 
prominent figures is vital, "since the killing of lesser members of the political 
community is included within a wider category of internal political turmoil, 
namely terrorism".*^"* Thus, this stresses the distinction between assassinating a 
prominent person and lesser - known political figure, as the political impact of the 
former would be greater. As a result, assassinating a less -prominent figure would 
fall into a broader category. Finally, it is also important that the target is a 
prominent political figure, because only then would the assassination have any 
important political impact. At the very least the political assassination should be 
able to draw public attention to the cause.
In defining political assassination, Yehuda elucidates the importance of 
power and morality. This is very significant because concepts like power and
Ibid. p334.
Kirkham, Levy, Crotty, op.cit. p56.
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morality are rarely explicit in definitions of political assassinations. Nevertheless, 
it is generally the case that power is a primary motive behind any form of political 
violence, including political assassinations. To bring in the moral arguments while 
defining the concept adds to further confusion as the aim of defining terms is to 
understand them and bringing in moral issues results in mixing two different ideas. 
In other words, the moral side of political violence should be dealt with separately, 
so that it can be understood well and in the right context. Additionally, there are a 
few apparent criticisms. One is how hired assassins fit into the definition. It also 
does not specify who may be responsible for the killing.
Murray C. Havens, Carl Leiden and Karl M. Schmitt suggest “that 
assassination refers to the deliberate, extralegal killing of an individual for political 
puiposes”.*^  ^ There are two problems with this definition. First, it does not 
mention political motives as an important element of a political assassination. 
Secondly, the definition maintains that an assassination carried out on any 
individual is an assassination but this cannot be termed a political assassination if 
the individual is not a political figure.
Franklin L. Ford defines an assassination as “the intentional killing of a 
specified victim or group of victims, perpetrated for reasons related to his (her, 
his) public prominence and undertaken with a political purpose in mind”.*^  ^This 
definition ignores the political motives which may instigate the assassination.
Max Lemer claims that
assassination refers to those killings or murders, usually 
directed against individuals in public life, motivated by
Havens Leiden Schmitt, op.cit. p4. 
Ford, op.cit. p2.
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political rather than by personal 
relationships.. .Assassination is the deliberate, extralegal 
killing of an individual for political purpose.
This definition seems to be quite close to what a political assassination is. The 
definition clearly states first, that there should be a political motive behind a 
political assassination. Second, it states that the assassination should be directed 
against individuals in public life. Finally it says that assassinations are not legal 
acts. This definition contains all the elements needed to classify a killing as a 
political assassination.
For example, the politically - motivated killings of people of little 
importance, the killing of a king in an accident, or the murder of a politician by a 
thief cannot be categorised as political assassinations because they all lack the 
required motivations. Although the last example may have political consequences 
it cannot be categorised as a political assassination. The possible targets of 
political assassinations would thereby include heads and former heads of states, 
presidential candidates, judges, ambassadors, governors, cabinet ministers, 
military figures, generals and so on.*^^  These people are all prominent political 
figures, and there would have to be a political motive behind killing them, thus 
resulting in a potential political impact. Lemer’s definition will be adopted for the 
purposes of this thesis.
These are a few of the definitions of assassination that have been examined 
by scholars. Each definition that has been cited is not precise enough and thereby 
presents a flaw. However, it is important and interesting to note that all the above
Max Lemer, ‘Assassination’, edited by Edwin Seligman in Encyclopedia o f the Social Sciences 
Vol. 2. New York: Macmillan, 1930.
For further information see Feierabend, Feierabend, Nesvold and Jagger, op.cit. p57-58.
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mentioned definitions of assassination clearly point out that the political 
dimension, or motive, is central to the planning and execution of an assassination. 
In other words, "Most assassinations are politically motivated and can never be 
separated from the political context in which they occur; their impact, public and 
systemic, is political".*^® Thus, the definition of political assassination used in this 
thesis will emphasise the political motives underpinning the deliberate killing of a 
particular individual, usually a prominent figure in society, with a political 
purpose.
Kirkham, Levy and Crotty have pointed out three significant separate 
elements that are woven into the concept of an assassination. It is these three 
factors that distinguish a political assassination firom ordinary murder. These 
factors are:
(1) a target that is a prominent political figure;
(2) a political motive for the killing;
(3) the potential political impact of the death or escape firom
death, as the case may be.*"*®
It is, however, stated by Kirkham, Levy and Crotty that all political assassinations 
contain, to a greater or lesser extent, all three elements and that it is not necessary 
for all three factors to be responsible. They maintain that “all three elements, 
however, do not necessarily coexist”.*"** By contrast, this thesis argues that in the 
case of a political assassination, it is essential for all three factors to be present. If 
that is not the case then the killing cannot be categorised as a political
Havens, Leiden, Sclimitt, op.cit. p3. 
Kirkham, Levy, Crotty, op.cit. p i. 
Ibid.pl.
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assassination. It would still be debateable whether a murder that contains any one 
of the factors is a political assassination or not. However, in this thesis for a 
murder to be classified as a political assassination it would have to involve all 
three factors, as only when these three factors come together do we witness a 
political assassination.
Thus, the most important aspect that comes to the forefront after analysing 
all the definitions pertaining to political assassinations is that concept of political 
assassination is a contested issue. It is therefore difficult to nail one definition as 
being the best. One must analyse all the definitions as they all contain certain good 
points. Therefore, to pinpoint the perfect definition would be impossible.
Assassination Event
It is essential to understand the various components of a political assassination if 
we are to understand the phenomenon of political assassination. As a result it is 
important to understand the process behind a political assassination, because it is a 
separate issue from the assassination itself. This is referred to by the specific term 
“assassination event”. Feierabend et al. define an assassination event “as an act 
that consists of a plotted, attempted, or actual murder of a prominent political 
figure (elite) by an individual (assassin) who performs this act in other than a 
governmental role”*"*^. In other words, the term “political assassination event thus 
refers to an attempt to take someone’s life against his wish”.*"*^ It is important to 
remember that the target has to be a significant political person as the impact of the 
assassination would then be far greater than if it were any lesser - known political 
figure. Also as mentioned killing of, any lesser members of the political
Ibid. p56.
Yehuda, ‘Political Assassinations as a Rhetorical Device’, op.cit. p333
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community would be included within the definition of internal political turmoil, 
which basically refers to terrorism.*'*'* This is indispensable to understand the 
whole process of a political assassination irrespective of the actual assassination. 
That is not to say that one should ignore factors which might have influenced it. 
Kirkham et al. regard it as necessary to define what is meant by ‘an event’ for two 
reasons. The first reason is, “...it demarcates the act fi"om its cultural interpretation. 
Second, along the way, an important distinction is made between executions and 
assassinations”.*"*^ This implies first that an act of political assassination is an 
individual act, thus making it easier for the purpose of analysis. Secondly, the 
definition clearly distinguishes between an assassination committed by an 
individual or group who have no ties with the state, and by individuals or groups 
hired by the state to carry out assassinations (in other words, state - sponsored 
assassinations).
In addition to defining what is meant by an ‘assassination event’ this 
definition makes a clear distinction between a political execution and an 
assassination. It is, therefore, essential to define what is meant by an execution. 
“An execution may be regarded as a political killing, but it is initiated by the 
organs of the state, while an assassination can always be characterised as an illegal 
act”.*"*^ However, execution is not included within the parameters of this thesis. 
This is because an execution is strictly an act committed by a government with a 
legal basis.
For further reference see Crotty op.cit. p56.
Yehuda, ‘Political Assassinations as a Rhetorical Device’, op.cit. p333.
Ibid.
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Classification of political assassinations
There have been attempts by various scholars to classify assassinations in order to 
simplify their study. These classifications help us to understand the various 
possible ways of classifying assassinations, and which murders can be identified 
as political assassinations.
Kirkham, Levy and Crotty outline five types of assassinations:
• Elite substitution - the assassination of a political leader 
without a major systemic or ideological change visualised. This 
type typically refers to a power struggle when a particular 
leader is assassinated in order to replace him/her or those he 
/she represents in power with an opposing group at the same 
level.
• Tyrannicide - the assassination of a despot in order to 
replace him with a better, usually less oppressive, more rational 
ruler; this is one of the oldest forms of assassination, one which 
has inspired many moral and philosophical justifications.
• Terroristic assassination - assassination on a mass and 
indiscriminate basis in order to demonstrate the government’s 
inability to rule, or to let a minority govern a majority.
• Anomic assassination - assassination of a political figure for 
private reasons. A common example is the lone assassin who 
uses political rhetoric to justify the act, but appears to 
demonstrate a psychiatric disorder.
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• Propaganda by deed - assassination which aims to direct 
attention to a specific problem.*"*^
All of the above classifications are based on motivation, which makes this the 
most appropriate classification. It is by no means the best classification. A 
political assassination requires the three characteristics which have been 
mentioned earlier in the chapter. What would have improved the classification 
would be if elite substitution would actually imply the assassination of a political 
leader with a major systemic or ideological change visualised, and if terroristic 
assassination implied the deliberate killing of people.
In this thesis political assassination is considered to involve an integration 
of specific aspects of elite substitution, tyrannicide and propaganda by deed. Elite 
substitution would require the assassination to be directed against a political 
figure with at least an attempt at instituting systemic and ideological change. 
Political assassination is definitely indicative of a power stmggle to replace the 
individual in power. However, this replacement does not necessarily mean the 
substitution of a similarly ranked individual in an opposing group. Political 
assassination does not necessarily imply the replacement of a person, since a case 
may arise when a leader is assassinated without there being a replacement in 
mind. If the assassination takes place with a replacement in mind, this indicates 
the assassin hopes the replacement will be a better leader. As a result, this is 
linked to tyrannicide, as the political leader could be a despot who will be 
replaced by a better, rational and less oppressive individual. Finally, propaganda 
by deed is important because a political assassination is targeted towards a
All the following points are taken from Nachman Ben Yehuda article Political Assassinations 
as Rhetorical Devices; Events and Interpretations.p343.
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particular individual who represents or pursues specific political issues, which are 
not considered legitimate. This is one of the best classifications of political 
assassinations that can be found. Thus, particular aspects of the above three 
characteristics are needed for a proper explanation of an assassination.
Nachmen Ben Yehuda classifies political assassinations on the basis of 
assassination events. He puts forward four categories of political assassination 
events. They are as follows;
• First is the pre planning of a political assassination.
This implies that the entire event has been contemplated but 
has not been plamied.
• Second is planning whereby the assassination has been 
planned but no attempt has been made to actually commit 
the assassination.
• Third is an unsuccessful assassination. The event was 
contemplated and there was a plan but the assassination 
was not properly carried out and therefore did not produce 
desired results.
• The fourth type is a successful assassination. As the 
name suggests this implies that the victim was killed or 
wounded as a result of an assassination.*"*^
This is not in any way a classification of political assassinations. It does prompt 
the question of how it can contribute to classifying political assassinations. The
148 Yehuda, Political Assassinations as Rhetorical Devices’, op.cit.
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above categories can be considered as important and practical divisions of 
political assassination events. Despite the obvious shortcoming in the
classification, it suffers from other problems. The drawback of such a
classification seems to be that it does not reveal any other characteristics of 
assassinations. In other words, elements which need to exist for a murder to be 
classified as a political assassination, are not stated. This classification illustrates 
whether an assassination is planned or not, and whether it is successful or 
unsuccessful. Once again, in no way does this allow an assassination to be termed 
a political assassination. As a result, it is difficult to classify an assassination as 
political by the assassination event. Hence, the above classification system is not 
an accurate and reliable way of classifying political assassinations.
By contrast, Oscar Jaszi classifies political assassinations and other forms 
of political murder on the basis of motives. These can be identified as the 
following:
• An assassination committed for personal reasons without 
any political aims. The primary motivations behind committing 
such assassinations are jealousy, anger, hatred other personal 
sentiments. The only political aspect of this type of
assassination is that it is targeted against a prominent political
figure.
• Murder committed in order to seize power for gratification 
of power or the advantages with having power.
• The third type is diplomatic assassinations. The removal of 
dangerous opponents.
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• Political murder committed for reasons of state.
• Political murder connected to religious issues and often 
related to religious fanaticism and the pursuit of power.
• Finally, murder driven by nationalism which is related to a 
struggle for constitutionalism and republicanism.*"*^
Jaszi’s classification is very interesting, but it is not only a classification of 
political assassination, but also of political murder. In a sense it confuses the two 
issues. Political murder includes different types of murders from assassinations to 
random killing. As has been aheady established, political assassination is a 
specific form of murder. All the motives stated by Jaszi are legitimate factors 
which could promote an assassination and not just a political assassination. 
Motives could include any of the above, but each case undoubtedly has to have an 
underlying political motive. That is to say that the motives included above are not 
all political and this is a necessary aspect of a political assassination. The first 
category could never comprise a political assassination as a murder committed 
against a prominent figure for personal reasons cannot be considered a political 
assassination. This is against the very nature of a political assassination. Similarly, 
murders committed for gratification of power, diplomatic reasons, reasons of 
state, religious issues and nationalism do not contain the three essential factors of 
a political assassination.
Richard B. Laney states that “since assassination is a means to an end and 
since the ends of politics are legion, there is practically no limit to the different 
kinds of assassinations if  they are classified by motive”. Laney accepts Jaszi’s
149 Oscar Jaszi and John D. Lewis, Against the Tvrant (Glencoe: The Free Press, 1957) chapter 14 
pl51-155.
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classification but adds his own points to the classification of political 
assassination. He classifies political assassinations in the following way:
• It firstly depends on the number of assassins. That is 
whether it is one, a few or many assassins.
• Secondly, whether the intended victim was tyrannical or not.
• Political assassination maybe either ‘oligarchic’ or 
‘plebeian’, ‘dynastic’ or ‘revolutionary’ depending on whether 
it grows out of a power struggle between small groups of men 
at the top of the social pyramid or between the top and bottom 
of the pyramid.
• Political assassinations are also classified on the basis of 
ideology.
• Political assassinations are committed according to character 
of people.*^®
Laney’s first classification is somewhat irrelevant. It really is immaterial how 
many assassins are involved. It only helps to establish whether the assassin acted 
on his own or if he was he associated with a group. An assassination cannot be 
termed a political assassination according to the number of people involved in the 
act. The number of people does not effect the victim’s prominence, the political 
motive or the political impact. Therefore, in this case, a murder cannot be 
categorised as a political assassination as it does include the elements which are 
necessary for a political assassination. Secondly, it does not matter if the victim
Richard B. Laney, Political Assassination; The History of an Idea (Michgan: Microfilm, 1966) 
pl7-19.
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was tyrannical or not, because, as far as the assassin was concerned, the victim 
was tyrannical and therefore had to be killed. Classifying assassinations according 
to a political system is not important as all political assassinations are about 
power. As a result, the system under which they were committed is irrelevant. 
However, a classification based upon ideologies reveals an incredible amount of 
information about whether the assassination was political or not. Insight is given 
into the beliefs that the assassin possessed, which might have prompted him to 
carry out a political assassination. These beliefs could form the political 
motivation behind a political assassination. The character of a person is 
completely irrelevant. An assassin’s character cannot make an assassination 
political in nature. For carrying out the act of assassination it does not matter if the 
assassin is mentally ill or just happens to firmly believe in his ideology.
Finally, James W. Clarke presents a very different type of classification. He 
has organised assassinations on the basis of types of assassins:
• Type I assassins view their acts as a probable sacrifice of 
self for a political ideal. They are fully cognisant and accepting 
of the meaning, implications, and personal consequences of 
their acts. Inherently personal motives, such as a neurotic need 
for recognition, are secondary to their primary political 
purpose.
• Type II assassins are persons with overwhelming and 
aggressive egocentric needs for acceptance, recognition, and 
status. There is none of the cognitive distortion associated with 
psychoses. Emotionally they are characterised by moderately
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high levels of reality-based anxiety that exerts a strong 
influence on their behaviour. Without delusion, they fully 
appreciate and accept the personal consequences of their acts.
• Type III assassins are psychopaths (or sociopaths) who 
believe that the condition of their lives is so intolerable, 
meaningless and without purpose, that destruction of society 
and themselves is desirable for its own sake.
• Type IV assassins are characterised by severe emotional and 
cognitive distortion that is expressed in hallucinations and 
delusion of persecution and/or grandeur. Their contact with 
reality is so tenuous that they are usually unable to grasp the 
significance of their actions or understand the response of the 
others to them.*^*
Most importantly, assassinations cannot be categorised in terms of the assassins 
who commit them. As this does not in any way make an assassination political in 
nature. Thus, only type I can be categorised as involving a political assassination, 
as the assassination is directed against a prominent political figure and political 
purpose is the primary motive for committing the act. As far as type II, III and IV 
are considered, the assassinations are directed towards political figures but the 
motives are often personal. Furthermore, the assassins in cases II, III and IV are 
people who are mentally ill or disturbed. As a result, these types do not conform 
with the three essential factors needed in a political assassination. Therefore, only 
type I can be considered as a political assassination.
James W. Clarke, American Assassins The Darker Side of Politics. (Princeton: Princeton 
Univeristy Press, 1982)
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Tyrannicide
“Tyrannicide was a self sacrificing act for public benefit (and so morally 
esteemed); common assassination, its opposite, namely, a self-serving act for 
private gain (and correspondingly censured). Terrorist assassinations, though 
similarly condemned, raise a special problem since they purport to be self denying 
acts for the public good”.^ ^^
Rule by tyrants and tyrannicide have been recorded throughout history. The 
word tyrant originates from the Greek word “turranos” meaning tyrant. A tyrant 
was a “strongman or dictator who seized the reins of power in a city and controlled 
its government”. It can be said that tyrant in those days was seen as a ruler who 
would govern the country while looking after the interests of the people, so “a 
tyrant was not necessarily considered to be bad if he exercised his autocratic 
authority in a manner beneficial for the city”.^ "^^  Thus proving the point in the 
quotation at the beginning of this section. However, it would appear that since 
these times, the idea of what a tyrant is has changed. In recent history Anwar 
Sadat, Yitzhak Rabin and Rajiv Gandhi were considered to be tyrants in the worst 
sense by a section of the population. The leaders were seen as oppressive towards 
their people as they were pursuing policies that some considered did not suit the 
people.
David George, “Distinguishing Classical Tyrannicide From Modem Terrorism”, in Review of  
Politics V ol:50,1988. p390.
Michael W. Taylor, The Tyrant Slavers. The Heroic Image in Fifth Centurv B.C. Athenian Ait 
and Politics (Salem: Ayer Company. Publishers Inc, 1991) p xii 
Taylor, op.cit. pxii.
This will be explained in greater detail in the case studies.
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One of the first acts of tyrannicide recorded was in Athens in 514 B.C. 
when Harmodios and Aristogelton assassinated Hipparchus, the tyrant of Athens. 
Hipparchus was considered to be the weakest ruler in the Peisistratid tyranny. He 
was murdered in broad daylight during the Panathenaic Festival. An important 
point that comes to the forefront is that “both Herodotus and Thucydides our most 
renowned sources for the historical events of ancient Greece, down play the event, 
noting that this assassination failed to put an end to tyranny”. During the rule by 
this dynasty Athens saw a period of peace and stability. It is important to 
remember that “while Harmodios and Aristogeiton did make an attempt to 
overthrow the tyranny, the assassination was primarily motivated by a private 
personal quarrel”. I t  is questionable, therefore, how self - sacrificing the actors 
were being and whether the killing can be considered an assassination.
This example shows that, when the people felt that they were being ruled 
by a tyrant and that living under such conditions were becoming unbearable, they 
decided to get rid of the tyrant. It can be seen in the historical section discussed in 
the introduction that most of the assassinations in the past were carried out because 
the leaders were tyrants. Political assassinations were carried out against tyrants. 
Keeping in mind the three important concepts of political assassinations : the 
person, motive, and the consequences, there is a fine line between tyrannicide and 
a political assassination. This makes it necessary to define what is meant by 
tyrannicide. According to Ford “if assassination represents only one kind of 
political murder, tyrannicide denotes more limited still, a circle within a circle 
within a circle”. From this statement it can be seen that although assassinations 
and tyrannicide might be very similar, there is a difference between the two. Also,
Taylor, op.cit. pxii.
'^ ’ Ibid.
Ford, op.cit. p2.
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sometimes tyrannicide can be considered as a subcategory of an assassination. 
This difference needs to be recognised in order to avoid confusion. Tyrannicide is, 
therefore, a very specific action, the killing of a tyrant in order to put an end to the 
tyranny. An act of tyrannicide, of course, will not always be successful. In the case 
of Hipparchus it is clearly seen that the tyrannicide did not put an end to the rule of 
tyranny.
Niccolo Machiavelli, in his book ‘The Prince’, interestingly establishes the 
relation between the Prince and his subjects. Machiavelli states what a Prince must 
do in order to remain in power;
If the ruler wants to keep hold of his new possessions, he 
must bear two things in mind: first, that the family of the 
old prince must be destroyed: next, that he must change 
neither their laws nor their taxes.
This implies that the new rule should be similar to the old rule. With this in mind, 
parallels may be drawn between the Prince and the contemporary ruler. The 
lessons that can be drawn are that a contemporary ruler, in order to retain his 
power, must eliminate political rivals.
Machiavelli also notes the importance of how the Prince should make sure 
that his people do not hate him, while making “himself feared in such a way that, 
if he is not loved, at least he escapes being hated”. This, it would seem, 
represents a good Prince.
Niccolo Machiavelli, The Prince (London: Penguin Books Ltd, 1995) p7. 
'""Ibid. p53.
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He will be hated above all if, as I said, he is rapacious and 
aggressive with regard to the property and the women of his 
subjects^
In the contemporary world, most rulers do not seem to follow Machiavelli advice. 
In some cases, rulers introduce policies which may make the people hate them. 
Rulers manage this hate and it only manifests itself in a minority of the 
population. As a result, this hate does not effect the ruler in a great way. 
Furthermore,
He will be despised if he has a reputation for being fickle, 
fi'ivolous, effeminate, cowardly, irresolute: a prince should 
avoid this like the plague and strive to demonstrate in his 
actions grandeur, courage, sobriety, strength.
This seems to apply quite well. Today most mlers seem to realise that the position 
requires them to possess traits like being strong and having courage and dignity. It 
is only then that a ruler’s power can survive. A ruler “should appear as a man of 
compassion, a man of good faith, a man of integrity, a kind and a religious man”^^  ^
to those around him. Machiavelli places immense importance on religion and this 
can be identified in today’s world particularly with respect to the case studies 
chosen for study. Another important point he makes is “...there are two ways of 
fighting: by law or by force. The first way is natural to men, and the second to
Ibid. p57. 
Ibid. p57. 
Ibid. p56.
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beasts”. He thereby, implies that both options are available to men and that they 
need to make use of both for best results, Machiavelli states that “there are two 
things that a prince must fear: internal subversion from his subjects; and external 
aggression by foreign powers”. T h i s  last point is something that a contemporary 
ruler is constantly aware of today. However, it is important to remember that 
“unlike an ordinary political assassination which is said to be invariably for private 
benefit, tyrannicide was always supposed to be undertaken by private men pro 
bona publico" ' I t  was a public act for private reasons. This does not conform 
with what constitutes a political assassination as a political assassination cannot be 
committed for private reasons.
There is one important difference that can be highlighted while analysing 
tyrannicide and political assassination. Unlike with case in modem political 
assassination, after an act of tyrannicide was committed, Greek and Roman 
traditions dictated a celebration of the act. “Honouring tyrannicides (even the 
unsuccessftil) and eulogizing their patriotic deeds has been an enduring and 
prominent feature in the Western political tradition.. Whereas with a political 
assassination, the effort has always been to keep the event as quiet as possible.
David George is quite right in pointing out the continuity between 
tyrannicide and terrorism. He is of the opinion that the phenomenon of tyrannicide 
made way for terrorism “at some point in the past tyrannicide (the antecedent) 
ends and terrorism (the consequent) begins”. I t  seems that the distinguishing 
line between the two events is thin. Where does one separate the two? Tyrannicide 
was specifically directed towards a figure in power. Whereas, in sharp contrast.
Ibid. p54. 
'"^Ibid.p57.
David George, op.cit. p391. 
Ibid. p394.
Ibid. p396.
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terrorism is not necessarily specifically targeted against a person in power, and 
modem terrorism is typically directed towards civilian populations. As there are a 
number of mlers who can be identified as tyrants, it is still possible to carry out 
tyrannicide. Modem assassinations directed against mlers may be seen as 
tyrannicides. However, these contemporary assassins are not considered heroes by 
the majority of the population. Also, “it is tme by definition that a democratic 
majority can never be a tyranny by usurpation since the only lawful title to power 
in a democracy is winning at least 51 per cent of the vote”.^ ^^  It is quite accurate 
to say that “Democracy is thus opposed and outbid in the name of a higher 
democracy, and the right of resistance invoked in terrorist assassination is said to 
be a “modem version of tyiannicide” when authentic tyrannicide of predemocratic 
Europe is no longer possible”. As a result, the political assassinations analysed 
within the course of this thesis can account for modern day tyrannicide.
Terrorism
Having illustrated what is meant by assassination, we can now move on to what 
constitutes terrorism and how political assassinations relate to terrorism. 
Historically, the term “terrorism” is derived from the regime de la terreur which 
existed in France during the French Revolution. The aim was to annihilate the 
enemies of the revolution, and to restore order in the anarchical society that 
followed the uprising of 1789. The regime de la terreur “was an instmment of 
govemance wielded by the recently established revolutionary state”. A t  this 
point in time, terrorism was viewed positively by some, as opposed to the negative
Ibid. p398. 
Ibid. p 399.171 Hoffman, ‘Inside Terrorism’, op.cit. pl5.
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image it has today. It shared, however, two common characteristics with modem 
day terrorism the first of which was that regime de la terreur was not random nor 
indiscriminate as terrorism is commonly thought to be today, but was systematic 
and deliberate. Secondly, its goal and its justification were to create a society just 
like political terrorism aims to do today. This thesis will define terrorism as "the 
deliberate creation and exploitation of fear through violence or the threat of 
violence in the pursuit of political change".
Defining terrorism has perplexed scholars, from Grant Wardlaw and Paul 
Wilkinson to Walter Laqueur, for many years. There is no common definition 
agreed upon by scholars. Terrorism is a term used in very different ways. Paul 
Wilkinson divides terrorism into four different types -  criminal, psychic, war, and 
political terrorism. These distinctions are very effective, as they help to nanow 
down the concept of terrorism to political terrorism.According to Wilkinson, 
political terrorism is “the systematic use of murder and destruction, and the threat 
of murder and destruction in order to terrorise individuals, groups, communities or 
governments into conceding to terrorists demands”. T h e  definition does not 
consider the importance of power involved in terrorist tactics. Also, the definition 
does not highlight the significance of political goals that are the main part of a 
terrorist’s aim. Grant Wardlaw’s definition of political terrorism is
the use, or threat of use, of violence by an individual or a 
group, whether acting for or in opposition to established 
authority, when such action is designed to create extreme 
anxiety and/or fear-inducing effects in a target group larger
172 Ibid. p43
For further reference see Paul Wilkinson, Political Terrorism (London: Macmillian, 1974). 
Paul Wilkinson, Terrorism and Liberal State (London: Macmillian, 1977) p49.
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than the immediate victims with the purpose of coercing 
that group into acceding to the political demands of the
perpetrators 175
Wardlaw makes an important point by stating that the use or threat of violence can 
be for, or in opposition to, an established authority. The use or threat of violence 
by an established authority is in most cases overlooked. Terrorism is mostly 
conducted in order to destroy governments. This is seen as the stepping stone 
towards fulfilling desired goals. Significantly, “a terrorist will shoot somebody 
even though it is a matter of complete indifference to him whether that person 
lives or dies.”^^  ^The idea of fear is an integral part of a terrorists aim:
Terrorism is used in order to create fear; but it is aimed at 
creating fear in order that the fear, in turn, will lead 
somebody else -  not the terrorist -  to embark on some 
quite different program of action that will accomplish 
whatever it is that the terrorist really desires^
More specifically terrorism is about gaining, and the use of, power “to achieve 
political change”. Terrorism is the use of violence as a means to fulfil a political 
aim.^^  ^ Characteristics of terrorism are: the use of violence, to inculcate fear, 
defined political objectives and the objective to make a profound impact on
Grant Wardlaw, Political Terrorism. Theory, tactics, and counter-measures (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1982) p i 6.
David Fromkin, ‘The Strategy o f Terrorism”, in International Terrorism, characteristics, causes, 
control edited by Charles W Kegley Jr. (St Martin’s Press, 1990) p60.
177
178 David Fromkm, op.cit. 60.Hoffman, ‘Inside Tenorism’, op.cit. (London: Victor Gollancz,1998) p l4.
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society. Over the years, terrorism has changed with respect to tactics, targets 
which makes it difficult to identify a set of people as terrorists. In the traditional 
sense, terrorism was not directed at gaining maximum casualties. Their actions had 
to be directed towards civilians but this was used mainly to draw attention to the 
cause. September 11*^  2001, demonstrated that in today’s world terrorists aie 
tiying to get maximum casualties. Due to modem technology terrorists are capable 
of causing mass destmction. These transformations have allowed terrorists “to 
enter the political arena on a new scale and to express ideological goals of an 
organised sort rather than mere crime, madness or emotional derangement as in the 
past”.^ ^^  Despite these changes, assassinations are still one tactic of terrorists.
Thus, it can be seen that there are a varied conceptions of what constitutes 
terrorism. It is not a simple concept. Every definition analysed above contains 
relevant points yet there is no definition that can provide a best explanation of 
terrorism. Therefore, defining terrorism poses similar problems to defining 
political assassination, and it can be concluded that it continues to be a contested 
concept.
Characteristics of Terrorism
It is obvious that terrorism is not in general a mindless phenomenon. It is a means 
to an end. Terrorism has a collective rationality. That is, terrorist groups share 
common goals and ideas and select similar modes of violence against their 
opponents. This proves that there is a unity in conception and in the course of 
action within a single terrorist group. In other words, terrorism is selected as the
‘^^David C Rapoport, Assassination and Terrorism (Toronto: T. H. Best Printing Company Ltd, 
1971) p3.
Fromkin, op.cit. p55.
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course of action against all other alternatives. Terrorist groups choose terrorism 
because of “efficacy” -  it is seen as being more efficient when “compared with 
other methods of achieving political goals”.^ *^ Terrorism is the weapon of the 
weak. By using the term “weak” there is a negative connotation attached to the 
concept. Terrorists are, in most cases, oppressed people who feel that they have 
failed in every other legitimate way to achieve a goal. This can be seen especially 
in the struggle by the Tamil Tigers of Elam in Sri Lanka and the Palestinians in the 
Middle East. For these groups, terrorism in the long run will help achieve their 
goals. Terrorism is considered often to be the last resort since all other legitimate 
alternatives have failed. Activists see that the use of terrorism as a tactic will draw 
the attention of not only their own government but also that of the entire world 
towards their cause. Publicity of this sort is a large motivating force for terrorists. 
The Tamil Tigers of LTTE are a good example of this. They argue they have 
exhausted every way to improve the conditions of the Tamil people. Thus, the only 
avenue left to them is to indulge in violent tactics, which guarantee governmental 
and international attention for their cause. Whether this is the way to achieve their 
goals, is a completely different matter. In the past couple of years the Tamils 
Tigers have declared a ceasefire and at present are negotiating peace talks with the 
Sinhala govermnent, with Norwegian and Japanese mediators.
Martha Crenshaw writes that terrorists are impatient for a c t i o n . T h i s  
impatience can stem from a number of factors like psychological or organisational 
pressures, personalities of leaders, demands from followers, seizing an immediate
Martha Crenshaw, The logic o f terrorism: Terrorist behaviour as a product o f strategic choice 
edited by Walter Reich in Origins of Terrorism. Psvchologies. Ideologies. Theologies. States of 
Mind (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990) p8.
‘®^Ibid.pl3.
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opportunity and competition from r i v a l s . I t  is important to point out that a 
terrorist act is not always instigated by the above - mentioned factors, and that 
terrorists also carefully plan their attacks. Terrorists, while carrying out suicide 
bombings, bombings, hijackings and even political assassinations, have to plan the 
act in great detail. In fact, success is dependent on careful planning. As a result 
there is little place for impatience which may lead to a failed course of action. 
Terrorism is seen to have one very important advantage: “if the reasons behind 
violence are skilfully articulated, terrorism can put the issue of political change on 
the public agenda”. One objective of political terrorism is to gain publicity, 
which will provide world-wide attention for their movement. Publicity will also 
inspire and mobilise supporters for their cause. This would lead to the expansion 
of the membership of the movement.
According to Paul Wilkinson, “teiTorists place no limits on means 
employed and frequently resort to widespread a s s a s s i n a t i o n . . . . I n  fact, a 
terrorist group cannot afford to limit their actions as this would defeat the very 
purpose of being terrorists. If people were awaie that tenorists would not cross a 
certain threshold, then nobody would pay any attention to their threats. As a result, 
their actions would not produce the desired outcome. Wilkinson seems to believe 
this might have always been the case with terrorists: that they had no limits. It 
seems that terrorists have evolved and only very recently have reached the position 
where there are no limits on the means employed. In the past, terrorists did have 
certain limits. For example, when Narodnaya Volya attempted to assassinate 
Grand Duke Serge Alexandrovich, the assassin aborted the mission when he saw 
that “the duke was accompanied by his children rather than risk harming the
Ibid.
^^^Ibid.pl7.
185 Paul Wilkinson, ‘TeiTorism and the Liberal State’, op.cit. p52.
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intended victim’s family”/ H o w e v e r ,  September the 11^ ’^ has shown that in 
modem society there are no limits on what course of action terrorists will take in 
order to achieve their goals. Therefore, it is possible to acknowledge the change in 
modem - day terrorists from their earlier counterparts.
Furthermore, as stated by Thomas H Snitch, terrorism can be divided into 
‘indirect’ and ‘direct’ terrorism whereby "Indirect terrorism is the random violence 
aimed at the general population" for example HAMAS planting a bomb in a 
crowded market, or the random shooting at people. Direct terrorism, on the other 
hand, “focuses the violent action on a political institution or an individual”. The 
kidnapping and killing of the Egyptian religious affairs minister Zahabi and former 
Prime Minister of Egypt, Nasser, also exemplify such direct attacks on specific 
people.
Similarities and Differences between Terrorism and Assassination
There is, however, an inherent connection between terrorism and political 
assassination. TeiTorists commit a wide range of violent acts, for example, 
kidnapping, hijacking or bombing. Assassination is only one of the tools that 
terrorists use. Assassinations can be seen as a fomi of indirect terrorism conducted 
in order to remove a particular individual. Yet teiTorism is usually aimed at a 
general and collective target. Political assassination is highly discriminatory 
because it seeks the death of a particular actor. Terrorists often commit atrocious 
acts in order to draw public attention to the cause, whereas, a political
Hoffman, ‘Inside Terrorism’, op.cit. p i 8.
Thomas H Snitch, “Terrorism and Political Assassinations: A Transnational Assessment, 1968- 
1980”, in The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science. 463, September 
1982. p55.
'«»Ibid.
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assassination is committed with the sole purpose of eliminating a specific 
individual. Even though political assassinations are typically committed in front 
of a huge audience, this is more a matter of convenience than of necessary 
publicity. Though, at the same time, some degree of publicity for their cause is 
always welcome. This is because it would enable the terrorists to draw some 
attention to their struggle in the hope that they can gain world sympathy. There 
have been political assassinations which have not been committed in public, such 
as the assassination of Indian Prime Minister Indira Gandhi in 1984, when she 
was assassinated within her own residential area by her own Sikh bodyguards.
There is a difference between the mind of the assassin and that of the 
terrorist. The assassin destroys men and women who are corrupting the system 
while the terrorist destroys a system, which in their opinion has already corrupted 
everyone it touches. Terrorism may be a product of impatience, but political 
assassination may be an act which, if not carefully planned has involved much 
time and thought. The immediate desired consequence of a political assassination 
is desire for change. Whereas terrorism aims for publicity that is and desire for 
their agenda will receive world - wide attention. Assassination is an incident, a 
passing deed, an event; terrorism is a process, a way of life, a dedication. At most, 
assassination involves a conspiracy, but terrorism requires a m o v em en t/A ll 
political assassinations cannot be equated to terrorism and all terrorism is not 
political assassination. In other words, because a terrorist group commits a 
political assassination it does not imply that this is an act of terrorism.
Furthermore, Thomas Snitch lists five basic goals identified by both 
terrorism and political assassinations. First, to receive popular recognition for a
Ibid. p55-56.
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cause/group. Second, to receive official recognition for a cause/group. Thirdly, to 
gain recruits. Fourth, to undermine the morale and the prestige of the government. 
Finally, to provoke the government to use such harsh and desperate measures as 
martial law, curfews, and massive arrests, causing popular discontent and helping 
to overthrow the government. The five basic goals that Snitch mentions do not 
necessarily always the case and the degree of importance of each varies amongst 
terrorists and political assassins. Receiving popular recognition is very important 
to the terrorist. It is however, less important to the political assassin. Receiving 
official recognition is not at all important to a political assassin. Terrorists aim to 
gain recruits unlike political assassins. Both tenorists and political assassins aim 
to undermine the government and finally, terrorists may aim for harsh measures 
by the government again unlike to political assassins. Thus, Snitch’s five goals 
identified for both terrorism and political assassination do not seem to fit the case. 
If anything, this illustrates that the two concepts are very different but sometimes 
may share common characteristics. An important similarity between 
assassinations and tenorism is that they are both about power. The causes for 
assassination can be numerous, ranging from social, religious, and economic to 
political problems, but the main cause most of the time is political. Terrorism at 
the same time can also be caused because of social, religious, economic and 
political factors, but the main reason that instigates terrorists to violence is 
political.
The five points are taken from Thomas H Snitch, ‘Terrorism and Political Assassinations: A 
Transnational Assessment 1968-1980’ in The Annals o f the American Academy of Political and 
Social Science. September 1982. p55-56.
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Conclusion
This chapter shows that it is necessary to understand the correct definition of the 
term political assassinations for both social-scientific research and policy. There 
is a tendency to label political assassination as terrorism. However, this is not 
necessarily always the case. Additionally, as mentioned earlier there are certain 
requirements which are necessary for an assassination to be a political 
assassination; these have been put forward by James F Kirkham, Sheldon G Levy 
and William J Crotty in the 1970s. It is these three factors that distinguish a 
political assassination from ordinary murder. These factors are a target that is a 
prominent political figure, a political motive for the killing, and the potential 
political impact of the death or escape fi*om death, as the case may be. Thus, in 
essence, a political assassination is a politically - motivated act of killing, 
directed against prominent figures in political life with political consequences, 
and is not therefore just simply a murder.
Furthennore, having evaluated all the pros and cons of various typologies 
of political assassination, this thesis found that the typology used by Kirkham, 
Levy and Crotty is the most appropriate typology of political assassinations, as 
this focuses on the motivations for political assassinations. Although not all the 
types mentioned by them contain the three elements required for an assassination 
to be a political assassination it is still the most relevant as all three factors are 
found in some form in it.
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Chapter 2 
Justifications offered for Political Assassinations 
Introduction
Many forms of stinggle are justified by their participants by the argument that 
they will improve lives of people who are politically, economically and 
socially oppressed or deprived or otherwise dissatisfied with their way of life. 
Whether violence results in any real change is questionable. Some instances of 
use of force have brought about positive change, which can be witnessed, for 
example the fight against nazism which eventually brought about its end. Thus, 
there are many forms of violence which can lead ultimately to positive 
c h a n g e .T h is  is however odd as it questions the idea of sanctity of life. The 
right to life is an extremely complex issue which encompasses a number of 
issues such as the use of abortion and the death penalty. It is a right not 
dependent on just living in one country but “it is supposed to be a universal 
human right, a moral right, not dependent on the laws or rules of a particular 
social institution”.C le a r ly ,  assassinating someone is depriving that person 
of this right. In some cultures this right to life is related to the idea of sanctity 
of life. Sanctity of life is taken to imply that as life is created by God it 
deserves protection, despite human beings tendency towards self
191
192 Although thousands of people lost their lives in the process.Richard Norman, Ethics. Killing and War (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995)
p40.
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destruction/^^ God creates natural calamities like earthquakes, floods, famines, 
old age etc. From this premise it can be followed that there is nothing 
intrinsically wrong with the destruction of life provided that it is done by God, 
not by man. It is however important to identify the difference between the 
deliberate taking of life and death due to natural occurrences. If a society 
believes that life is sacred then it would be wrong not only to assassinate, but 
also to take any form of life such as plants and animals. This in turn creates a 
further debate as to why human life is more important than any other form of 
life. The most common answers, however, relate to self consciousness. 
Humans possess qualities such as freewill, happiness and sympathy which are 
not possessed by other species. Here again one can question the meaning of 
‘qualities’. If a human being does not possess certain qualities does that imply 
he can be killed? In short, it is difficult to find concrete answers to contested 
concepts like ‘qualities’. Therefore, political assassination follows the same 
suit. Irrespective of the fact that the victim may have pursued policies not 
accepted by society or made decisions which have not been in the best interest 
of the society the victim still possesses the right to life. In other words, the 
qualities possessed by a victim may not be considered as good for the society 
however under no circumstance can this allow for the taking of this persons 
right to life.
Political assassination is one aspect of numerous conflicts that we 
experience. Thus, in the words of Dougherty and Pfaltzgraft:
Sanctity of life is a concept that is prevalent in different cultures although there might be 
some difference the underlying point is that life is sacred and its not up to any human to 
another humans life.
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international war is one form of social conflict- 
undoubtedly the most important single form in terms of 
its potential consequences for the individual and 
nations. However, there are may other foims of social 
conflicts: civil war, revolution, coup, guerrilla
insurgency, political assassination, sabotage, terrorism, 
seizure of hostages, prison riots, strikes and strike­
breaking, sit-ins, threats, displays of force, economic 
sanctions and reprisals, psychological warfare, 
propaganda, tavern brawls, labor management disputes, 
flare-ups at collegiate or professional sports, divorce 
contests and legal wrangling over the custody of 
children, intrafamily fights and felonious crimes
The task of morally justifying an act of violence is difficult. Through the 
centuries however, various justifications for violence have emerged. Many of 
these arguments have similarities to those put forward for war or other violent 
political acts. In this chapter I will discuss a number of these justifications 
offered for it is important to understand how violence has been justified in the 
world of political thought and moral philosophy. Some theories have been 
rejected by potential and actual assassins as they did not offer substantial 
justifications for political assassinations. These theories are pacifism and 
realism. A brief discussion of each of them will illustrate why they could not
'^frames e Dougherty and Robert L, Pfaltzgraft in Contending Theories o f International 
Relations: A Comprehensive Survey. (New York: Longman, 5^ edition) p i95.
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be used for the purposes of this thesis. If war and killing (and other forms of 
violence) can be justified however, it follows that assassinations can be 
justified along similar lines. The three most appropriate justifications that can 
be offered the consequentialist justification, the just war tradition and 
terroristic justifications are considered last.
Pacifism
For pacifists, “moral concepts can indeed be applied meaningfully to 
international affairs. But the result of such application, in the case of war, is 
always that war should not be resorted to”.^ ^^  There are two different forms of 
pacifism: absolute pacifism and contingent pacifism. An absolute pacifist
considers “any kind of violence (especially killing) as an intrinsic wrong, 
whereas a more moderate version (contingent pacifism) contends that it is the 
kind of scale of violence (especially killing) which war involves that cannot be 
justified”. Neither believe that there can be a moral justification for war. 
Furthermore a number of different forms of pacifism such as secular and 
religious pacifism that can be seen within a number of different traditions. 
Secular pacifism with all traditions is motivated by a belief that it is wrong to 
take human life than a scriptural authority telling believers not to kill. 
Religious pacifism within different traditions maintains that God would never 
encourages killing. Thus, within the Christian tradition there are three specific 
forms pacifists of principle, pragmatic pacifist and selective pacifist.
Brian Orend, Micheal Walzar on War and Justice (Cardiff: University of Wales Press:2000)
p4.
Ibid. p69.
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According to the first view “only non violence can beget non violence”/  
This form clearly promotes the idea of non violence which rules out any form 
of violence. According to pragmatic pacifists “violence is counter productive 
and non violence productive”. Again the point is that there is no gain from 
engaging in violence and therefore one should not get involved. Finally, 
selective pacifism “simply selects what things to be and not to be pacifists 
about”. The example given here by Elford is that a pacifist might engage in 
a conventional war but using nuclear weapons in war is out of the question as 
there are no winners from such events.^ ®® Furthermore, pacifists within the 
Islamic faith are the Bahai’s who maintain that:
the earth is but one country, and mankind its citizens.
Strong emphasis is placed on the abolition of prejudices 
of all kinds, on full equality between men and women, 
and on the responsibility of each individual to 
investigate truth for himself^^
Hinduism believes in the notion of Ahimsa or non-violence. Mahatma Gandhi 
was a firm believer of the principle and actually applied it to his activities. As a 
result violence is denounced by principles of Hinduism illustrating its pacifist 
side. The general conclusion that can be drawn is that pacifism is all its forms 
denounces the use of violence.
John Elford, “Christianity and War”, in Christian Ethics edited by Robin Gill. (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press:2001). pl74.
Ibid
Ibid.
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^  Ibid.201Douglas Martin, The Case o f the Bahâ'i Minority in Iran. http://www.bahai;org/article-l-8- 
3-7.html#7
Pacifism raises the issue of the morality of self-defence. Many pacifists 
declare that, “what they reject is war and not all uses of violence; hence 
individual self-defence may be justified even though war is not”.^ ^^  Yet as 
McMahan points out “the acceptance of individual acts of self defence may
itself imply an acceptance in principle of certain types of war”. Violence in
certain cases like self-defence may be justified but “no recognizable version of 
pacifism allows killing even as a defensive act”.^®"^
Pacifism in the strictest sense may be completely impossible. In the 
words of Orend, “the ideals contained in our shared discourse on war 
presuppose that the non-violent world imagined by the pacifists is not actually 
unattainable, at least for the foreseeable futine”.^ ®^ This complete rejection of 
any type of violence by pacifism suggests that a country adopts this view then 
its citizens are going to be defenceless. Pacifists reply to such arguments by 
stating that
we do not need to resort to war in order to protect 
people and punish aggression effectively. In the event 
of an armed conflict by an aggressor state, an organised 
and committed campaign of non-violent civil 
disobedience -perhaps combined with international 
diplomatic and economic sanctions-would be just as
Jeff Mcmahan. “War and Peace”, edited by Peter Singer in A Companion to Ethics 
(Oxford:Blackwell: 1991) p386.
Ibid.
^  Jonathan Glover, Causing Death and Saving Lives (Harmondsworth; Penguin Books, 1977) 
p255.
Orend, on.cit. p69.
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effective as war in expelling the aggressor, with much 
less destruction of lives and property^®^
Such beliefs are not widely accepted, and many believe that “pacifism 
lacks realism”/^^ Although, it is apparent that there are stark differences 
between realism and pacifism there is however one similarity between 
realism and pacifism, which is that
they both deny that war can ever be subject to moral 
limitation. Moreover, both regard the attempt so to 
subject war as dangerous or counterproductive, 
increasing rather than decreasing the likelihood of war, 
adding to its ferocity, and obscuring the moral 
degradation and corruption that war inevitably brings 
about^ ®^
Pacifists often argue that war leads to the “deadening of moral 
sensitivity and the erosion of moral responsibility”.^ ^^  The ultimate aim 
of pacifists is not an attempt to avoid violence “but about the 
replacement of evil with good, about the positive overcoming of 
violence”.^  It can be safely said that for pacifists the entire concept of 
just and unjust war is meaningless. Thus, political assassination for an 
absolute pacifist would be never be justified under any circumstances.
"°"lbid.r)70. 
mid. p69.
A.j Coates, The Ethics of War (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1997) p82.
Ibid. p83.
Ibid. p88.
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They would feel that carrying out such an act would be simply morally 
wrong. Contingent pacifists would not justify political assassinations as 
the scale of violence involved would be unjustifiable. According to 
religious pacifism God would not encourage political assassinations. In 
all forms of religious pacifism any form of violence is forbidden. In 
conclusion, for pacifists there is ho justification that can be offered for 
political assassinations.
Realism
In the beginning of the 20^  ^ century realism came to the forefront during the 
inter war period. It helped to understand war more specifically its causes. The 
study of war showed the realists the importance of power and the need to 
maximise ones own interests and thereby warned state leaders from sacrificing 
their own interests. As a result, “this view of human nature, as self interested 
and unconstrained by an universally higher moral laws are profound for civil 
society”.^ ^^  Human nature seen by realism is profoundly selfish. Boucher 
quotes Machiavelli and says “human appetites are insatiable, for by nature we 
are so constituted that there is nothing we cannot long for”.^ ^^  A system of 
self-help is another important element of realism. Each actor is responsible for 
their own survival. There is no room for trust, friendship etc. Thus, realists 
also believed that national interests are of prime importance. In other words,
David Boucher, Political Theories o f International Relations. From Thucvdides to Present. 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998) p29.
212 Ibid.
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“everything and everyone is a means to an end, and has to be justified in terms 
of its, or his usefulness”/^^
The realist view “sports a profound scepticism about the application of 
moral concepts”/'"^ The main concepts of realism, like power and national 
security, “motivate states during wartime, and thus moral appeals are strictly 
wishful thinking”/^^ However, it can be said that “if morality played no part at 
all in international relations, realism would lose much of its point”/^^ Realists 
believe that war is an inherent part of the anarchical society and “that it ought 
to be resorted to only if it makes sense in terms of national self-interest; and 
that, once war has begun, a state ought to do whatever it can to win”/^^ 
Realists maintain “war is a world apart, where life itself is at stake, where 
human nature is reduced to its elemental forms, where self-interest and 
necessity prevail”/'® There is no place for morality and law as people are 
interested in looking after only themselves. Michael Walzer rejects realism and 
insists on the morality of war. Walzer explains the Melian dialogue in great 
detail.
This memorable, well known piece describes a 
historical meeting between Athenians generals and the 
leaders of Melos, a Greek island. The expansionist 
Athenians were to annex Melos and supplement their
Ibid.
Orend, op.cit. p4.
Ibid. p4 -5
Coates, op.cit. p21.
Orend, op.cit. p62.
Micheal Walzer, Just and Unjust Wars. A Moral Argument with Historical Illustrations 
(Harmondsworth: Penguin Books: 1977). p3.
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power, the Melians to preserve their independence and 
protect their own life^'^
Since the Melians refused to get involved they were defeated by the Athenians. 
This brings to the forefront a number of issues about the morality of war. The 
killings of the Melians were seen by the Athenians as “the circumstances of 
war and the necessities of nature”. As a result killings were an accepted part of 
war for the Athenians. Thus, military necessities were the political reality of 
engaging in war.
Another aspect of realism that the Athenians put foiward is that “if we 
must act in accordance with our interests, driven by our fears of one another, 
then talk about justice cannot possibly be anything more than talk”.^ '^' Acts are 
carried out ensuring that interests are protected. Similarly, an assassin is 
looking out for his own interests which in an indirect way represents the 
interest of the societies. As a result an assassin feels that assassinating a
political figure who is a threat to his society is justified. The assassin feels
he/she is looking out for his own interests and the grief which effects the 
victim’s family is of no consequence to him. Also,
it is generally true, but especially so in time of violent 
conflict, that we understand what other people are
saying only if we see through their fair pretences and
Orend, op.cit. p62. 
Walzer, op.cit. plO.
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translate moral talk into the harder currency of interest
ta lk '''
Therefore, Walzer’s opinions on realism can be grounded in three propositions '
(1) there is no freedom to choose morally in the 
international arena; (2) moral argument with regard to 
international affairs is meaningless; and (3) any link 
between morality and armed force will result in greater 
destruction than an amoral stance'"
Another important concept is strategy, which “is the other language of war, 
and while it is commonly said to be free from the difficulties of moral 
discourse, its use is equally problematic”. '"  In a sense a political assassination 
is a strategy. It is used by assassin to get rid of a person who is a potential 
threat to what the assassin aims to achieve, or may desire and even a threat to 
the assassins community. The strategic thing to do would be to assassinate 
him. Furthermore, “strategy, like morality, is a language of justification”" '' 
thus, strategy is another way of justifying an act of political assassination. 
Therefore, one thing to remember is “that the moral reality of war is not fixed 
by the actual activities of soldiers but by the opinions of mankind”."^ In the 
same way the moral reality of a political assassination is also affected by the 
opinions of mankind making it a subjective notion.
lb id .p lk
Orend, op.cit. p62-63.
^  Walzer, op.cit. pl3.
^  Ibid.pl5.
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A J. Coates points out that “without the antithetical notion of 
‘utopianism’ (or of its synonyms ‘moralism’, ‘idealism’, and ‘legalism’) 
realism would be largely unintelligible”."^ For a realist utopianism has 
“grossly inflated expectations about the world of international politics”. '"  
Moreover, a realist considers “the decision to go to war should be dictated not 
by vagaries of moral sentiment but by pragmatic considerations of power and 
interest”."^ At the same time, realists are aware that “the reverse often applies, 
particularly in the case of those wars of intervention that lend themselves more 
readily to a moral or altruistic interpretation”."^ Furthermore, realists believe 
that “[r]eal war is limited because of its instrumental nature and because it 
relies on political guidance to determine it objectives, objectives that if  realists 
has his way (and if morality and ideology are kept in check) are always 
specific and finite”."^ Saying that “morality ends where war begins” can sum 
up much of the realist argument."'
For realists, political assassinations are a part of the anarchical society. 
An assassin may believe that committing a political assassination would 
promote security for himself and his society and this may make the assassin or 
his political masters more powerful. If a political assassination achieves such 
goals as security and power then it will be justified in realist terms. A political 
assassin driven by self-interest to achieve communal or self security reflects 
Walzer’s belief that “men and women do what they must to save themselves
Coates, op.cit. p i8.
""'Ibid.
Ibid. p23.
Ibid. p25.
Ibid. p27.
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and their communities, and morality and law have no place”. " '  Therefore, it is 
correct to think that “for a realist war is not an end in itself but a means to 
something else”' "  and the political assassination may be designed to achieve 
security for the community. Finally, this may help to limit the number of 
political assassinations that will be committed. Most political assassinations 
have a specific target which is guided by an objective that must be achieved. 
However, an assassin cannot have any self interest as this would defy the 
concept of a political assassination. Nevertheless, political assassinations can 
be an act carried out by a political assassin in order to secure security or better 
conditions for himself and his community. This he may view as self interest. 
Thus, realism paints a very direct approach in trying to justify any acts of 
violence.
History of Justifications
One ought to pose the following questions: first, is any form of political 
violence justifiable and second is it always considered wrong to kill someone? 
A number of answers have been offered. In most cases the assassin justifies 
his or her actions in his or her own terms. Whether the justification given is 
accepted by the world is commonly not a matter of concern to the assassin. 
Religious justifications for assassinations have been given. There is evidence 
of religious justification in the Bible. Today there are all sorts of groups using 
religion to justify their ally types of violent actions, for example, the Aryan 
Nations, Hamas, and Aum Shrinyko. This use of religion to justify acts of
Orend, op.cit. p62. 
Coates, op.cit. p25.
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violence is not straightforward. In some cases religion fulfils a specific 
political goal which may have social or religious connotations for example the 
concept of purifying society. As a result, religion is only part of the 
justification employed. The justification presented for assassinations 
committed by religious fundamentalists is considered more powerful than for 
those assassins motivated by non-religious reasons. This is for three reasons. 
Firstly, the justification coming from a religious authority carries more weight 
as it is coming from religius texts and ideologues and therefore this gives 
legitimacy for actions. Related to this is the fact that fundamentalists believe 
that there is a notion of being ruled by a God/entity to whom we are indebted. 
We exist because of Him and as a result owe Him everything. Most religious 
fixndamentalists possess this feeling of owing everything to their creator. An 
evidence of this can be seen in the Koran when it states that “God is your lord, 
the creator of all things. There is no God but Him”." '' Finally, fundamentalists 
argue that since they were created by God it is Gods duty to provide. Thus, for 
religious groups religion is an important force which is used to justify acts.
One can say that religious reasons are compelling for an assassin as the 
relation to God gives any action more grounding. Therefore there is a tendency 
amongst tenorists who commit political and social reasons for violence to 
attach religious significance to their cause. This implies that religion adds more 
of a significance or legitimacy to their struggle. For example, the assassin of 
Anwar Sadat committed the assassination out of outrage for God and the 
assassin of Yitzhak Rabin believed it was God who told him to kill. Evidence
The Koran, translated by N.J. Dawood. (England: Penguin books, 2003) p332.
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can be found in an interview when Dr Umar Abd al-Rahman mufti and leader 
of the Islamic groups in Egypt when asked:
Q. What is your opinion on the issue of political 
assassinations and [claims] that you are resorting to 
them against those who do not share your opinion?
A. We do not exclude anything from our minds. If there 
is any law in the Sharia that orders the assassination of 
someone, then we will kill him -a  literal word for word 
application.
Q. Do you think that Islam sanctions assassinations?
A. Islam sanctions the killing of a killer. Assassinations 
is a new and general word. The issue is whether he 
person killed or did not kill -  whether he committed a 
crime or did not commit a crime"^
In both cases religion was the motivating factor behind the assassinations. 
Furthermore, Franklin Ford’s book “Political Murder, From Tyrannicide to 
Terrorism” is an intricate history of assassinations committed around the 
world. According to Ford amongst the reasons put forward for committing 
assassinations are religious reasons."^ Ford states a number of other reasons 
for assassinations such as dynastic rivalry, and, more commonly, social unrest, 
religious fanaticism and choice among secular ideologies like nationalism.
Interview with Dr Umar Adb al- Rahman. Summary of World Broadcasts. 17/ 04/89.
For further reference on Fords account on the connection between killing and religion see 
chapter 1 p7-24.
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libertarianism, egalitarianism, socialism and even anarchism. However, Ford 
never directly addresses the question of justification behind the assassinations 
throughout the book.'" It is left to the interpretation of the reader.
Having looked at the several theories for justifying political 
assassination and understating why they cannot be used this thesis has found 
three theories put forward by Yehuda to be most suited to justify political 
assassinations. According to Yehuda the three types of justifications for 
assassinations have developed in the West:
The first, was a purely instrumental one, developed by 
the Greeks and the Romans stipulating that the moral 
value of an assassination depends entirely on the end(s) 
achieved. The second, developed by Christian 
philosophers stipulates that political assassination is evil 
in itself, but nonetheless assassinations can be justified 
on the grounds that it can prevent a greater evil. The 
third, was developed solely to justify an assassination 
which was part of a terrorist campaign. Participation in 
the struggle, or assassination, was a good thing in itself 
regardless of the particular results achieved"^
hi other words, the typology for justifications that can be found for political 
assassinations in this thesis:
Frankin Ford, Political Murder, op.cit.
Yehuda, ‘Political Assassinations as Rhetorical Devices’, op.cit. p327.
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• Instrumental justification
• Non Utilitarian justification
• T erroristic justification
This seems to be the most appropriate justifications that can be offered for 
political assassinations in that it offers justifications from three different levels 
of analysis. This includes instrumental, moral and terroristic justifications and 
thereby allows to cover the main areas in terms of analysing the consequences 
of a political assassination, the moral reasons behind a political assassination 
and influence of ideologues which are all used to justify a political 
assassination.
Thus, the next section examines each of these types of justifications in 
turn. The consequentialist philosophers whose arguments will be analysed are 
Ted Honderich and Richard Norman. These particular thinkers were chosen 
because they have put forward theoretical explanations for political violence 
which can also be used to justify political assassinations. The following section 
will explore the Just War tradition and how it may be adopted to offer 
justifications for assassinations. Finally, the remaining section will examine 
how tenorists and other extremist groups justify political assassinations. This 
type of analysis will involve understanding the teaching of religious ideologues 
like Sayyid Qutb, Mohammed Al Faraj, and Rabbi Meir Kahane.
Instrumental Justification 
Consequentialism
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Historically the instrumental justification for violence has existed throughout 
centuries. As mentioned above the Greeks and the Romans have always 
maintained that the justification depended on the consequences. The modem 
version of instrumental justification is consequentialism.
“Consequentialism is the view that whatever values an individual or 
institutional agent adopts, the proper response to those values is to promote 
them”.'^  ^ [The agent would be responsible for only promoting the values that 
he/she values. This point can be criticised on the basis that there are certain 
values that should be honoured but not necessarily promoted.] 
Consequentialists see the relation between agents and values as instrumental. 
Agents act to promote values. There are two propositions that consequentialists 
defend:
1.Every prognosis for an option, every way the world 
may be as the result of a choice of option, has a value 
that is determined, through perhaps not up to 
uniqueness, by the valuable properties realised there: 
determined by how far it is a happy world in which 
liberty is respected, a world where nature thrives, and so 
on for different valuable; the value determined will not 
be unique, so far as the weightings between such 
properties are not uniquely fixed.
Philip Pettit, Consequentalism edited by Peter Singer in A Companion to Ethics (Oxford: 
Blackwell, 1991) p231.
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2. Every option, every possibility which an agent can 
realise or not, has its value fixed by the values of its 
prognoses: its value is a function of the values 
associated with the different ways it may lead the world 
tobe'"°
According to the above propositions, the choice of political assassination 
would thereby depend on the value of its results rather than the virtue of the 
action. Secondly, political assassinations are fixed upon other values, which 
may lead to a better world. For example the assassination of a dictator would 
be justified if it improved the social, economic and political conditions of the 
country. In this way an act of political assassinations would be considered the 
right action.
The consequentialist holds that the proper way for an 
agent to respond to any values recognised is to promote 
them: that is, in every choice to select the option with 
prognoses that mean it is the best gamble with those 
values''"
It can be said that the consequentialists’ approach depends entirely on the 
consequences being good and bad. “A distinctive mark of consequentialism 
might rather be this, that it regards the value of actions as always consequential
Ibidp232.
Ibidp233.
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(or, as we may more generally say, derivative), and not intrinsic”,''" If the 
assassination promotes happiness and ends suffering the action is deemed to be 
good. If the desired aim was not achieved then the action had negative value. 
In other words, a political assassination would only be the right action if the 
results achieved were better than any other alternative.
The most influential version of consequentialism is utilitarianism. D. 
D. Raphael states that “according to utilitarianism, an action is right if it is 
useful for promoting happiness”."" The theory measures happiness as the sum 
of pleasures. Pleasure is seen as good and pain as bad. Therefore, actions 
which either produce pleasure or happiness, or ones which remove or prevent 
unhappiness and pain are right. In other words, the action, that produces the 
most happiness or prevents unliappiness, is undoubtedly the right action. With 
respect to this, if an assassination were seen to promote the greatest happiness 
and remove most unhappiness in a society, it would be the right action.
There is another form of utilitarianism that includes other goods like 
virtue, love, knowledge and beauty. However, “traditional utilitarianism, tries 
to simplify things as much as possible, says that pleasure is the sole intrinsic 
good and that these other things are valued for the sake of pleasure, either the 
pleasure which they themselves contain or the pleasure which they like to 
produce”. There is a need to make a distinction between good as means and 
good as an end. A political assassination will not be committed for the sake of 
love of committing an assassination or because it is good as an end in itself. A 
political assassination which will promote further happiness for the society is 
what an assassin hopes for and this represents the fact that the assassination
Bernard Williams, “A Critique of Consequentialism”, edited by Joram Graf Haber in 
Absolutism and its Consequentialist Critics (Maryland: Rowman & Littlefield, Inc, 1994) p94. 
D.D. Rapheal, Moral Philosophy (Oxford: Oxford University Press: 1994) p34.
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represents the means and the creation of a better society is the end. For the 
consequentialist it can be stated that a political assassination could be seen as 
morally good if it produces morally good ends, not because the means used is 
moral in itself.
Indeed, “utilitarianism of all varieties says right actions are useful 
actions, good as means; that rightness is in fact of efficiency, but restricted to 
efficiency for good ends”.""' Classical utilitarianism or Hedonistic 
utilitarianism holds that the only thing that matters is the production of 
happiness as an end. Whereas Ideal utilitarianism holds that there are other 
things that are important as an end. Both maintain that the utility of an act and 
its usefulness in producing good results are the things that determine the 
rightness of the act. Thus, an assassination would be the right act if it resulted 
in positive changes and promoted happiness. This would to a certain degree 
hold tme for Yigal Amir, the assassin who killed Yitzhak Rabin. He 
proclaimed to do what was God ordered him to do. He considered it a great 
privilege to carry out God’s order. This represents Amir’s self-interest in the 
task as it increased his happiness. (At the same time other motives that initiated 
the assassination along with results after the assassination should not be 
ignored). More specifically Amir’s action would fit the theory called 
Theological Utilitarianism, “On this view, the promotion of the general 
happiness is the purpose of God, who does not suffer the limitations of human 
nature in being self-interested”.'''^ That is, God arranges for his disinterested 
purposes to be carried out by self-interested humans by setting the possibility
^^ I^bidp35.
Ibidp38.
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of reward and punishment. “Utilitarianism is often said to assume a God’s eye 
point of view”.'''^
Therefore, it can be safely said that the concept of self-interest is an 
essential part of the theory of utilitarianism. “For the most part, most people 
act with a view to their own happiness, to self-interest”. '"  With regards to this, 
murder, assault, theft and so on are seen as reducing general happiness to the 
immediate victims and to the wider society, but to the thief or murderer the 
action would only increase happiness as it would enable him for instance to 
acquire money. Classical utilitarianism states that happiness includes everyone 
and anyone. However, Jeremy Bentham states that people usually (not always) 
act from the motive of self-interest. According to utilitarianism this would be a 
bad action as this would not promote happiness to a number of people but, on 
the other hand, it would be the right action for the perpetrators as it would 
promote their happiness. This does not hold true in the case of a political 
assassination because the assassin considers the act to be beneficial for the 
entire society. His own self interest is important along with the happiness of 
society, which would be a result of the assassination. Contemporary 
utilitarianism usually takes a different view. It is divided into Act- 
utilitarianism and Rule-utilitarianism. The focus is not on the production of 
happiness and pleasures but on utility. “A moral theory is utilitarian if and only 
if it assesses acts and/or mles in terms of nothing but their utility”."'^ Utility 
stands for a matter of usefulness. Today, utilitarians like R.M. Hare and J. 
Griffin do not measure everything in terms of happiness, pleasure and self-
Brad Hooker, “Rule-Utilitarianism and Eutlianasia”, edited by Hugh La Follette in Ethics in 
Practice. An Anthology (Cambridge: Blackwell Publishers Ltd, 1997) p44.
Raphael, op.cit p39.
Hooker, op.cit p43.
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interest and they are not the only desirable goods available. There are other 
desirable goods like knowledge, friendship and love. The reason for the change 
is that people now tend to care for things apart from pleasure, such as 
knowledge, religion and autonomy. Utilitarian’s will favor benefits to a 
minority if the benefits to the minority will result in overall good in society. In 
other words, “when our actions will affect various people in various different 
ways, it is the characteristically utilitarian conclusion that the right action is 
that which maximizes utility (however construed) summed impersonally across 
all those affected by that action”."^ An assassin would therefore envisage an 
assassination to produce greater utilities for the entire society and thereby an 
assassination would be justified.
Act-utilitarianism can be divided into two versions.
One version holds that an act is right if and only if  its 
actual consequence would contain at least as much 
utility as those of any other act open to the agent.
Another version claims than an act is right if and only if 
its expected utility is at least as great as that of any 
alternative'^''
According to the first version a political assassination would be the right action 
if its actual consequence were as much as that of any other alternative act 
available to the agent. According to the second version, a political 
assassination is the right act if its expected result or utility is as much as that of
Robert E Goodin, “Utility and the Good” edited by Peter Singer in The Companion to 
Ethics (Oxford: Blackwell Publishers, 1991) p245.
^  Hooker, op.cit p44.
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any other method to achieve the same consequence. It is important to note that 
both effectively justify the act of killing on the basis of the level of utility.
Rule-utilitarianism does not assess each act on solely on the basis of 
its utility. Rule-utilitarianism assesses acts on the basis of rules and the rules 
depend on the basis of utility. “Rule utilitarianism holds that an act is morally 
permissible if and only if the rules with the greatest expected utility would 
allow it”. " ' Utility of rules is a matter of general internalization. If utilities of 
rules are to be internalized then it suggests that the rules are justified and one 
can act and react according to them. Rule-utilitarianism does not concentrate 
only on rules that have been already accepted but tries to find acceptable codes 
and tries to make people use them.
For unlike act-utilitarianism, rule-utilitarianism agrees 
with common conviction that individual acts of murder, 
torture, promise breaking and so on can be wrong even 
when they produce somewhat more good than their 
omission would produce'^'
This rule is likely to produce more good than if these acts were not prohibited. 
Therefore, rules against murder, torture and promise breaking are all justified 
in society. Such acts according rule-utilitarianism would be justified if only 
there was a grantee that the consequences of acts like murder, tortuie and 
political assassinations would have greater utility than these acts being
^^^Ibidp45.
Ibidp45.
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forbidden. The results of a political assassination would have to produce 
greater utility than any other action in order to be justified.
A utilitarian concept excludes values that are based on respect: “more 
important of all such values include a respect for life whereas utilitarian 
thinking by itself justifies too easily the sacrificing of someone’s life to 
promote the good of others”. " '  In summary, the utilitarian reasons that it is 
wrong to kill someone because firstly killing someone causes grief to family 
and friends. Secondly, there is a loss to the wider society that could have 
benefited from the services of the dead man. This point however, may not be 
completely correct, as the victim may have led a totally isolated life. Thirdly, 
killing someone denies the person of a future. Lastly, killing always inflicts 
considerable pain on the victim.
In conclusion consequentialism has the potential to justify an act of 
political assassination if and only if it can be shown to have maximised general 
happiness in society. Thus, the assassinations of political figures in this thesis 
was committed with the hope that it would put an end to the suffering in the 
society and possibly promote happiness.
Non utilitarian Justification
In this section a range of moral justifications from a variety of traditions such 
as the Christian, Hindu and Chinese traditions will be analysed. The main 
justification that can be derived from all three traditions is that if an act of 
violence puts an end to larger violence then the act can be justified. In all
Rcihard Norman, Ethics. Killing and War (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995) 
p l l .
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traditions parallels are made with war. War plays an integral part in the 
Christian, Hindu and Chinese tradition. It will become clear in the discussion 
that in most of the cases war was committed in order prevent further trouble 
and this as a result justified war.
According to Coates “this tradition has monopolised the moral debate 
about war, at least in the Western World”."'' Is there a moral justification 
behind war? In the words of A. J. Coates
in the theoretical sphere the tradition has been by far the 
most prolific in the development of an apparatus of 
specific moral principles and concepts by means of 
which the experience of war can be articulated and 
subjected to systematic moral investigation'^^
War and conflict has been the important focus of study for all within 
International relations. The study of war is not just limited to people within 
academia but most people often ponder the idea of war. In fact, “the stability of 
the international system is usually defined in terms of its proximity to or 
remoteness from the occurrences or likelihood of large scale war”."^ This 
interest in trying to understand the concept of war led to the much-asked 
question of what is war. According to Clausewitz “war is an act of violence 
intended to compel our opponent to fulfil our will”'" .  The United States’ War
Coates, op.cit. p i.''"Ibid.
Dougherty and Pfaltzgraft, op.cit. p i88.
Clausewitz on War edited by Anatol Rapoport. (Harmondsworth : Penguin Books Ltd,
1968) plOl.
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on Terrorism, which has brought the concept of war and more specially the 
notion of Just War back to the forefront. The Just War tradition:
is rooted in a sense of human moral fallibility and the 
conviction that any moral enterprise, especially one as 
uncompromising as war, is always to a greater or lesser 
extent flawed"^
Furthermore, one important aspect of Just Wai* is that it “
provides a defence of the use of violence in war that 
parallels both the common sense justifications for the 
use of violence by individuals and perhaps more to the 
point, common-sense justifications for the use of 
violence by the state for the domestic defence of 
rights"^
However, by examining the Just War tradition it can be seen that “ a just war is 
more a matter of preventing or curbing (one’s own as well as that of an 
adversary) than it is of promoting good”."" Just War theory has two 
components. “The first of these, known as the theory of jus as bellum, defines 
the conditions under which it is permissible to resort to war. The second 
theory, that of jus in bello, sets the limits of permissible conduct in
Coates, op.cit. p2.
Mcmahan, op.cit. p386.
Coates, op.cit. p3.
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war”.'^'Justification for violence and killing can be found in the former. One 
of the most noted books in contemporary use is Michael Walzer’s ‘Just and 
Unjust Wars’, which provides a detailed account of the morality of war by 
which similarities can be found for committing a political assassination.
The Just War tradition has “been heavily influenced by Christianity”." ' 
It is said that “the veiy success of just war theory has tended to divide 
Christians from the Middle Ages and forward into those who accept 
participation in violence, specifically war, and those who do not”.'" ' The 
tradition enjoyed a long development which included Augustine, Aquinas and 
Grotius to name a few. In the words of Geoffrey Best,
like most of the serious writing about moral values in 
relation to war, its language comes out of two related 
great traditions; the ancient Christian one, substantially 
founded by St Augustine, and developed to a high pitch 
of refinement by the close of the Middle Ages, and 
intermittently resuscitated since then'"''
The second phase of the development of Just War theory is associated with St 
Thomas Aquinas, who takes over Augustine’s requirement that a war be 
declared by a legitimate authority and be for a just cause but adds to them
Mcmahan, op.cit. p386.
Robert L. Holmes, “Can War be Morally Justified? The Just War Theory “, edited by Jean 
Bethke Elshtain in Just War Theory, p i98.
James Turner Johnson, Just War Tradition and the Restraint of War (Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 1981) pxxv.
Geoffery Best, Humanity in Warfare (New York: Columbia University Press, 1980). p3.
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requirement his own”.'" ' Augustine states that “the real evils of war, are Tove 
of violence, revengeful cruelty, fierce and implacable enmity and the like’”.'"" 
With regards to an assassin fierce and implacable enmity are the most 
important as it is the driving force that leads to a political assassination.
According to the Just War tradition there are six requirements that a 
state needs to fulfil:
• Just Cause: “war is permissible only to confront a real and certain 
danger i.e. to protect innocent life, to preserve conditions necessary for 
decent human existence, and to secure human rights”.'" ' This has been 
one of the most important aspects of the Just War theory. It is believed 
that “the absolute conviction that their cause is just (and that the 
adversary against whom they fight is the consummation of evil) may 
encourage combatants to override the moral limits of war or to neglect 
other equally weighty considerations, such as the costs of war or the 
shedding of innocent blood”.'"^ Therefore, in such terms an assassin 
always believes that the cause is he fighting for is just. Since a political 
assassination is a selective act the chance of innocent civilians being 
killed in the process is not very high. From an assassins point of view a 
political assassination is committed for a just cause.
• Right Intention: “A state must intend to fight the war only for the sake 
of a just cause. Having the right reason for launching a war is not 
enough: the actual motivation behind the resort to war must also be
^  Holmes, op.cit. p i99.
""’ Ibid. p212.
Coates, op.cit. pl46.
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morally appropriate”.'"^ Yet how can one judge rightness of intention? 
An assassin has no doubts about his intentions about committing a 
political assassination and thus the assassins has right intentions.
Proper authority and public declaration: “A state may only go to war 
only if the decision has been made by the appropriate authorities, 
according to the proper process, and made public, notably to its own 
citizens and to the enemy state(s)”."" There is no way that this would 
comply with carrying out a political assassination. It is not possible to 
make public any intention of carrying out a political assassination. 
Also, orders for carrying out a political assassination do not come from 
proper authorities. This does raise the question about what constitutes 
proper authority. For an assassin from a terrorist group the proper 
authority could be the leader of the group to a top official within the 
group. This kind of authority in most cases is not recognised by 
everyone. Whereas the US government ordering the assassination of 
heads of states is an authority that is recognised by the entire 
international community. The question of authority is debatable. Thus, 
this is major differences between engaging in war and committing a 
political assassination.
Last Resort: “A state may resort to war only if it has exhausted all 
plausible, peaceful alternatives to resolving the conflict in question, in 
particular diplomatic negotiation”." ' A political assassination is 
usually the last resort that an assassin takes on once the assassin
Orend, op.cit. p87. 
Ibid.
Ibid.
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believes that all other channels have been used. The last resort is to 
remove the person in order to achieve their goals.
• Probability of Success: “A state may not resort to war if it can foresee 
that doing so will have no measurable impact on the situation”. " '  An 
assassin committing a political assassination thinks that only by killing 
the victim will there be an impact.
• Proportionality: “The damage to be inflicted and the costs incurred by 
war must be proportionate to the good expected by taking up arms”." ' 
An assassin definitely believes in the immense good that would be 
created by the assassination would be immense and it would be 
comparable to any other consequences of the act.
Underlying the Just War tradition is a belief that “most actions have some bad 
consequences, particularly in the area of social and political affairs; the best of 
policies impose demands upon some persons or ask sacrifices of them”." '' If 
there were supposed to be bad consequences as a result of certain policies an 
assassin would try to correct this by assassinating the person responsible. In 
this way the assassin would sacrifice himself. However, “the just war theorists 
insists on the moral determination of war where that is possible, and on the 
moral renunciation of war where it is not”. " '  In a similar way parallels can be 
drawn with political assassinations. The one thing that is constant in the Just 
War tradition is that if one engages in war then it should be for the right 
intention. A political assassination is committed by an assassin who considers
"’"Ibid.
Holmes, op.cit. p213. 
Ibid. p200
"’" Coates, op.cit. p97.
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that he is committing such an act for the right reasons. This certainly raises the 
issue about what is the right reason. Furthermore, “this means that one must 
intend to promote the good and avoid evil; merely having a just cause and 
legitimate authority is insufficient”."" The assassins in the cases examined in 
the thesis believed that a political assassination does just this. By committing 
an assassination an assassin is promoting good as he has gotten rid of the evil.
According to Michael Walzer states have a moral justification for 
engaging in armed conflict and in contrast realism rejects such moral concepts. 
He “suggests that war is the inevitable product neither of the structure of 
nature nor of the international system rather, war is a human action purposive 
and premeditated, for whose effects someone is responsible”. " '  Walzer also 
states that what states want does not stop at just security but humans want to 
belong to a community and in this way he tends to disagree with realism.
Walzer discusses in detail the tyranny of war with which a number of 
parallels can be drawn to political assassinations. He correctly states that “war 
is most often a form of tyranny”."^ Political assassinations can be committed 
as an attempt to end tyranny in many cases. Furthermore, he states that “war is 
a social practice in which force is used by and against men as loyal or 
constrained members of states and not as individuals who choose their own 
enterprise and activities”."^ Political assassinations however are not carried 
out by and against men as loyal or constrained members of state. In fact it is 
more of the opposite as political assassinations are directed towards men who 
have their own endeavour. An important aspect of the tyranny of war- is that
Holmes, op.cit. p200. 
Orend, op.cit. p63. 
Walzer, op.cit. p29. 
Ibid. p30.
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“the experience of war as hell generates what might be called a higher 
ambition: one doesn’t aim to settle with the enemy but to defeat and punish 
him and, if not to abolish the tyranny of war, at least to reduce the probability 
of future oppression”. This is similar to the aims of a political assassination. 
The assassin aims to end tyranny by removing the tyrant and thereby reducing 
the threat of further oppression as this is the ultimate goal, the assassin will not 
settle for anything else.
With regard to terrorism Walzer maintains:
the systematic terrorizing of whole populations is a 
strategy of both conventional and guerrilla war, and of 
established governments as well as radical movements.
Its purpose is to destroy the morale of a nation or a 
class, to under its solidarity, its method is the random 
murder of innocent people'^"
Additionally, “terrorism, because it is directed against entire peoples or 
classes, tends to communicate the most extreme and brutal intentions-above 
all, the tyrannical repression, removal, or mass murder of the populations 
under attack”.'^' However, with political assassinations the aim is to destroy 
the oppressor and by no means is the act random. Assassins justify this course 
of action by saying that the victim represented what they are fighting against. 
Assassinating the victim will further their cause. This again aligns in with the
Ibid. p203.
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concept of strategy where the assassin uses political assassination as a very 
strategic means to achieve goals. Walzer suggests:
that most political militants don’t regard themselves as 
assassins at all but rather as executioners. They engage, or 
so they regularly claim, in a revolutionary version of 
vigilante justice. This suggests another reason for killing 
only some officials and not other, but it is entirely a self 
description'^'
In the case of a political assassination this certainly is the case. While 
committing a political assassination an assassin is very discriminate but the 
reasons behind the assassination maybe based on self description. Finally it is 
important to remember that, “even in destruction, there’s a right way and a 
wrong way- and there are limits”.'^' In most cases of political assassination the 
ultimate limit is the assassination event itself; however, the political objective 
of the assassin or the group with which he is associated is usually the deciding 
factor in stopping at one assassination or in finding it necessary to carry out 
more. The important point is that an assassin will generally try to avoid killing 
civilians except for the intended victim. In contrast terrorists are usually less 
discriminate. Walzer mentions that
in the eyes of those of us whose judgements of 
oppression and injustice differ from their own, political
Ibid. p202. 
Ibid. pl99.
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assassins are simply murderers, exactly like the killers 
of ordinary citizens. The case is not the same with 
soldiers, who are not judged politically at all and who 
are called murderers only when they kill 
noncombatants. Political killing imposes risks quite 
unlike those of combat, risks whose character is best 
revealed by the fact that there is no such thing as 
benevolent quarantine for the duration of the political 
struggle'®''
This pinpoints the reality of a political assassination. Furthermore, he is right 
in saying that “even if we do not share their judgements, these men are entitled 
to a kind of moral respect not due to terrorists, because they set limits to their 
actions”.'®' Assassins always target a specific person for or because of 
specific reasons, therefore an assassin would not arbitrarily decide to kill 
someone else. Thus an assassin places limits upon the number of events to be 
carried out. Some people view this as a form of morality as an assassin would 
and assassinate randomly. Hence, the defence for violence provided by Just 
War tradition is another way by which political assassinations can be justified.
Furthermore, within Indian political thought one can find parallels to 
Just War. The Hindu tradition justification for the use of force was can best be 
understood within the context of the King and his Kingdom. As A.L. Basham 
states “the recognition of the moral justification of revolt against an impious
Ibid. p200-201. 
Ibid. p201.
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king must always have acted as some check on his autocracy”?*  ^ Therefore, 
there is moral justification that is sought for engaging in violence. One of the 
most important books on the practice of statecraft illustrates this claim. The 
Arthasastra “deals not with the theory of the State, but with the Art of 
Government and kindred topics”.^ ^^  It was written by Kautilya (also known as 
Chankya) an important figure of the Indian Maurya Dynasty. He was 
“renowned not only as a king maker, but also for being the greatest Indian 
exponent of the art of government, the duties of kings, ministers, and officials, 
and the methods of diplomacy”.^ ^^  Therefore, the importance of a kings duty 
is vital. He is referred to as the Holy King.
In the Arthasastra there is a need to
employ as ministers those whose fathers and 
grandfathers had been ministers before, such persons, in 
virtue of their knowledge has been ministers before; 
such persons, in virtue of their knowledge of past events 
and of an established relationship with the King^^^
There is stress laid on the kind of people who should be employed by the King. 
This shows the importance of tmst which needs to be established between a 
King and his officials. It seems the reason for this is to make sure that there is
A.L. Basham, The Wonder that was India in Ancient Indian Polity: Life and Thought, p i. 
http://www.india-emb.org.eg/section.
U.N. Ghoshal, A History of Hindu Political Theories. From the earliest times to the end of 
the Seventeenth Century A.D. (London: Oxford University Press, 1927) p82.
^  Dr R. Shamasastiy, Kautilva’s Arthasastra (Mysore: Mysore Printing and Publishing 
House, 1967) p5.
^ Ib id .p l3 .
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no threat from his most trusted officials. This constant look out for any threat 
again shows that King was very vulnerable and that all attempts had to made to 
protect him.
All duties that are stated by Kautilya are advice that a King should 
follow in order to keep the enemy away. There was a lot of stress put on 
looking out for trouble which only illustrated the threat of enemies from 
outside and fear of being overthrown.
Related to this Kautilya suggested the idea about the institution of 
spies. He suggested that spies should be created in all areas looking over his 
ministers and should be found amongst fraudulent discipline, a recluse, a 
householder, a merchant etc. Kautilya says the spies were “sworn to the King 
and myself, thou shalt inform us of whatever wickedness thou findest in 
others”.^ ^^  Spies should also be used to watch the citizens and country people. 
If people were found to be guilty the King would punish by levying taxes. 
Furthermore, “treacherous opponents of sovereignty shall be silenced”.^ *^ 
Specifically with regards to foreigners Kautilya suggests:
where foreigners carry on an intrigue with foreigners, or 
local men with local men, there the consequences of the 
intrigue, unanimously carried on with a set purpose, will 
be very serious. When the guilt is got rid of, there will 
be no guilty persons; but when a guilty person is got rid 
of, the guilt will contaminate others. Hence, when 
foreigners carry on an intrigue, the king should employ
"^m .p l8 .
M à .  p23.
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the policy of dissension and coercion.” And also “ then 
the fiery spies may mix with the servants and soldiers of 
the abettor (of foreign conspirators) and kill then with 
weapons, poison, and other means^^^
Thus, Kautilya’s advice for a King demonstrates the immense need to protect 
the king. The intent seems to be that if there is an immediate danger to the 
King and his Kingdom then all efforts would be made to protect the King and 
this would include attacking the threat.
Also within Chinese tradition war played an important part in Chinese 
politics. The Art of War by Sun Tzu provides evidence to show that different 
regions within China were almost engaged in war with one another. It was so 
much so that “occasionally the rulers managed too arrange recesses from the 
endemic wars which were produced by their insatiable ambitions”.^ ^^  Due to 
the constant nature of war Mo Ti “denounced the crime and futility of the wars 
to which the rulers of his age devoted their energies”^^ "^  He also condemned 
aggressive war and states that
If a man kills an innocent man, steals his clothing and 
his spear and sword, his offence is graver than breaking 
into a stable and stealing an ox or horse. The injury is 
greater, the offence is graver, and the crime of a higher 
degree. Any man of sense knows that it is wrong, knows
^  Kautilya’s Arthasastra Book IX ‘The Work of the Invader’. p7. 
http://www.mssc.edu/projectsouthasia/history/primarydocs/Arthashastra/BookIX.htm.
Sun Tzu, The Ai t o f War, Translated by Samuel B. Griffith, (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 1971) p21.
Ibid. 21.
121
that it is righteous. But when murder is committed in 
attacking a country it is not considered wrong; it is 
applauded and called righteous. Can this be considered 
as knowing what is righteous and what is 
unrighteous?^^^
For obvious reasons this was not a very popular philosophy during this period 
but it shows that “Warring States rulers who were actuated by the imperatives 
of power rather than by the adjurations of moralists”.^ ^^  Also during this age 
diplomacy was based on bribery, fraud, and deceit. Espionage and intrigue 
flourished”^^  ^ and it demonstrated that it was age were everyone was always 
aware of the possibility of threat from all directions. As a result the effort was 
made to keep a watch out for any sort of trouble.
Furthermore, the society during this period had a strict legal code. 
There were “several thousand crimes were punishable by death or mutilation. 
Castration, branding, slicing off the nose, chopping off the toes or feet, cutting 
led tendons, or breaking knee caps were commonly inflicted”.^ ^^  Both cases 
illustrate that violence if aimed at a greater good can be morally justified. The 
strict legal code for individuals were constructed with the aim that it would 
prevent further crime. If people were punished for crimes immediately and 
strictly then in the longer term this would prevent further evil. With regards to 
the Warring States it was important to attack and kill people if necessary, as 
this would mean that it would curb any future threat from other states and
Ibid. p22.
"^Ibid.
Ibid. p24.
Ibid. p23.
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prevent greater evil. Thus, moral justifications for violence can be found in 
different traditions. It is a phenomenon that is not restricted to any particular 
culture.
Terrorist Justifications
The final justification that can be offered for political assassinations is the 
justification offered by terrorists. It is simplistic to suggest that the justification 
can only be derived from the nature of such groups as terrorist ones. A 
terrorists’ justification can also be derived fi*om other arguments or beliefs 
Justification by religious terrorists is sought from sacred texts and symbols, 
mythology and especially from religious ideologues. Furthermore, violent acts 
are not only justified by religious terrorists but in a lot of cases before 
committing an act consent is sought fiom religious ideologue. Finally, the act 
is praised by religious ideologues making such acts glorious deeds. The above 
discussion is what constitutes terroristic justification.
Closely related to this notion of terroristic justification is the concept 
of fundamentalism. In most cases individuals or groups that illustrate radical 
behaviour in conjunction with religion usually get termed as 
fundamentalists.^^^ Another term used interchangeably with fimdamentalism is 
extremism. Inlierently, fundamentalism is a Western construct. In the eyes of 
many such groups they are seen not as fundamentalist gi'oups but rather as 
nationalistic groups where the main aim is to fight themselves. This can clearly
The terrorist groups that are referred to are mainly religious and nationalist groups. 
Further discussion on fundamentalism will follow.
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be seen in many of the Middle Eastern groups like HAMAS and Hizbollah.^^^ 
This is not a phenomenon related to the Middle East but can also be seen in 
America. Bruce Hoffman states “Half a world away from the Middle East in 
the heartland of America, the use of violence is similarly justified by 
theological imperative as a means to overthiow a reviled secular government 
and attain racial purification and religious redemption”. Indeed, 
“Christianity like most traditions has always had a violent side”.^ ®^ Lawrence 
Kaplan points out that :
although the term fundamentalism arose from a 
uniquely American situation among Protestants early in 
this century, it has been applied to religious movements 
as diverse as Twelve hnam, Shi’ites, Sikhs and 
Sinhalese on the Indian subcontinent, Pentecostals in 
South America, and Israeli settlers on the West Bank, as 
well as smaller sects throughout the world^^^
Fundamentalism’s origins can be traced to America. Specifically, “the term 
originated in the USA in the 1920s with the publications of a series of 
pamphlets called ‘The Fundamentalism of the Faith’ Today the term is used 
fairly universally to represent most groups that use the fundamental precepts of 
religion along with violence. In the 1970s in the United States fundamentalism
See Bruce Hoffmans book ‘Inside Terrorism’ for further information.
Bruce Hoffman, ‘Inside Terrorism’, op.cit. pl05.
Mark Juergensmeyer, Terror in the mind o f God. The Global Rise o f Religious Violence. 
(Berkeley: University o f California Press:2000) p i9.
Lawrence Kaplan, Fundamentalism in Comparative Perspective (edited) (Amherst: The 
University o f Massachusetts Press, 1992). p5.
Steve Bruce, Fundamentalism (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2000)._pl0.
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reappeared in the more specific form of the Christian Right. Most importantly, 
religious fundamentalism was also “trying to preserve a way of life”.^ ®^ 
Furthermore, “in the 1980s, coinciding with the election of a conservative 
president, fundamentalism announced itself as an important influence on the 
national political scene”.^ ®^ It is however correct to say that “the histoiy of 
right-wing extremist movements advocating violence in the United States is 
long and well-documented”.^ ^^
Broadly speaking John L. Esposito defines fundamentalism in tliree 
basic ways. Firstly, “all those who call for a return to foundational beliefs or 
the fundamentals of a religion”.^ ®^ For example the Muslims see the Quran as 
the word of God. Secondly, “our understanding and perceptions of 
fundamentalism are heavily influenced by American Protestantism”.^ S te v e  
Bruce clearly states that “one distinct belief was the proposition that the Bible 
was the inerrant word of God and hence that anything that challenge biblical 
teaching was not just wrong but sinful”.^ ^^  Here again the Bible is seen as the 
right way to Christian life and teaching. Finally, “fundamentalism is often 
equated with political activism, fanaticism, terrorism and anti- 
Americanism”.^ ^^  This can certainly be seen in fundamentalist groups who 
often are responsible for committing political assassinations. For example.
Bruce, op.cit. p68.
Kaplan, op.cit. p4.
Walter Lacquer, The New TeiTorism. Fanaticism and the Arms of Mass Destruction. 
(London: Phoenix Press, 2001) pl07.
John L. Esposito, The Islamic Threat: Myth or Reality (New York: Oxford University 
Press) p7.'^°IMd.
Bruce, op.cit. 67.
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Islambouli the assassin of Anwar Sadat was related to Takfir wal Hijra.^^  ^
Thus, the term fundamentalism can be closely related to rigid religious beliefs. 
One aspect of fundamentalism to is the fact that “religion has always been a 
disruptive force”.^ "^^  Religion has been used by many terrorist groups in the 
past to justify their acts of violence. Some examples of such groups are the 
Zealots, Assassins and the Thugs. In this thesis however the effect of the first 
and the third points are combined. In both the assassinations of Sadat and 
Rabin the assassins were related to fundamentalist groups who were involved 
with violence, especially political assassinations.
Fundamentalism in the United States broadly falls under the category 
of White Supremacists. The three main categories are firstly the Christian 
Right, secondly the Christian Patriots and finally the various militias. Although 
these groups are all right wing they do not necessarily share the same beliefs. 
Some militia share the same religious beliefs as the Christian Patriots like the 
Aryan Nations, and there are other Militias who do not have any religious 
inclination, such as the Michigan Militia. While most of them are religious 
however some are also apocalyptic such as the Branch Davidian.
The main aim of Christian Right identity is to establish a country 
which reflects the teachings of the Bible. This Gallagher states “religion... is at 
the heart of many ideologies on the contemporary radical righf’.^ ^^  Dan 
Gayman and Richard Butler are important men associated with the Christian
An Egyptian Islamic fundamentalist group established after the 1967 war. It was a direct 
decedent o f the Muslim Brotherhood however the Takfir al Hijra’s differed greatly in its 
attitude to violence.
Bmce, op.cit. p i.
Eugene V, Gallagher, “God and Country; Revolution as a Religious Imperative on the 
Radical Right”, in Terrorism and Political Violence Vol. 9, Autumn 1997, No. 3.
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Right. Both believed in a short interpretation of the teachings of the Bible and 
God and were followers of the Church of Israel, which upon realising:
that the religious and political right in America is 
charged with many diverse ideologies, feels an urgent 
need to point those who desire to be Christians toward a 
Christ-centered walk in this evil world^^^
Both Gayman and Butler thought that it was therefore up to them to convince 
people of the direction they should be taking. Furthermore, the Church of 
Israel’s “theology holds that Adam was neither the first created being, nor even 
the first biped which God placed on the earth.” However, “Adam was the first 
Caucasian, the only bearer”.^ ^^  They believe that “Jews were the result of the 
seduction of Eve by Satan”.^ ^^  Thereby, “the Jews are the synagogue of Satan 
and they are believed to have dispossessed the true Israelites’’. ’^  ^ From all 
these statements it is easy to see how both Gayman and Butler managed to 
influence the minds of a number of religious people. It has been stated that “in 
the United States any group that defines its mission as religious is claiming a 
very powerful form of legitimacy”. T h i s  legitimacy often accounts for the 
justification groups put foi*ward for their actions. Furthermore, Gallagher states 
that, “many patriots, constitutionalist, militia-members, tax resisters appeal to 
religion in order to justify their cause” and
Jeffrey Kaplan, “The context o f American Millenarian Revolutionary Theology: The Case 
of the Identity Christian Church of Israel”, in Terrorism and Political Violence. Volume 5, 
Spring 1993, No 1. p53.
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they include the attempt to identify the essence of a 
religion through scriptural exegesis, the fabrication of a 
civil religion to serve political goals and the adoption of 
fundamental forms of religious expression to underscore 
the paradigmatic values of certain past events^^’
From this similarities can be seen with the Christian Right who try to justify 
their cause through religion, their use of scriptures and the adoption of 
fundamental forms of religious expression. Christian Identity religious beliefs 
are pronounced. They believe that Jesus Christ was an Aryan and not a Semite; 
white Anglo-Saxons are the true Chosen People; the lost tribes of Israel are 
blue eyed Aiyans and the United States is the promised land.^^  ^ This, lends 
itself to immense racial hatred which was justified by religion.
The Christian Patriot groups are considered to be “militant, anti­
federalist or extremists tax-resistance movements”.^ ^^  Their activities are also 
coupled with “religious hatred and racial intolerance, masked by a transparent 
veneer of religious precepts”.^ '^’ Hoffman also maintains that “many militia 
groups, field manuals and other literature quote liberally from Christian 
scripture in support of their activities and use biblical liturgy to justify their 
paranoid call to arms”.^ ^^  They believe in:
• Hostility to any form of government above the county level;
Ibid. p64.
For further reference refer to Hoffman ‘Inside Terrorism’. 
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• the vilification of Jews and non-whites as children of Satan;
• an obsession with achieving the religions and racial purification of the 
United States;
• belief in a conspiracy theory of powerful Jewish interests controlling 
the government, banks and the media;
• advocacy of the overthrow of the US government or the ZOG (Zionist 
Occupation Government), as the Patriot/militia groups disparagingly 
refer to it^ ^^
The bombing of the Alfred P Murrah Federal building in Oklahoma 
City in April 1995 by a US army veteran Timothy McVeigh fell under the 
umbrella of the Christian Patriot Movement which “encompasses both racist 
adherents of what is termed Christian Identity and more traditional Christian 
fundamentalists’’.^ ^^  It was the “Christian Identity ideas were most likely part 
of the thinking of Timothy Mcveigh”.^ ^^  McVeigh believed that the US 
government had already initiated a programme to control completely the life of 
every American”.^ ^^  Therefore, this meant that “American liberties are in 
danger of finally being snuffed out and that they [Christian Patriots] are the 
only force that can stop it”.^ ’^’ McVeigh was immensely influenced by these 
arguments and interpreted them literally. Furthermore, McVeigh was 
influenced greatly by the novel The Turner Diaries written by William
^^Ibid.
Martin Durham, “Preparing for Aimageddon: Citizen Militias, the Patriot Movement and 
the Oklahoma City Bombing”, in Terrorism and Political Violence Vol. 8, No. 1, spring 1996. 
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Pierce.^^’ The book, which is about a fictional war between the U.S. 
government and a group known as The Order, details “a ruthless campaign of 
violence involving the assassination of public officials and prominent Jews, the 
shooting down of commercial airliners, the poisoning of water supplies and 
bombings of public utilities”. T h e  Turner Diaries ends with the destruction 
of many American cities. McVeigh essentially uses the books many precise 
details as blueprint for the Oklahoma city bombing. He believed that his duty 
was also to stop the US government and this meant attacking government 
symbols. The date of the McVeigh attack marked the anniversary of the Waco 
commune burning, which McVeigh interpreted as an attack on religion. Martin 
Durham states that “the Oklahoma City, both government investigators and 
reporters have concluded, was the work of extremists who blamed the 
government for the deaths at Waco exactly two years before”.^ ^^
The Evangelical Christian Rev Mike Bray was known for his anti 
abortion acts. Mike Bray was most influenced by Dominion Theology where 
the establishment of the Christian Theocratic state. He started several anti 
abortion fights. Bray justified his act by stating that “Christianity gives him the 
right to defend innocent unborn children, even by use of force, whether it 
involves destroying the facilities that they are regularly killed in, or taking the 
life of one who is murdering them”.^ '^’ Violent acts including killing people 
associated with abortion clinics was justified by Bray.
Thus, “this history and these biblical images have provided the raw 
material for theologically justifying the violence of contemporary Christian
Andrew Macdonald, The Turner Diaries (Arlington: The National Alliance/National 
Vanguard Books, 1985)
Hoffman, ‘Inside Terrorism’, op.cit. p ll5 .
Durham, op.cit. p76.
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groups”.^ ^^  Furthermore, the discussion on the Just War tradition which had its 
origins in the Christian Tradition illustrates
the use of the military force under certain conditions, 
including proportionality-the expectation that more 
lives would be saved by the use of force than would be 
lost-and legitimacy, the notion that the undertaking 
must be approved by an established authority^^^
sums up the basic belief of the Christian Identity. There is therefore in this 
circumstance a close relation between the Christian Identity and the Just War 
justification for violence. In conclusion, “some modem Christian theologians 
have adapted the theory of Just war to liberation theology, arguing that the 
Church can embrace a “just revolution”.^ ^^
Within the Islamic tradition, fundamentalism can be traced back to the 
time of the Assassins. As discussed before the Assassins carried out their 
activities with clear religious beliefs in mind which served to justify the acts. 
In the contemporary world however, “Islamic fundamentalism refers to the 
modem political movements and ideas, mostly oppositional, which seek to 
establish in one sense or another, an Islamic state”.^ ^^  Although this desire for 
an Islamic state has always been a part of this aspiration has been strengthened 
by modemisation which has been “equated with the progressive westernisation
Ibid. p20. 
Ibid. p25. 
"""Ibid.338 Sand Zubaida, Islam. The People and The State. Political ideas and movements in the 
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and secularisation of society”.^ ^^  This process of westernisation and 
secularisation has always been limited to a minority of the population whilst 
the majority of the population refused to accept any such change. As a result 
“the most forceful manifestations of the Islamic resurgence have occurred in 
the more advanced and modernised countries of the Muslim world such as 
Egypt, Iran, Lebanon and Tunisia”.^ '’® It was the Iranian Revolution of 1979 
that turned world attention towards Islamic fundamentalism and, at the same 
time, it illustrated that “Islamic fundamentalists could overturn a powerful 
regime”.^ "” Furthermore, the concept of martyrdom glorified in religious terms 
plays an important aspect of Islamic activities.
Esposito states correctly that “Islamic revivalism has often been seen 
and experienced as a direct threat to the ideas, beliefs, practices and interests of 
Muslim secular elites as well as Western governments and multinational 
corporations”.^ '’^  This revivalism was greatly felt in the 1970s and 1980s. This 
can be seen in the history of Islam and by a number of its fundamental 
precepts. The fundamental aspects of Islam are that “to a Muslim, God is all 
powerful and all knowing, the creator of all that was and is and will be, the 
righteous judge of good and evil, and the generous guide to men and women 
through his messengers and scriptures’’.^ '’^  Furthermore, it is believed that 
“God revealed himself through the words He put into the mouths of certain 
righteous men called Prophets”.^ '’'’ It is these preachings that “have been turned
John L Esposito, The Islamic Threat: Myth or Reality (Oxford: Oxford University Press: 
1992) p8-9.
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into the Quran of the Muslims” '^’^  and is the most important scripture to the 
Muslims. “The scriptural sources” Arjomand writes “that constitute the 
fundamentals of Islam are the Quran, the standard version of which was 
established within a generation after Muhammad’s death, and the Tradition 
(hadith, singular) of the Prophet”.^ '’^  At the same time it is important to note 
that “if Muslims agree on the authenticity and primacy of the Quran, however, 
they occasionally differ with regard to its meaning” and “there is no way of 
taking the entire text of the Quran literally”.^ '’^
In Islam reliance on scriptures works in combination with the influence 
of religious ideologues who hold very important positions in the Muslim 
world. It will become obvious from the discussion below that “contemporary 
Islamic thought, particularly in its radicalist variety, accords political struggle 
and power the most pivotal fimction in its strategy as a whole”.^ '’^  Hasan al 
Banna, Sayyid Qutb, Sheikh Yasin and Ayatollah Khomeni have produced 
some of the most important works in Contemporary Islam. They are “not 
theologians but social thinkers and political activists”. Their work has 
formed the inspiration for several religious ideologues like Sheikh Yasin the 
spiritual leader of HAMAS (Harakat al-Muqawama al Islamiya) (Palestine) 
and terrorist groups in the Muslim world such as the Muslim Brotherhood 
(Egypt) and the Takfir Wal Hijra (Egypt).
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The establishment of the Muslim Brotherhood in 1928 accelerated the 
process of political Islam in Egypt. Hasan al Banna started the institution as a 
social organisation for education and Islamic reform of society and 
government from secular and Westernised society. This organisation “more 
than any other organisation, has been the ideological and institutional epicentre 
of fundamentalism in the Arab sphere and the Islamic world”. Hasan al 
Banna stated that “ the society of Muslim Brothers would not deviate from 
Gods’ Book, the Tradition of the Prophet, and the conduct of pious 
ancestors”.^ ’^ As a result, the Muslim Brotherhood eventually “developed its 
own armed secret apparatus and engaged in political assassinations, the most 
prominent victim being the Prime Minister of Egypt, al Nuqrashi, killed in 
1 9 4 9 ”  352 - p j j - g  angered the Egyptian government, who in turn ordered the 
assassination of al Banna. After al Banna died, the Brotherhood suffered from 
many problems which included not having a strong leadership and no 
structure. It cannot be however, denied that the secret organisation of the 
Muslim Brotherhood continued to be “responsible for military training and 
terrorist activities”.^ ^^
To understand the justifications behind the activities of the Muslim 
Brotherhood it is essential to understand the beliefs of al Banna. He was a Sufi 
spiritualist “who possessed a rare ability to evoke mass support by doctrinal 
complexities into social action”.^ '^’ According to Dekmejian, “Banna relied on
R Hrair Dekmejian, Islam in Revolution, Fundamentalism in the Arab World (Syracuse 
University Press: 1985), p73.
Arjomand, op.cit. p i86.
Zubaida, op.cit. p47-48.
Rubin, op.cit. plO.
Dekmejian, op.cit. p75.
134
the Quran and the six canonical treatise of hadith”/^^ Ibrahim M. Abu-Rabi 
states “al Banna’s understanding of the Quran as an ideological text is far more 
radical than that of the refoim movements of the nineteenth and early twentieth 
century”.^ ^^  His “Sufi revivalism could easily be harnessed to jihad movements 
to extend the frontiers of Islam”/^^ His movement’s characteristics were 
different from any other revivalist movements as the movement had “(1) an 
activist ideology, (2) an organisational structure, (3) charismatic leadership, (4) 
a mass following, and (5) a pragmatic orientation”.^ ^^  Since al Banna was an 
anti imperialist and that he considered secularisation as danger to Islam the 
result was that any act against imperialism and secularisation was justified in 
the name of Islam. Jihad was his answer to counter the secularisation of 
Egyptian society and the ulama.
Al Banna stated five problems responsible for the breakdown of the 
Islamic State which include: “political and religious differences; self- 
indulgence and luxury; the transfer of authority to non-Arabs; in difference to 
applied sciences and Muslim infatuation with authority”.^ ^^  Al Banna was 
opposed to colonialism and regard Western Christianity to be a tool used by 
the West to colonise the world. He also saw the importance of materialism in 
the West which he considers a bad force. As a result, al Banna’s associated 
“Western civilisation with apostasy, licentiousness and adultery, egoism, usury 
and moral and political bankruptcy”.^ ®^ The factors above illustrate the reasons 
why Muslims should start trying to protect and promote Islam. Al Banna
Ibid.
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suggested that “near Easterners realize the necessity of freeing themselves 
from the yoke of Western occupation which has curtailed their honor and 
independence and has imposed upon them heavy sacrifices in money and in 
blood”.^ ’^ Thus, the main aspect of al Banna’s teachings were “the oneness of 
religious world and the lay world, of religion and state; the belief in pan 
Islamism in the face of Egyptian nationalism”.^ *^  ^ Additionally, al Banna’s 
main teachings asserted that “every piece of earth on which the banner of 
Islam is raised is a homeland for every Muslim to protect, work fight for and 
that just as it is a belief and a worship, [Islam] is a homeland and 
nationality”.^ ^^  These teachings have been interpreted by radical Muslims to 
justify participation in violence. It is important to remember that it was al 
Banna “who first legitimised violence and established a secret organisation 
[the Muslim Brotherhood] for that purpose, which soon became associated 
with assassinations and killings during the 1940s and early 1950s”.^ '^’ Thus, it 
does not come as a surprise that contemporary groups use religious scriptures 
and ideologues to justify violence.
Hasan al Banna’s teachings set the foundations for justifying violence 
but Sayyid Qutb was an even more influential religious ideologue for the 
Muslim Brotherhood. Qutb’s works have also influenced many of today’s 
extremist groups. Qutb “has been called the most famous personality in the 
Muslim world in the second half of the twentieth century”.^ ^^  Qutb’s works 
borrow much fr om al Maududi, another prominent ideologue. Qutb joined the
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Muslim Brotherhood in 1951 and was put in charge of the da’wa (missionary 
activity). Qutb, as al Banna, was concerned with the influence and impact of 
Westernisation on Egyptian society, which was encouraged by Nasser. Qutb 
believed that “the world is living in Jahiliyya” (pre-Islamic or non Islamic 
society).^*’^  According to Qutb “Jahiliyya is bound to rear its head whenever 
people’s hearts are devoid of a divine doctrine and their lives cease to be 
governed by legal injunctions derived from this doctrine”.^ ^^  This provides a 
reason for Muslim people to resist Jaliiliyya from entering their lives.
Qutb also was also a firm believer of concepts such as hakimiyya 
(sovereignty) and Kafir (infidel and nonbeliever). Also according to Qutb a 
believer must:
reject all man-made laws and government, which are 
the foundations of the new paganism. The true 
believers, the elect, must organise themselves into 
vanguard groups apart from the new society of 
ignorance and repeat the original pattern of 
establishment of Islam through withdrawal/migration, 
jihad, and conquest of power^^^
Qutb believed in the use of force to achieve goals. When a group who 
considers themselves to be the true believers use violence their justification is 
derived from Qutb’s beliefs.
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It was this kind of preaching’s that led to the formation of “several 
takfir (excommunication) organisations in the past two decades”.^ ^^  It was 
such groups who state that
after the emigration from the land of Egypt -the land of 
atheism and abode of war-[true] Muslims would prepare 
to fight atheistic society and attack the existing political 
systemso as to take over the reins of authority. Thus the 
movement would follow the same stages to the 
historical spread of Islam: call emigration, holy war 
(da’wa, hijra, jihad)^^’’
Furthermore, Qutb draws on Maududi’s political struggle which
called for the establishment of an ‘International 
Revolutionary Party’ in order to wage jihad against 
tyiannical governments. Its members were called ‘the 
functionaries of God’ and their duty would consist in 
wiping out oppression, mischief, strife, immorality, 
high-handedness and unlawful exploitation from the 
world by force of arms^^’
369 Ibid. pl85.
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Qutb states that the “Islamic Vanguard has to arm itself with a clear-cut and 
permanent criterion”^^  ^ and this clearly legitimised violence. Additionally, a 
believer “stands his ground, never runs away, and meets the enemy in open 
combat. If killed, he is promised martyrdom by God, the highest honor to be 
gained by a Muslim”.
Evidence of this can be seen in a interview with al-Gama’a al 
Islamiyya (Islamic group) formed in the 1970s. They were influenced by a 
number of religious ideologues, from al Maududi to Sayyid Qutb. When asked
you said that you studied the writings o f Sayyid Qutb.
He was a leader o f the Mulism Brothers.
Qutb has influenced all those interested in Jihad (holy 
struggle) throughout the Islamic world. At the time 
there were many interpretations (turuq) and we need a 
direction. This Sayyid Qutb’s teachings provided^^'’
Evidence of the influence of Qutb and the Muslim Brotherhood and other 
Islamic ideologues can also be found in a number of other organisations like 
the Islamic Liberation Party and Takfir wal Hijra.^^^
A number of others have also sought to justify the use of violence of 
in their teachings such as Sheikh Yasin, the spiritual leader of HAMAS,
Ibid. p30 
Ibid.
Hisham Mubrak’s interview with Tal’at Fu ad Qasim, What Does the Gama’a Islamiyya 
Want? In Political Islam. Essav From the Middle East edited by Joel Benin and Joe Stork.
For further reference see R.Hrair Dekmejian, Islam in Revolution, Fundamentalism in the 
Arab World (Syracuse University Press, 1985)
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Ayatollah Khomeini, Leader of Iran and Sayyid Muhammad Husayn Fadlallah, 
the spiritual leader of Hizbullah. HAMAS was founded as a response to the 
social, political and economic problems faced by the Palestinians. Yasin’s own 
views were “inspired by that of the Muslim Brotherhood societies in Jordan 
and Egypt, and of the Islamic movement as a whole”.^ ’^’ Yasin states that to “it 
was his duty as a human being, as a Muslim, as an Arab, and as a Palestinian, 
since he and large segments of his people have for decades have been suffering 
under the yoke of an intruding and oppressive occupation”.^ ^^  He states that 
“the way to regain Palestine is through the exercise of Jihad, in the sense of a 
holy war against external enemies”.^ ^^  It is clear from statements like “the gun 
is the only means that should be used in addiessing the enemy”^^  ^ that 
justification does not need to be interpreted by extremist groups but that 
justification is given clearly by religious authorities.
Ayatollah Khomeini was responsible for inspiring the Islamic revival 
that led to the Iranian Revolution. The most important themes of his teachings 
were the “Shia tradition of struggle against oppression, the investment of 
political power in the clergy, and a pattern of messianic and utopian 
expectations”.^ ’^’ The Westernisation by the Shah of Iran was seen as 
oppressive for the Iranian people and his government was perceived as not 
respecting Islam and religious scholars. The preservation of Iran from the 
effects of Western influences was vital to Khomeini. He
Ziad Abu Arar, “Shaykh Ahmed Yasin and The Origins of Hamas”, edited by Scott 
Appleby in Spokesmen for the Despised. Fundamentalist Leaders o f the Middle East (Chicago; 
University o f Chicago Press: 1996). p242.
Amr, Ibid. p235.
Ibid. p242.
"""Ibid.
Mark Juergensmeyer, The New Cold War? Religious Nationalism Confronts the Secular 
State (University o f California Press: 1994) p53.
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reinterpreted Shiism to justify what he called the 
velayat-I faqih (Rule of the Jurist). This doctrine called 
for a state by a quasi-infallible rahbar (Leader) who 
would rule absolutely in his capacity as matja I taqlid, 
or supreme religious guide of all Shiites^^’
Khomeini believed that martyrdom^^^ was very important aspect of being 
Muslim and appealed to start the month of Ramadan (month when the 
martyrdom of Imam Husayn is celebrated) with “epic heroism... the month in 
which the leader of the Muslims taught us how to struggle against all 
tyrants”.
The Shah’s leadership fulfilled the criteria of a tyrant as he and Iran 
seemed to be moving away from the path of religion and Sharia. In order to 
undermine the Shah’s government “Khomeini and his entourage exploited the 
cult of martyrs to such an extent than in the popular imagination, the Shah and 
his police were almost made responsible for the suffering of all the Shia 
martyrs”.^ '^’ Martyrdom was justified through religious terms and it was 
glorified to encourage Muslims to commit acts of violence. Furthermore, 
Khomeini was keen to insist that “dying does not mean nothingness: it is 
life”/^^
Daniel Brumberg, “Khomeini’s Legacy, Islamic Rule and Islamic Social Justice”, edited by 
Scott R Appleby in Spokesmen for the Despised. Fundamentalist leaders o f the Middle East 
(Chicago; Chicago University Press; 1996) pl7.
Martyrdom is a central theme for Shiites.
Brumberg, op.cit. p38.
Mehdi Mozaffari, “Islamism in Algeria and Iran In Islamic Fundamentalism”, edited by 
Abdel Salam Sidahmed and Anoushiravan Ehteshami_in Islamic Fundamentalism. (Oxford: 
Westview Press: 1996) p237.
Brumberg, op.cit. p40.
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Mohammad Abd al-Salam Faraj was another ideologue who overtly 
promoted the used of violence. He encouraged Muslims to fight enemies, one 
of whom was Sadat. As a result Faraj espoused ideological motivations for the 
assassination of Sadat^^ ,^ this also can be applied to other people who defy 
Islam. Furthermore, “Faraj argues that the Quran and the hadith are 
fundamentally about warfare”.^ ^^  According to Faraj, Jihad was an important 
duty which involved. Also, he stated that “the true solider for Islam is allowed 
to use virtually any means available to achieve a just goal”.^ ^^  In conclusion, 
Faraj also stated that a paradise was awaiting all Muslims who was involved 
with Jihad. Thus, religion easily provides a justification for violence.
Jewish fundamentalism in Israel is usually associated with Abraham 
Isaac Kook (the father), Zvi Yehuda Kook (the son). Rabbi Meir Kahane and 
the Gush Emunim (the Bloc of the Faithful), the movement of settlers in the 
West Bank and Gaza. Kook is considered “the most influential theoretician of 
religious Zionism”.^ ®^ Kook, the son carried on his father’s views. His views 
however were far more militant in nature and he served as the main spiritual 
figure for the Gush Emunim.Rabbi Abraham Kook believed that the 
redemption process began with the establishment of the State of Israel. He 
stated that “The Zionist return to the land of Israel was the first act of the 
redemption drama which would soon, in our day, climax with all the glories
For ideological motivations see R, Hrair Dekmejian, Islam in Revolution. Fundamentalism 
in the Arab World. (New York: Syracuse University Press; 1985) p94-95,
Juergensmeyer, ‘The New Cold War’, p60.
Ibid. p60.
Mark Tessler, “Religion and Politics in the Jewish State of Israel”, edited by Emile Sahliyeh 
in Religious Resurgence and Politics in the Contemporarv World (New York: State University 
of New York, 1990) p277
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that had been foretold about the coming of the Messiah”. H i s  teachings 
always reflected the influence of religion and thus really encouraged the 
promotion of religion. The strongest aspect of his teaching was the importance 
he placed upon the occupation of the land of Israel, The evidence for this can 
be found Kook statement: “the hope for Redemption is the force that sustained 
Judaism in the diasporic, past, the present Judaism of the Land of Israel in the 
very Redemption”.^ ’^ Kook’s son’s teachings were dominated by
aggressive tones. It was known that Kook was “one of the few Israelis- 
religious or secular-who dared to express publicly a hostility towards 
Christianity”.^ ^^  He was responsible for channelling
the activist energies of his followers, even before the 
subject of the land arose, into violent actions against 
missionary institutions in Jerusalem and against Israeli 
Jews who enjoyed concerts of Christian Music^^^
Furthermore, Kook found the withdrawal from any part of Israel 
unquestionable due to his readings of religious texts which state the 
“unequivocal and decisive halachic rulings there exists severe prohibitions to 
pass to foreigners the ownership of any piece of land of Israel, since it was 
made scared by the brit bein ha betarim [Abraham’s Covenant]”.^ '^’
Arthur Hertzberg, “Jewish Fundamentalism” edited by Lawrence Kaplan in 
Fundamentalism in Comparative Perspective (Amherst; The university o f Manchester Press, 
1992) pl55.
Gideon Arran, “The Father, The Son, The Holy Land, Spiritual Authorities o f Jewish-  
Zionost Fundamentalism in Israel”, in Spokesman for the Despised. Fundamentalists o f the 
Middle East. Edited by R Scott Appleby (Chicago: University o f Chicago Press, 1997)p296.
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The teachings of Kook the son were so influential that he was “given 
the status of da’at Torah, literally “Torah wisdom”.^ ^^  This implied that the 
traditional meaning where the rabbi drew upon holy texts had now changed to 
the
authority of rabbi to issue binding directives to believers 
without giving an account of them and without basing 
them on valid Talmudic evidence. Rather than being 
justified in terms of the rules of the Torah, the 
pronouncements now derives its authority from being 
Torah-inspired^^*^
Jews who followed Kook found that they could now liberally interpret 
important religious texts to serve their own purpose. It necessary to briefly 
look at the ideology of Gush Emunim as Kook the son played a significant role 
in the group. Gush Emunim was a politico-religious movement founded after 
the Arab Israeli war of October 1973 by “a group of religious fundamentalist 
Jews in order to prevent a new partition of Eretz Yisrael.”^^  ^Its main objective 
was the rejudaization of Israel. Gush saw the effect of Westernisation on Israel 
as corrupting and wanted Israeli society to be governed by the Halakha (Jewish 
Law). Gush Emunim “wanted to exert influence on the state and went in for 
violent action -in  some cases even for terrorism”. I t  was seen that “in 1980
Arran, op.cit. p315.
Ibid. p316.
Flamliaft, op.cit. pl40.
Kepel, The Revenge o f God. The Resurgence o f Islam. Christianity and Judaism in the 
Modem World (Cambridge: Cambridge Unversity Press, 1994) pl41.
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some of its leaders did indeed turn to violent activism, taking the law into their 
own hands”.^ ^^  In fact, “Gush extremists fought terror with terror”/^^
Furthermore, studying Jewish fundamentalism is incomplete without 
analysing Rabbi Meir Kahane who formed the Kach party."^ ^^  Kach is 
considered to be an extremist right wing movement with strong political 
objectives. Kahane's ideology was a major attack on Gush Emunim as Gush 
attempts to combine secular nationalism and radicalism. There soon emerged 
in Israeli society a new concept called Kahanism which denoted, “a blend of 
ultranationalism, strong anti-Arab sentiment, religiosity, and a demand to 
respond in kind to Arab terrorism irrespective of the law”."^ ^^  Kahane was 
totally against the notion of a secular state as evident from his speeches; “the 
main position of the party was that Israel should be ruled strictly according to 
Jewish law, non Jews even secular Jews have no place in this sacred order” 
For Kahane, the secular state was representative of a sinful state. If an Israeli 
leader did not respect God or follow Jewish law then there was nothing sacred 
about him. He also proclaimed that “the State of Israel was established not 
because the Zionists who did not repent (!), deserved it, but as a result of the
Ibid. p i 62.
Ibid. Pl62
Kahane's history takes him back to 1968 when he lived in the United States and 
established the Jewish Defence League (JDL) in New York. Its main purpose was to 
provide protection to the American Jews who were subjected to various kinds of  
harassment and crime. In its early years the JDL committed symbolic violence which was 
within the boundaries o f law. In due course, the degree of violence increased by 
committing violence unaccepted by law. For example, JDL attacked an anti-semitic radio 
station and in 1970 attacked the Soviet trading company Amtrog. Kahane was given a 
suspended sentence o f five years and soon fled to Israel in 1971. Within a year of liis 
arrival the JDL was back to resorting to acts of violence.
For further reference on Kahane early life see Rapheal Cohen Amagor “Vigilant Jewish 
Fundamentalism From the JDL to Kach”, In Terrorism and Political Violence. Vol. 4,
N o.l, Spring 1992. p44-66.
'*°^ Ehud Sprinzak, “Three Models of Religious Violence: The Case o f Jewish 
Fundamentalism in Israel”, edited by Martin E Marty and R Scott Appleby in 
Fundamentalism and the State, op.cit. p478.
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actions of the Gentiles” Most importantly, it was created by God and 
therefore was to remain sacred forever.
“hi Kahane's view” Almagor has written “the only authentic Jewish 
State is a state of Jewish totality”."^®^ Indeed
he called for the creation of a truly Jewish state in Israel 
rather than a Hebrew speaking gentilized one where 
people would live according to the Jewish laws'^ ®^
Kahane claimed he did not hate the Arabs rather the problem “was not that 
they were Arabs but that they were non Jewish living in a place designated by 
God for the Jewish people from biblical times”.'^ ®^ “Kahane wrote that the 
Arabs were a time bomb, a malignant disease and that they multiply like 
fleas”.'^ ^^  He warned against the growth of the Arab population which he 
believed could destroy the Jewish State from within."^ ^® Kahane believed in the 
coming of the Messiah but also believed that the people of Israel had to take 
active part in the process of redemption. The Palestinian violence is viewed by 
Kahane as a further means of humiliating the Jews. In response, he proclaimed 
his own advocacy for the use of violence where
Ehud Sprinzak, “Violence and Catastrophe in the Theology of Rabbi Meir Kahane: The 
Ideologization of Mimetic Desire”, edited by Mark Juergensmeyer in Violence and the 
Sacred in the Modem World. p49.
Almagor, on.cit. p53.
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Jews were no longer to bow to their oppressors but were 
called upon to respond to them in kind and with 
physical force, if  necessary. Kahane believed that 
Messianic redemption which could be achieved in three 
ways, restoration of biblical land, revival of traditional 
Jewish law and the building of the temple on the 
Temple Mount"^ ^^
Kahane openly proposed that revenge should be sought against the Gentiles 
even if that involved war. This Kahane supported by saying that “he expressed 
the opinion of Halakha to violence as claiming that Law permits people to 
commit violence”."^ ^^  For him the Halakha did encourage committing violence 
if it would protect the Jewish people from the Gentiles.
The above debate illustrates that religious extremism exists in many 
forms which can be seem from the several examples that have been already 
been discussed. It is not a phenomenon that is confined to any one culture but 
can be found across the board. Also these extremist groups use of violence and 
then proceed to justify their action through religion. Thus, the role ideologues 
and holy texts are of most importance.
CONCLUSION
Thus, in conclusion justification for violence can be divided into three distinct 
categories. Firstly instrumental justification which analyses consequentialist
Robert I Friedman, The Savings of Rabbi Kahane. Feb 13,1996. 
Sprinzak, op.cit. p50.
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arguments for justifying violence. Secondly, non-utilitarian justifications for 
violence when violence is used to prevent further evil. Finally, terroristic 
violence which specifically examines religious groups. They rely heavily on 
the preachings by religious ideologues and scriptures.
The thesis also analysed theories such as pacifism which could not 
justify violence in any form. According to pacifism all acts of violence are 
wrong. The reason for analysing pacifism was that although a true pacifist 
would prohibit all kinds of violence there are subdivisions of pacifism such as 
contingent pacifism where killing committed for self defence can be justified. 
In conclusion, this theory was rejected on the basis that the main aspect of the 
theory prohibits violence and if an aspect of the theory does not justify 
violence then it would complicate the justifications of violence.
This thesis found that the consequentialist/utilitarianist approach was 
well suited to analyse the justifications for all forms of violence. According to 
its traditional meaning where an action is right if it promotes happiness. An act 
of assassination would be right, if the assassination would promote happiness. 
However, utilitarianism has come to be related not with happiness but the 
utility of an act. An act is judged on the basis of its utility. An assassin would 
consider an assassination of immense utility, as it would help achieve desired 
objectives. Hence, an act of killing in an assassin’s term is justified. According 
to consequentialism one should adopt values whose consequence would result 
in promoting such values. Similarly, an assassin feels that the consequences of 
assassination will promote good consequences. If the results of a political 
assassination were valuable then it would imply that the action was good. It is
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therefore possible to base an action as good or bad depending on the 
consequence.
With the non-utilitarian justification for violence the Just War tradition 
forms a very important aspect of justifying war. However, moral justification 
is not only restricted to only the Christian Just War tradition. The chapter 
illustrated how such justitifcation are also prevalent in cultures such as the 
Indian and Chinese cultures.
Finally, terroristic justifications refers to justifications that are offered 
by terrorist groups. These justifications are presented by religious leaders and 
texts which are taken very seriously by the assassins. The justifications offered 
by leaders are not widely accepted by most people and the legitimacy for these 
justifications are therefore restricted to within the group. As a result these 
justifications legitimise the actions committed by assassins but they do not 
help legitimise actions for people outside the group.
After a brief summary of the different moral viewpoints that exist on 
political assassinations it is still difficult to find one opinion that will justify 
political assassinations. It would not be correct to suppose that one moral 
opinion is wrong and the other is right. There are right answers’ depending 
upon what one believes is right. For example if an assassination is proved to be 
the best means available or if the consequences of an assassination were good 
then the killing would be justified. As a result this aspect of moral reasoning is 
a subjective issue. Each approach has its positive and negative aspects and it is 
a matter of one’s own moral judgement to choose the approach that is thought 
to be morally acceptable. Killing of innocent people in any form can never be 
justified whether that includes following a rational, consequentialist or
149
utilitarian approach, just war and terroristic approach. Therefore it is 
impossible to justify the taking of life whether it is by religion, promoting 
happiness, ending pain, suffering or development of the society.
Thus, next tliree case studies will examine the above analysed 
justifications which include instrumental, non utilitarian and terroristic 
justifications to see if the cases can be justified. Furthermore, the case studies 
will also examine whether the killings are political assassinations by 
comparing it to the definition of Kirkham, Levy and Crotty which state that an 
assassination can be a political assassination if it contain three specific 
elements. These are that the victim has to be a prominent political figure, there 
has to be a political motive and a political consequence of the act. The case 
studies will also put the assassinations tluough the classification forwarded by 
Kirkham, Levy and Crotty to categorise the assassinations. This will illustrate 
that this particular classification is the most efficient classification available. 
Finally, the case studies will then examine whether the assassinations succeed 
as an existential act.
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Chapter 3 
EGYPT 
I am Khalid Islambuli, I have killed Pharaoh and I do not fear death.^ ^^  
Introduction
Anwar Sadat, the President of Egypt, was killed on 6th October, 1981, while 
he was attending a military parade commemorating the anniversary of his 
most important military victory in the Sinai peninsula in 1973. He was killed 
by Lieutenant Khaled Ahmed Shawki al Islambouli, a member of the al 
Jihad organisation, an Islamic fundamentalist group.
In this chapter, the root causes, circumstances and consequences of this 
assassination are outlined. Consequently, the first part of this chapter plots 
the contemporary resurgence of Islamic fundamentalism in Egypt - linking 
thematically political developments to the growth and strength of 
fundamentalist groups. Primarily, this section will highlight how Egypt 
underwent a process of resurgence of political Islam since the 1970s which 
was characterised by the political aim of at establishing an Islamic state 
based on the Sharia (Islamic law). This arose from the Islamist project 
developed by the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood from the late 1920s on. This 
vigorous resurgence of political Islam in turn was characterised by a strong 
critique of the existing political order, and a level of militantism that made 
the use of violent tactics likely. In addition to the religious justification
'*'^ John L Esposito, ‘The Islamic Threat’, op.cit. p93.
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discussed in chapter 2, this chapter will also underline further religious 
justifications for the assassination. The chapter will then briefly summarise 
the assassination event and its consequences.
Historical Background 
Egypt under Nasser
It has been “suggested that Egypt is the only real state in the Arab world”.'^ '^^  
This makes it necessary to understand the different aspects of the state 
formation of Egypt in its early stages. In other words the growth of Egypt 
under both Gamal Abdul Nasser and Anwar Sadat. It would inadequate to 
try and understand Sadat’s assassination without trying to understand 
conditions within Egypt under Gamal Abdul Nasser, who took over Egypt 
more than forty years ago in an attempt to establish an authoritarian state. 
This was nationalist reaction to the imperialist rule in Egypt. Egypt was at a 
stage when everything was created to serve imperialist interests, “turning the 
country into a plantation for Western industry and its landed upper class’’."*^  ^
At the same time Egypt was also suffering from a number of other problems 
such as population giowth, urbanisation and unemployment. As a result the 
standard of living fell dramatically. Egypt was also in a state of political 
instability at the time. From this backgiound rose the need for a nationalist 
struggle, and groups like the “the Muslim brotherhood, radical nationalists,
Nazih N. Ayubi, Over Stating the Arab State. Politics and Society in the Middle East. 
(London; I.B Tauris, 1999) p99,
Raymond A. Hinnebusch Jr, Egyptian Politics Under Sadat. The Post-Populist 
Development of an Authoritarian -Modernising State. (Boulder; Lynner Rienner 
Publishers, 1988). p l l .
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secular leftist - entered the political arena demanding greater nationalist 
militancy and a redistribution of wealth and power"/^^ This culminated in 
the formation of the Free Officers by middle - class army officers who 
overthrew the monarchy in the revolution of 1952. They hoped to establish a 
authoritarian regime. Under such circumstances it was important that the 
notion of state building within Egypt be handed to a charismatic leader who 
happened to be Nasser. His policies were heavily driven by radical 
nationalist desires. Every policy was to be made from above but would be 
decided by the state. Policy process was very bureaucratic as:
policy making typically took place in small intra-elite 
arenas such as the Free Officers’ inner councils or the 
cabinet, though occasionally parliament, the press, or 
interest groups were permitted some input"^ ^^
However, things did not run smoothly. The bureaucracy was faced with 
classical bureaucratic problems such as inefficiency, lack of work ethic and 
irresponsible attitude. This was followed by the regime founding an Arab 
Socialist Union in 1962. However, it lacked any “ideological solidarity and 
organisational muscle, it failed even to serve as an effective instrument of 
mass mobilisation and policy implementation”."^  ^^  Although Nasser did 
achieve to some extent and succeeded in rebuilding Egypt, his pursuits were 
not entirely successful. It is believed that
'^ ‘®Ibid.pl2. 
‘^’ Ibid.pl7. 
Ibid. p 19.
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the very strengths and virtues on which it had risen -  
powerful charismatic leadership, a development strategy 
avoiding the worst costs of capitalism and communism. 
Pan- Arabism -  had negative sides and accumulating 
costs^ ^^
As a result Egypt’s institutions seemed too weak to deal with such forces. 
Therefore, “the decline of Nasirism spawned the forces which would give 
rise to Sadaism”."^ ®^
The Muslim Brotherhood
From ancient times, Egypt has occupied a central position in the politics of 
the Middle East mainly due to the strategic and economic importance of the 
Suez Canal, and the westernising reforms initiated by Egypt. Furthermore, 
Egypt is considered to be the home of political Islam in the world, and as a 
result is often referred to as the “Cradle of Islamism”"^ ^V^ ^
The desire to establish a state based on Islamic law has existed since 
the early revivalist movements of the Eighteenth Century"^^ .^ Egypt has been
Ibid. p29.
‘“ Ibid.
R Hrair Dekmejian, Islam In Revolution. Fundamentalism in the Arab world. (Syracuse: 
Syracuse University Press, 1985) p73.
The main reason for the rise of political Islam in Egypt has been discussed later on in the 
chapter.
'‘^ s^ee, for instance, Youseef Choueiri's chapter on revivalist movements, including 
Wahabism in Saudi Arabia. Choueiri, chapter 1, Islamic Fundamentalism.
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one of the epicentres of Islamic fundamentalism since the foundation of the 
Muslim Brotherhood founded by Hasan al-Bana in 1929. This was an 
institution founded for social and educational reform. The Muslim 
Brotherhood's “original aim was the reform of hearts and minds, to guide 
Muslims back to the true religion, and away from the corrupt aspirations and 
conduct created by European dominance”.'^ "^^  They regarded the Quran as 
their constitution. In many ways, Egypt during the interwar years was “the 
focus of conflicting social, economic, political and ideological pressures, 
which provided a favourable milieu for the rise of the Brotherhood”."^ ^^  The 
majority of the population, stricken by poverty, lack of education and 
housing problems were facing an increasingly strained economic situation 
characterised by unemployment and lack of government spending on 
agriculture, trade and business. Ideologically and politically, the Egyptian 
polity continued to be controlled by the British, leaving the cultural influence 
of Islam, and previous political structures to prosper underground. As a 
result, the Muslim Brotherhood grew considerably through the 1930s with 
many supporters ranging from professionals, bureaucrats, and students to 
workers and peasants, and it also strongly influenced the army and police. It 
was able to inculcate the population with a sense of security, identity and 
belonging.
At the same time, the Brotherhood also developed its own secret 
apparatus which was responsible for carrying out terrorist activity. After its 
formative years, the Muslim Brotherhood faced repression on a number of 
occasions like during the 1948 Palestinian war, when a member of the
'*^Sami Zubaida, op.cit. p48,
Hrair Dekmejian, op.cit. p74^
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Brotherhood shot Prime Minister Mahmoud Fahmi Nuqrashi/^^ The 
repression was a result of the regime sensing for the first time that the 
Muslim Brotherhood could pose a political threat. The Brotherhood had 
spread tremendously and needed to be brought under control. This was one 
of the earliest assassinations carried out by any Islamic fundamentalist group.
Under Lieutenant Colonel Gamal Abd al-Nasser, an ideology inspired 
by Marxist-Leninist social, economic and political principles was developed, 
making it apparent to the Muslim Brotherhood that, “Nasser did not want to 
establish an Islamic state but instead promoted a secular Arab nationalism 
and socialism”."*^  ^ Initially, the Muslim Brotherhood had supported Nasser’s 
coup, and it was only as it became apparent that Nasser had no intention of 
promoting the Brotherhood's political platform that the fundamentalists 
became Nasser's political en em ie s .A f t e r  assassination attempts on him 
and his ministers, Nasser outlawed the organisation. Mass arrests and the 
execution of six members led to the silencing of Islamic fundamentalism."*^  ^
However, in early 1964, “Nasserism became encumbered with the Syrian 
secession, the Yemeni War, and economic problems setting the stage for the 
Brotherhood’s re-emergence”."*^** Yet again, the regime was threatened by the 
Brotherhood thousands were put in jail and three of its prominent members 
were jailed and executed, including Sayyid Qutb, the spiritual leader of the 
group.
'’^ '^uqrashi assassinations was led to the assassination o f Hasan al-Bana on 12 February 
1949 by government agents.
'’^ ’john L Esposito and John O Voll, Islam and Democracv. (New York: Oxford University 
Press, 1996) pl74.
'*^ ®For further Reference see, Richard P Mitchell, The Society o f The Muslim Brothers. 
(New York: Oxford University Press, 1993).
'*29por Further Reference See, Richard P Mitchell, The Societv of The Muslim Brothers. 
(Oxford University Press, 1993).
'*^®Dekmejian, op.cit. p78.
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The failure of secular nationalism
The granting independence of Egypt from the British in 1922 (and 
subsequently from British and French influence) was a long and difficult 
process, and thus stood as a unifying symbol of strength, prestige and 
advantage in terms of state-building."*^* Consequently, Egypt became 
recognised as one the natural leaders of the Arab world upon 
independence."*^  ^ Yet, and paradoxically, this independence was 
characterised by the secularisation of Egyptian political structures and its 
cultural identity, exemplified by changes in title from Sultan to king, the 
constitution being modelled on that of Belgium and the turn towards 
democracy, and administrative and economic reforms, which lead to 
profound cultural and social change."*^  ^As Mark Juergensmeyer states,
the secular nation of the day was defined also by what 
it was not: it was not one of old ethic and religious 
identities that had made nations parochial and 
quarrelsome in the past."*^ "*
'Egypt was thought of as an autonomous province but in reality was a British colony. In 
1922 Egypt unilaterally declared its independence. After a bitter quarrel a treaty was signed 
in 1956 terminating British occupation of Egypt.
Arthur Goldschmidt Jr, A Concise Historv of the Middle East. ( Boulder: Westview 
Press, 1988) p229.
For Further Reference see, Goldschmidt Arthur Jr, A Concise Historv o f the Middle 
East.
“'^ '‘Mark Juergensmeyer, ‘The New Cold War’, op.cit. p i 1,
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The growth of secular nationalism, associated with the charismatic 
leadership of Nasser in the 1960s, gave Egypt a whole new sense of personal 
identity and allegiance to a nation-state rather than to religion, and secular 
nationalism was regarded as “a supra religion of its own, which a society 
could aspire to beyond any single religious allegiance”."*^  ^ Rupert Emerson 
acknowledged, however, “that although in the European experience the rise 
of nationalism coincided with a decline in the hold of religion, in other parts 
of the world such as Asia secular nationalism moved on and enveloped these 
regions the religious issue pressed more clearly to the fore again”/^^ This has 
certainly held true for Egypt. Despite the unifying influence of Nasser's 
strong political leadership, secular nationalism failed to address the 
economic and political needs of vast sections of society, and more 
particularly the recently urbanised poor and educated upwardly-mobile 
sections of the population. Imposed from above, it was perceived as an 
artificial import from the West."*^  ^ In particular, economic development was 
based upon the theory of modernisation which was further associated with 
Westernisation and secularisation. When the ideological, political and 
economic pledges which were the promises of secular nationalism proved to 
be a failure leading to unemployment, poverty, housing problems and 
political corruption, faith in secular nationalism, as well as Western models 
of behaviour, declined. Furthermore, religious leaders such as Sayyid Qutb 
believed and tried to convince the society that secular nationalism was not 
good for the people of Egypt as it did not represent people's desires.
^^ I^bid. p i3.
pl4.
Mark Juergensmeyer, ‘The New Cold War’, op.cit.
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Religious ideologues like Qutb also held the opinion that secular nationalism 
posed a great threat to religion.
More specifically, Saad Eddin Ibrahim summarises the main six 
reasons for the rise of contemporary fundamentalism in Egypt, which reflect 
the many facets of the failure of secular nationalism. Firstly, the failure of the 
regime to provide its population with the social equality and justice 
embodied in its socialist ideology struck at the heart of the urban poor. 
Secondly, the question of popular participation in the political process 
remained unaddressed by the regime, especially in terms of the establishment 
of fair elections. It is in these terms that Muslims fundamentalists highlighted 
the intrinsic lack of popular legitimacy of the regime, which was neither 
efficient, nor elected. Thirdly, the competence of the regime in the wise use 
of resources and in promoting development was widely questioned. Fourthly, 
the failure of the regime to fulfil its nationalistic promises was glaring, 
despite Nasser's early flamboyance in securing the Suez Canal and taking 
diplomatic initiatives with regard to Israel. In fact, the 1967 defeat against 
Israel came to symbolise the failure of Nasser and of independent Egypt to 
secure a place as the leader of the Arab world. Fifthly, and in more general 
terms, the preservation of Egypt's political and economic independence lay at 
the core of its nationalist identity. Once again, secularism failed because it 
took on the values of the coloniser it had expelled. In fact. Westernisation 
symbolised the very opposite of independence. And finally, in cultural terms, 
the question of balance between Westernisation and the preseiwation of 
Egypt’s own historic traditions, including Islam, had been inappropriately
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addressed through a policy of enforced secularisation without any real 
economic or cultural benefit for the majority"*^ .^
Thus, in the case of Egypt, the failure of Nasser's popular socialism left 
both a political and an ideological vacuum, which fundamentalists, with their 
innovative interpretation of the place of religion in public and private life and 
their vision for political change, filled with ease, with contemporary Islamist 
ideologues such as Sayyid Qutb introducing a novel way to combine 
religious beliefs with the struggle for political change, and thus challenging 
both Westernisation and secular nationalism."*^  ^ In fact, it is essentially 
believed that, “the Muslim countries of the Mediterranean basin and its 
environs, re- Islamization movements took over fi'om groups inspired by 
Marxism in challenging the foundation values of the social order”."*"***
Catalysts
Nasser’s death brought Anwar Sadat to the forefront of the political arena as 
the new President of Egypt in September 1970. However, Sadat, who lacked 
the charisma and the popular legitimacy of his predecessor, seemed an 
unlikely candidate for strong leadership."*"** Many fundamentalists within 
Egyptian society were pleased with the accession of Sadat, because they
'*^ ®See Saad Eddin Ibrahim in Bariy Rubin Islamic Fundamentalism in Egyptian 
Politics,(Houndmills : Macmillian Academic and Professional Ltd, 1990) p.4-5.
‘‘^ ^The ideology of Sayyid Qutb and other leading Islamist intellectuals is discussed later in 
this chapter in the context o f the connection between religious fundamentalism and the 
assassination o f Anwar Sadat.
'’'"'Gilles Kepel, The Revenge of God. The Resurgence of Islam. Christianity and Judasim 
in the Modem World. (Polity Press, 1994) p i3.
'’'’’John L Esposito, ‘The Islamic Threat’, op.cit. p94.
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thought of him as weak and easy for them to control."*"*^  However, in time 
Sadat was to prove that he was difficult to manipulate, shrewd and politically 
confident. He realised the importance of Islam in society, and increased the 
building of mosques, while the media began coverage of his praying in the 
mosques. Islamic learning became a compulsory subject and in 1971 Islam 
was declared the official religion of the state and Shariah was declared a 
source of legislation. All these were political moves in order to gain religious 
legitimacy. However, in an attempt to counter the growing socialist 
opposition he made the mistake of releasing many members of the Muslim 
Brotherhood from prison and encouraged them to join student unions, and 
other associations in society, thus allowing them to function properly."*"*^  The 
basic aim was to counter the socialist influence, and at the same to time 
establish Sadat's legitimacy as a ruler. Instead, releasing the Brothers from 
prison fuelled fundamentalist tendencies leading to violence that would 
become difficult to control in the future."*"*"*
Working backwards chronologically, several catalysts for the assassination 
of Sadat can be identified. In short, it was a political agenda backed by 
religious motives that eventually led to Sadat's elimination. However, closer 
scrutiny shows a chain of events combining a complex array of political 
errors, matched with the mismanagement of the growth of fundamentalist 
groups and of their increasingly militant and oppositional ideology.
'*'*^ For further Reference See, Hkst David and Beeson Irene, Sadat. Chapter One, The 
Crossing (Faber and Faber; London, 1981).
"*"*^ For further reference see, R Hrair Dekmejian Chapter Six, Egypt.
'’'’'’Sadat signed his death wanant 10 years ago, 10/11/1981. Indian Express (New Delink
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Political choices
After a reasonable amount of success in the 1973 war, policies initiated by 
Sadat marked a reversal of economic and social policies instigated by his 
predecessor, as well as changes in leadership style reflected in a different 
diplomatic posturing. Firstly, Sadat initiated an open door economic policy 
(infitah) which aimed at liberalising Egyptian economic activity by 
encouraging the growth of an independent private sector. Furthermore, a step 
was taken towards démocratisation and freedom of the press and freedom of 
expression were encouraged. Additionally, in 1976, Sadat reintroduced the 
multiparty system which was still restricted to three parties, excluding the 
Muslim Brotherhood and Nasserites"*"*^ . Secondly, Sadat turned away from 
the Soviet Union and turned towards the United States, and full diplomatic 
relations were established between the two in 1974, and “the years between 
1974-1977 witnessed what may be called a honeymoon in Egyptian- 
American relations, and most Egyptians welcomed it”."*"*** This so-called 
honeymoon was to be shaken by the 1977 food riots, which were sparked off 
because of the steep rise in prices and cut in government subsidies. These 
resulted in a severe blow to the power and prestige Sadat had accumulated up 
until that point. Finally, the most important change was towards peace with 
Israel. This was a total reversal of Nasser's policies, which supported a policy 
of limited war. The Camp David Accords and the signing of the peace treaty 
in 1979 were events which were not welcomed by many Egyptians. Finally,
‘’“’^ Sadat's own party 'Egypt Arab Socialist Party', the right 'The Liberal Right' and the left 
'The Unionist Progressive Party'.
'’'"’Saad Eddin Ibrahim, “Domestic Developments in Egypt”, edited by William B Quandt in 
The Middle East. Ten Years After Camp David. (Washington D.C, The Booking 
Institution, 1988) p26.
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Sadat made the diplomatic miscalculation of supporting the Shah of Iran and 
denouncing the Islamic revolution in Iran in 1979, prompting internal dissent 
among many Muslims at home and abroad, many of whom could hardly be 
classified as fundamentalists. Though Sadat used religion to legitimise all his 
policies starting fiom the 1973 Palestinian war, Islamic fundamentalist 
groups like the Muslim Brotherhood saw Sadat as moving away from the 
path of religion and they became some of his foremost critics. In fact, “Sadat 
was seen by his critics as a prime example of Egypt's Westernised elite in 
both his personal and his political life”."*"**^ In retaliation, Egypt was struck by 
a number of attacks in bars, cinemas, theatres and night-clubs, which 
expressed the fundamentalist grievances."*"*^
Fundamentalist resurgence
The Muslim Brotherhood grew in strength with the backing of the 
government. It resumed its publications and for a brief period denounced 
violence and opted for a policy of working for change. “The militants 
believed that the liberation of Egyptian society required that all true Muslims 
undertake an aimed struggle, or a holy war, against a regime which they 
regarded as oppressive, anti-Islamic and a puppet of West”."*"*^ The mid- 
1970s witnessed the emergence of other radical Islamic groups like al Takfir 
wal Hijra (Excommunication and Emigration), Islamic liberation Party (the 
military technical college organisation) and Tanzim al-Jihad (the Jihad 
Organisation, formed from the remnants of Islamic al-Jihad). Takfir wal
'’'’^ John L Esposito, ‘The Islamic Threat’, op.cit. p95.
For further reference see, R Hrair Dekmejian, Chapter Six, Egypt. 
'^’^ Esposito, ‘The Islamic Threat’, op.cit. p95.
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Hijra was a splinter organisation of the Muslim Brotherhood and shared the 
ideology of Hasan al-Bana and Sayyid Qutb. The leader of the organisation 
was Shukri Mustafa."*^ ** It fought against the state, which it considered to be 
infidel, and fought for the establishment of an Egyptian Islamic state. This 
group followed the pattern of withdrawing from society and establishing 
their own community based on the five pillars of Islam. Once this was 
established they planned to return to civilisation to try and conquer it. This 
group was responsible for the killing of ex-minister of religious affairs 
Muhammed al Zhahabi, and the regime arrested many members and Mustafa 
was executed.
The Islamic Liberation Party was formed in 1974 under the leadership 
of Salih Abd Allah Siriyya, a Palestinian. The ideology of Sayyid Qutb like 
hakimiyya and taI0r held special importance. The group believed in first 
reforming the individual and then turning to society."*^  ^ The group failed to 
take over the technical military college in 1974."*^  ^Al Jihad was founded in 
1978 and was far more radical. It was able to exert influence in the military 
and government institutions. Its most important feature was that it was led by 
a collective leadership as opposed to a single leadership. The main ideologue
further reference see, R Hrair Dekmejian, Chapter Four, Islamist Ideology and 
Practice.
For further reference see, Saad Eddin Ibrahim in Barry Rubin Islamic Fundamentalism 
in Egyptian Politics. Captor Two, Contemporary History of fundamentalism in Egypt. 
op.cit.
For further reference see, Abdel Azim Ramadan, “Fundamentalist Influence in Egypt: 
The Strategies o f the Muslim Brotherhood and the Takfir Groups”, edited by Martin E 
Marty and Scott R Appleby in Fundamentalism and the State, op.cit.
For further reference see, Abdel Azim Ramadan, ‘Fundamentalist Influence in Egypt: 
The Strategies of the Muslim Brotherhood and tlie Takfir Groups’, op.cit.
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was Abd al Salam Faraj."*^ "* It was responsible for the assassination of Sadat, 
which was followed by large - scale arrests of its members.
It was at this point of resurgence that Sadat realised that his “Islamic 
initiative proved counterproductive as he discovered what many have 
realised in other contexts - that reliance on Islam for political legitimacy is a 
two edged sword, capable of legitimating, of mobilising support but also of 
mobilising opposition”."*^  ^ The common thread in all these different groups 
was the ideology which was very similar to that of the Muslim Brotherhood, 
and the goal of Egyptian Islamic groups was “the creation of an Islamic state 
headed by a pious Muslim and enforcing Islamic law and social justice”."*^  ^
Thus,
while the general trend of returning to Islam aims to 
correct the society in a step by step fashion and to 
instil the values of the religion as a way of life, the 
extremist Islamic organisations have turned the 
phenomenon into a lever to fulfil political aims - 
whether tlirough democratic process in order to gain 
power by legal means, or through tenorism and other 
illegal means."*^ ^
454 For further reference see, Mohamed Heikal, Autumn of Fury, The Assassination of
Sadat, (London: Andre Deutch, 1983) Past 4, Thunderstruck.
John L Esposito and John O Voll, Islam and Democracv. op.cit. p i75.455
Hinnebusch, op.cit. p200.
'’^ ^Intemet, Background Material. The Threat o f Islamic Fundamentalism. gopher://israel- 
mfo.gov.il: p2.
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One of the first attacks by an Islamic fundamentalist group, the Islamic 
Liberation Organisation, was on the Technical Military Academy in April 
1974, and the next important event was the kidnapping and murder of the 
religious scholar and ex-religious affairs minister Husayn-al Dhahabi in 1977 
who was “strangled and shot through the left eye, a ritual form of 
execution”"*^  ^ by Takfir al-Hijira. This led to the suppression of the two 
groups and emergence of Jamaat al Jihad (Holy War society).
Religious Justification
The main religious aims underpinning Sadat's murder cannot be overlooked. 
The fundamentalists’ motivations possessed a strong messianic component. 
Irrespective of which group was responsible, it was obvious that “the aim 
was to commit an outrage for God”."*^  ^Furthermore, the victory in 1973 was 
attributed to the fact that God wanted the Islamic people to win, and even on 
the anniversary, God supported the fundamentalists: he also wanted Sadat 
dead. David Rapoport very significantly points out that, “the decision by Al- 
Jihad to use the trial in order to affirm responsibility seems with the spirit of 
the early sacred terrorists”."*^**
The teachings of Sayyid Qutb and Abu Abd al Faraj provide the 
guiding force of many contemporary fundamentalist organisations in the 
Muslim World, including the ones outlined above. Sayyid Qutb was 
associated with the Muslim Brotherhood but his ideology was also followed 
by members of Tahfir al Hijra and al Jihad. He was responsible for the re-
'’^ ^Beliind the Gunmen,Newsweek October 19,1981 p36.
'’^ ^Cult That Killed Sadat Has Deep Roots. Los Angeles Times 26/10/1981. 
'*®°David C Rapoport, ‘Sacred Terror’, op.cit. p i29.
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emergence of the Muslim Brotherhood in the 1960s which contributed to the 
intensification of Islamic radicalism as a challenge to the existing political 
order. Qutb was of the opinion that the West, secular states, communists and 
Jews were all trying to destroy Islam, the only true religion in the world. 
Muslims who associated themselves with foreign concepts like secular 
nationalism, democracy and communism were not true Muslims. In other 
words, “Islamic radicalism is a politico-cultural movement that postulates 
qualitative contradiction between Western civilization and the religion of 
Islam”."*^* As a result, a true Islamic society does not exist and now has to be 
created. “Islamic societies as a whole, the radicalists argue, have renounced 
their religion and relapsed to a state of ignorance (jahiliyya), not unlike that 
which flourished before the rise of Islam in Arabia”."*^  ^Qutb claims, “it is an 
intellectual and spiritual temper that becomes preponderant whenever those 
fundamental values, sanctioned by God for humanity, are replaced by 
artificial ethics based on temporary whims’’."*®^ Furthermore, “jahiliyya, or 
pagan ignorance, becomes a psychological state which rejects God's 
guidance, and a system that refuses to conduct its affairs according to God's 
commands”."*^"* Furthermore, Qutb claimed that obedience to a ruler was 
dependent on the establishment of the Sharia by the ruler. The ultimate 
struggle was between truth and falsehood. Therefore, it was a duty of the 
dedicated Muslim to wage a Jihad or Holy war against a sinful person or 
society. “The underlying notion of wai* against such evil enemies, domestic
Youssef M. Choueiri, The Political Discourse of Contemporaiy Islamist Movements 
edited by Anoushiravan Ehteshami in Islamic Fundamentalism (Boulder: Westview Press, 
1996) pl23.
'‘®^Ibid,p92.
'’“ Ibid. p94.
'’“ Ibid. p22.
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and external is distilled in the quintessential notion of Jihad”."*^  ^ He 
repeatedly cited the example of Muhammad’s emigration to Medina and then 
back to Mecca for Jihad; that is, “he considered it imperative that Muslims 
emulate the prophet to constitute a strong vanguard as a prelude to the final 
victory- the establishment of God’s sovereignty on earth.”"*^®
Muhammad Abd al Salam Faraj played an instrumental part in the 
assassination of Sadat. He was the ideologue of the al Jihad group and 
advocated radicalism in ideology and violent tactics. According to him, “the 
duty that has profoundly been neglected is Jihad and it calls for fighting 
which means confrontation and blood”."*^  ^ Sadat's assassin Islambouli was 
influenced by the ideologies of both Qutb and Faraj, but the influence of 
Faraj was more significant. In a nutshell, he believed that Sadat was an 
apostate. Islambouli stated that his actions were noble, and that if the leader 
is evil, then violence against him is justified. Islambouli believed that “the 
greatest prize for a believer is salvation, and to kill and be killed in the cause 
of God”."***^ Islambouli lived in a politically active environment and was 
influenced by violent speeches of Faraj who headed a cell of the Jihad 
movement. The role of religious leaders was important in radicalising the 
population to support them. This kind of sentiments grew mainly in the Ahli 
mosques which can be seen as a haven for fundamentalists. Faraj and 
Islambouli came in contact with each other n such a mosque and the latter 
was influenced by Faraj's idea of killing an apostate leader. Faraj believed 
Egypt was being ruled by secular laws in a country the where majority of the
Raphel Israeli, “Islamikaze and their Significance”, in Terrorism and Political Violence 
V ol9, No.3. (Frank Cass, 19997)p 109.
Dekmejian, op.cit. p87.
Juergensmeyer op.cit. p60.
Heikal, op.cit. p247.
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population was Muslim. He proclaimed that “if the rulers are hypocritical 
Moslems as the Tartars had been in Ibn Tamiya’s day, they should be 
eliminated”.'^ ^^  In this context, Sadat was a hindrance to the establishment of 
the Islamic state, and he had to be removed. This is evident from the that 
Islambouli stated he had not committed any crime and that he “ ... thought of 
only God."^ ^^
However, it must be noted that these religious motives remained 
grounded in an understanding of recent political events which form an 
intrinsic part of Islambouli's motivation. The political reasons stated by 
Islambouli can be summed up thus: firstly, “the inconsistency between 
Egypt’s existing laws - a fact which brought suffering upon the Muslims. (2) 
Sadat’s peace with Israel. (3) the arrest, persecution, and humiliation of 
Islamists in September 1981”."^^^ This is a particularly crucial point, as the 
assassination took place within a month of Sadat's arrest of 1500 
fundamentalists including Muslims and Coptic Christian religious leaders. In 
fact, Islambouli's brother, Muhammed al-Islambouli was a member of TaJ^r 
Wal Hijira was arrested with other Muslim fundamentalists.
The Assassination
As already discussed, Egypt witnessed new reforms and moves but did not 
reap the results expected and instead it backfired. For example, support for 
capitalism, the turn towards the United States, and the Camp David Accords 
of 1979 were not compliant with Islamic law. This prompted an upsurge in
Ibid. p248.
Ibid. p253.
Dekmejian, op cit p94.
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fundamentalist militantism which Sadat took firm action against on a number 
of occasions. In 1979 for instance he publicly issued warnings to the Muslim 
Brotherhood and suspended the publication of the al Dawah and al FTisam, 
the Brotherhood's journals. Yet, at the same time, he built a number of 
mosques, and religion became a compulsory subject in school, thus 
continuing Sadat's trend in claiming legitimacy by maintaining the monopoly 
in and control over the religious sphere.
Anwar Sadat was assassinated on October 6, 1981 at a military 
parade. The day held special significance as it was the anniversary of his 
greatest military victory in 1973. It all happened when, one of a fleet of 
trucks, came to a sudden halt. The general view was that the truck, which 
was supposed to carry artillery, seemed to break down. Then, six to eight 
soldiers came running toward the presidential reviewing stand and started to 
fire. Anwar Sadat was hit, and was pronounced dead a little over an hour 
after the shooting. However, one clear point was that Sadat's assassins were 
Islamic fundamentalists and “the attack on Sadat and his party was swift and 
shocking, occurring toward the end of what seemed to be a spectacular 
military parade”."^ ^^  Initially, the group suspected was Tahfir al Hijra, 
however, the group finally found responsible was al-Jihad. Another prime 
accomplice was Lieutenant Colonel Abbud Abd al-Latif Hasah al-Zumur 
who was in operational command. It is well known that clerical sanction is a 
necessary component of any violent act, but in this case the assassination was 
sanctioned by either by Faraj or Islambouli. There is also evidence that al- 
Jihad had considerable support from within the military, the security services
He Moves to Assume Real Authority. Los Angeles Times 7/10/1981.
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and governmental organisations this is proved by the fact that Islambouli was 
in the military, assuring easy access to the President.
Further conclusions can be drawn from the circumstances surrounding 
the assassination. Firstly, Faraj and Zumar had on a number of occasions 
considered killing the President, but with the appointment of Islambouli to 
participate in the 1973 October celebration, they took the opportunity 
seriously and carefully planned the assassination event. This illustrates clear 
premeditation to carry out the plan under the best possible conditions. 
Secondly, the significance of the time and place was essential, as it was in 
October 1973 that the Egyptian army crossed the Suez Canal and broke 
through Israel's Bar-Lev Line in Sinai, proving Sadat's authority and prestige. 
The symbolic significance of the date and location of the assassination was 
thus central. Additionally, the act was committed in front of a significant 
crowd to publicise their cause well known and thereby gain supporters. Yet, 
at the same time, efforts were made by the fundamentalists to create fear 
amongst the officials, which might have resulted in the regime agreeing to 
some of their demands.
Consequences
The aftermath of the assassination was to prove difficult for Hosni Mubarak, 
the new President of Egypt. He was expected to deal with the consequences 
of both Nasser and Sadat's policies. “Mubarak's job was never going to be an 
easy one, as he needed to deal simultaneously with the economic crises and
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with Islamic radicals” On the other hand, the goal of the ftindamentalists 
was to renew Islam and establish an Islamic state, which they have still not 
achieved. The peace treaty with Israel still exists and considerable efforts 
have been made to build a durable Peace Process, particularly since the early 
1990s. The assassination of Sadat led to arrests and execution of individual 
members, but it marked a halt in the activities of the Islamist groups.'^ '^^  The 
three main fundamentalist groups remaining are the Muslim Brotherhood, Al 
Jihad and Al-Takfîr w'al-HiJra. Although at present the fundamentalists may 
not be capable of seizing control of the state, they are capable of challenging 
the political order politically and through violence. Consequently, one of the 
priorities of the regime remains to control the growth and virulence of these 
groups. At the same time, it is important to remember that fundamentalism 
also arose due to socio economic problems which remain to be addressed.
In this sense the problem of the Muslim Brotherhood remains 
preoccupation, for it is perceived that, “this whole problem of terrorism 
throughout the Middle East is a by-product of our own, illegal Muslim 
Brotherhood”."^ ^^  After the accession of Hosni Mubarak, the regime took a 
path of appeasement towards the Brotherhood by releasing its supreme guide 
Omar al-Tilmassni and other members."^^  ^ The regime allowed the 
Brotherhood to resume some of its activities in order to counter balance the 
other radical fundamentalist groups in society. The regime believed that if
"^’^Nazih N  Ayubi, The State and Public Policies in Egypt since Sadat. (Reading: Itiiaca 
Press, 1991) p229.
'^ '^*For further reference see, Saad Eddin Ibrahim in Bany Rubin Islamic Fundamentalism in 
Egyptian Politics. Captor Two, Contemporary History of fundamentalism in Egypt, op.cit. 
'*’^Joel Campagna, “From Accommodation to Confrontation: The Muslim Brotherhood in 
the Mubarak Years”, in Journal of International Affairs, op.cit. p298.
‘‘^ F^or further reference see, Ramadan Abdel Azim, ‘Fundamentalist Influence in Egypt: 
The Strategies of the Muslim Brotherhood and the Takfir Groups’, op.cit.
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the Muslim Brotherhood could be controlled then this would help to keep at 
par the other fundamentalist groups or prevent new groups from emerging. 
With the relative freedom that the Brotherhood gained they refrained from 
violence and attacking the government, and tried to increase their 
involvement in social activities like providing food and relief after the 
earthquake in 1992, distributing money for educational programmes and 
building houses."^^  ^ This was aimed at increasing support for the group 
among the population as well as providing political legitimacy.
The Brotherhood made its way into the political arena through an alliance 
with the Wafd party, and in the 1984 elections gained 15 per cent of the 
votes and 13 per cent of the s e a t s . A t  this point the Brotherhood started to 
voice its goals more openly and stated that its ultimate aim was the 
promulgation of Sharia as the law of the land. In the 1987 elections, the 
Brotherhood's success continued and it began to infiltrate the professional, 
student and other similar associations which gave it legitimate means to 
express their political aims. These associations provided the Brotherhood 
with huge financial benefits."^^  ^This proved to constitute a renewed political 
threat to the regime. With a partially legitimate political stand, the 
Brotherhood began to openly criticise the Peace Process. Allegations arose of 
connections between the Muslim Brotherhood and other radical 
fundamentalist groups which resorted to assassinations and other terroristic 
activity on behalf of the Brotherhood. For instance, the 1992 attack on
fulther reference see, Campagna Joel, “From Accomadation to Confrontation: The 
Muslim Brotherhood in the Mubarak Years”, in Journal of International Affairs, summer 
1996, 50, No l,p292.
'^’^Nazih N A yubi, ‘The State and Public Policies in Egypt since Sadat’, Chapter 10. op.cit. 
‘*^ F^or furtiier reference see, Joel Campagna, “From Accommodation to Confrontation: The 
Muslim Brotherhood in the Mubarak Years”., op.cit.
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tourists and the assassination of Faraj Foda by Islamic Militants were not 
criticised by the Brotherhood."^^® Predictably enough, the Mubarak 
government soon found itself in confrontation with the Brotherhood. 
Consequently, various laws were passed to restrain the Brotherhood's 
activities such as their role in associations and in the election process, and to 
lessen their support within the population. In 1995, as the elections 
approached, harsh methods were employed against the Brotherhood and 
1,392 Islamist supporters and poll watchers were arrested, and 81 Muslim 
Brothers were prosecuted as the regime was threatened by its own decline in 
legi t imacy.Thus ,  today, “...the government had decided to reduce the 
Muslim Brothers influence and deal with them in their official capacity of 
being an illegal movement, although it had tacitly permitted them to operate 
in the past few years”."^ ^^  Though these groups still remain small they show 
signs of breaking free and gathering wider support among the population.
Having examined the case study, an attempt will now be 
made to draw the threads together and to offer explanations of, and 
justifications for, the political assassination.
The three questions that were mentioned in the introduction will be 
analysed in turn. These were:
• Can the assassination analysed in the thesis be categorised as a 
political assassination?
Joel Campagna, op.cit. p289.
‘*®*See, Saad Eddin Ibrahim Islamic Fundamentalism in Egyptian Politics. Chapter Two in, 
“Contemporary History o f fundamentalism in Egypt”, op.cit.
Joel Campagna, op.cit. p302.
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• Can the justifications that are analysed justify the political
assassination in this thesis?
• Can political assassination ever be successful as a political strategy, or
is it only successful as an existential act?
Let us begin with the first question.
Can the assassination analysed in the thesis be categorised as a political 
assassination?
In Chapter One, we established that Kirkham, Levy, and Crotty is the most 
accurate as it focused on the reasons behind assassinations as opposed to the 
other typologies such as those offered by Richard B. Laney, Oscar Jaszi and 
James W. Clai'ke which did not really address issues such as motives. Laney’s 
classification does not address the three factors of the victim being a 
prominent figure, the political motive and political consequences. 
Furthermore, the classification has certain factors, such as the number of 
assassins, which do not contribute to the understanding of what constitutes a 
political assassination. Jaszi’s classification confuses the two issues of 
political assassination and political murder. Political murder is an ambiguous 
term, but strictly speaking, means the premeditated killing of an individual or 
group of individuals in order to get, maintain, or extend the power of the state 
in the interest of an individual or group. When the killing is directed at well - 
defined individuals, it would be more correct to speak of political 
assassinations. Since there is a difference between the two it would not be
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accurate to adopt a classification that combines the two things. Clarke’s 
classification focuses on the type of assassins: that is, whether they are 
psychopaths or have aggressive behaviour. This type of classification cannot 
offer a sound basis to the understanding of what constitues a political 
assassination.
Most importantly, the classification by Kirkham, Levy and Crotty 
does address the three important elements, i.e. prominent figure, political 
motive and political consequences that are needed for an assassination to be 
classified as a political assassination. Kirkham, Levy, and Crotty classified 
assassinations into five main categories. These were: elite substitution - the 
assassination of a political leader without a major systemic or ideological 
change visualised; tyrannicide - the assassination of a despot in order to 
replace him with a better, usually less oppressive, more rational ruler; 
terroristic - assassination on a mass and indiscriminate basis in order to 
demonstrate the government’s inability to rule, or to let a minority govern a 
majority; anomic - assassination of a political figure for private reasons; and 
propaganda by deed - assassination which aims to direct attention to a specific 
problem. This is, however, the most appropriate classification that exists. The 
classification would be improved if elite substitution actually implied the 
assassination of a political leader in order to effect major systemic or 
ideological change. This thesis therefore will consider elite substitution to be 
the assassination of a political leader with a major systemic or ideological 
change visualised. Furthermore, terroristic assassination does not necessarily 
mean that it has to be on a mass and indiscriminate scale. In fact a political 
assassination in most cases is going to target one individual and it is unlikely
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to be on a mass level. Therefore, in this thesis terroristic assassination will 
imply the political assassination of an individual in a discriminate way by 
terrorists. This typology will thus be more effective. Each type of political 
assassination mentioned by Kirkham, Levy and Crotty has its own distinctive 
characteristics but for the assassinations examined in this thesis to be 
categorised as political this thesis will try to explain which one is most suited 
and why.
Sadat’s Assassinations
With regard to the assassination of Anwar Sadat, from its characteristics that 
it is more suited to the tyrannicide and terroristic categories, and to a lesser 
degree to elite substitution. Elite substitution maintains that the assassination 
should always be directed towards a political figure with a major systemic or 
ideological change being visualised. This category further refers to a power 
struggle when a particular leader is assassinated and replaced by someone else 
from an opposing group at the same level. With regard to the assassination of 
Sadat, elite substitution is significant as the assassination was directed against 
a political figure and a major systemic change was visualised. Sadat was the 
President of Egypt and by assassinating him, the assassins hoped to reverse 
his policies. All the policies pursued by Sadat were seen as opposing 
Egyptian interests. More importantly, all of Sadat’s policies illustrated that 
Sadat was moving away from the true path of religion. Sadat, however, was 
not assassinated in order from him to be replaced by another leader of the 
opposition. There was no such vision at the time. With respect to tyrannicide.
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it is important to remember that from an assassin’s point of view Sadat was a 
tyrant. This is because Sadat tried to impose polices that could be viewed as 
dictatorial. Also, moving Egypt from the true path of religion was a sign of a 
tyrant according to the assassins. Tyiannicide was definitely not the nature of 
Sadat’s assassination. He was not a despot. Sadat attempted to liberalise the 
society. A despot would never attempt to initiate policies that would liberalise 
society. His .main fault was that he initiated policies that did not appeal to a 
small group of the population, namely the extremist population. There was no 
endeavour to replace Sadat by a better, less oppressive and more rational 
ruler. As a result, the assassination cannot be termed a case of tyrannicide. 
Furthermore, the political assassination of Sadat was not entirely terroristic 
according to the definition provided by Kirkham, Crotty and Levy. That is, 
the assassination was not on a mass and indiscriminate basis in order to 
demonstrate the government’s inability to rule, or to let a minority govern a 
majority. There was no attempt to demonstrate the government’s inability to 
rule because the perpetrators already believed that the government could not 
rule and that the Egyptian people were aware of it. Furthermore, there were 
no intentions of letting a minority government rule by assassinating the 
President. The assassination of Sadat was terroristic in so far as the assassin 
was a member of a terrorist group called the al-Jihad. It was carried out in a 
discriminate fashion against a political figure. Therefore, the political 
assassination of Sadat can be categorised as a terroristic assassination 
according to the definition put forward earlier. Anomic assassination is the 
most far-fetched of all the categories with regard to the assassination of Sadat. 
Although, anomic assassination is directed towards a political figure the
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assassination is carried out for private reasons. Any such assassination does 
not classify as a political assassination. It completely undermines the concept 
of an assassination being termed political. Finally, the assassination cannot be 
categorised as propaganda by deed, because the assassination was not aimed 
at directing attention to a particular problem. The aims of the perpetrators 
were to put an end to the policies initiated by Sadat and to take Egypt back on 
the path of religion. As a result, the political assassination cannot be 
categorised as propaganda by deed. Thus, the assassination in question may 
be classed as an example of elite substitution and terroristic assassination."^^^
Can the justification that are analysed justify the political assassinations in 
this thesis?
With regard to the consequentialist/utilitarianist debate examined previously, 
it was shown that the debate focuses on the consequences of the act. If the 
consequence of an act promotes happiness, then the act is justified. Similarly, 
with regard to utilitarianism if an act leads to greater utility, then the act is 
justified, as discussed above. Therefore, according to both the above claims, a 
political assassination would be justified if it promoted happiness or led to 
greater utility. The claims, however, made by the assassins in each case 
illustrate similar arguments. In all three assassinations the assassins 
Islambouli, Amir and LTTE committed the assassination with the
For further reference of the conditions in Egypt prior to the assassination look at Hrair 
R, Dekmejian ‘Islam in Revolution. Fundamentalism in the Arab World. John, L Esposito 
‘The Islamic Threat’. Raymond A Hinnebusch ‘Egyptian Politics Under Sadat. The Post -  
Populist Development o f an Authoritarian State’ and Youssef Choueiri ‘Political Discourse 
of Contemporary Islamist Movements’ in Islamic Fundamentalism. Also my own 
contextual discussion in the case studies will provide a comprehensive background to the 
assassination.
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understanding that the deaths of their victims would lead to happiness and 
greater utility. However, in each of the cases this was not achieved and in this 
respect the consequentialist/utilitarianist debate failed to meet the claims of 
the debate. This will become clear in the following discussion.
Consequentialism / Utilitarianism
According to consequentialism the assassination of Sadat cannot be justified 
because the consequences of the act were not good for the whole society. 
Sadat was a major threat to Egyptian society, according to certain sections of 
the population. He was responsible for taking Egypt away from the path of 
Islam. Furthermore, Sadat was assassinated because he had extended friendly 
relations with Israel, an enemy of all Islamic states. This was not felt by the 
entire Egyptian population but only by the fundamentalist population of 
Egypt. This implied that the assassination of Sadat cannot therefore be 
justified. According to utilitarianism the assassination of Anwar Sadat cannot 
be justified. All versions of utilitarianism states that an act can be justified if it 
promotes happiness, pleasure or maximises utility. Most importantly, 
however, the truth of the matter is that the assassination provided happiness 
and pleasure to only a small minority of the Egyptian population, namely the 
fundamentalists. Therefore, Sadat’s assassination brought happiness to only a 
small section of the population. It was not a universal feeling. In all versions 
of utilitarianism, whether it is classical, ideal, act or rule utilitarianism, the 
main aim is to further happiness and utility. This was not achieved by Sadat’s 
death. Theological utilitarianism, which states that the promotion of
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happiness is the intention of God, does not, justify the assassination either 
since only the assassin in this case would have been of the opinion that he was 
fulfilling Gods’ wishes. This was not a universal belief. Thus, in terms of both 
consequentialism and utilitarianism the assassination did not fulfil the aims, 
and the assassination cannot be justified.
Just War
As already established previously in the thesis, the Just War tradition has had 
a long history of development. It has had the opportunity to establish itself as 
a major debate in the academic sphere in terms of providing justification for 
acts of violence. Therefore, while trying to establish justifications for political 
assassinations the Just War tradition seems to fulfil this role. Although the 
Just War tradition inherently has a Christian heritage, in the contemporary 
world the Just War tradition has been incorporated in International Law and is 
therefore no longer a purely Christian tradition in any way. As a result, the 
justification for the use of force in any circumstance can be debated through 
the Just War tradition. For example Just War can be used to justify 
tyrannicide. Similarly justification for political assassinations can also be 
analysed through the Just War tradition. The six requirements of Just War will 
each be explained in relation to political assassinations, with the aim of 
finding out whether Just War can justify an act of political assassination. The 
six requirements of Just War will be discussed below with reference to 
political assassination.
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The first requirement of Just War is Just Cause which maintains that 
the use of force is permitted if there is a real danger. By the same rules 
political assassinations can be committed if there is real danger and if such 
action would protect innocent people and would improve living conditions. 
The political assassination of Sadat did fiilfil this criterion. The assassin 
Islambouli believed that there was a Just Cause as Sadat’s death would make 
life better for the Egyptian population. Therefore, fi-om an assassin’s point of 
view there is always a just cause behind committing a political assassination. 
However, there are always other alternatives to rushing into peipetrating 
political assassinations. Most times other options are not even considered. 
Therefore the entire notion of just cause is very subjective. As mentioned 
earlier Sadat’s assassin did believe that assassinating Sadat would rid Egypt of 
any real danger. In this case other alternatives such as actively voicing protests 
to the President, might have offered other ways of trying to improve conditions 
within Egypt. Policies that were implemented by Sadat were reactionary to 
contain the situation in the country. It seems that a Just Cause for the 
assassination of Anwar Sadat did not exist.
The second requirement states that a state can use force only if there 
is Right Intention. If this is the case then the assassination of Anwar Sadat 
cannot be justified, because who is to decide what is the right intention? The 
assassin will always think that he has the right intention for carrying out the 
assassination and this may not be the case for other people. As a result, right 
intention is not a requirement in the case of assassination.
According to popular authority and public declaration the authority for 
the use of force needs to come from the appropriate authority. This does raise
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the question about what is appropriate authority. With reference to political 
assassinations, this very rarely to going to be the case. There is never going to 
be an appropriate authority as in most cases political assassinations are carried 
out by terrorist groups. Furthermore, this requirement states that there should 
be a proper process that is made public to both within the group and to its 
enemy. There is no way that it could ever be considered that a political 
assassination can be carried out through the right channels. Additionally, it is 
not possible ever to publicise plans of an assassination especially to the enemy, 
as this would make it difficult to plan an assassination as the target might take 
extra precautions. Therefore, the decision was not made by the proper 
authority and the decision to assassinate Sadat could not have been made 
public.
Furthermore, Just War maintains that a state should only use force if it 
is the last resort. This is one instance within the Just War tradition where there 
is some support for political assassinations. Sadat’s assassin was of the opinion 
that there was no other way to prevent Egypt moving away from the path of 
Islam and the only option that was left would be to assassinate Sadat. Thus, 
according to the assassin this was the last resort.
Probability of Success is the next requirement. According to this if 
there is going to be any impact from the taken action then the act cannot be 
justified. Most assassinations are carried out in the hope that there will be 
considerable impact on the situation following the assassination. However, 
there is no guarantee that this will be the case. Sadat’s assassination did not 
result in any significant change.
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And the final requirement is proportionality, which states that the cost 
of the use of force must be in proportion to the good expected from taking up 
arms. The damage inflicted and the cost incurred from committing such an act 
as a political assassination is never going to produce good. A political 
assassination can create an unstable condition and this could mean that the 
action was counterproductive. Sadaf s assassination did not change things 
within Egypt.
Terroristic Justifications
Since most political assassinations are committed by terrorist groups, this form 
of justification is very important especially with reference to the political 
assassinations of Anwar Sadat of Egypt and Yitzhak Rabin of Israel. It is 
important to remember that despite the importance of this form of justification 
there is very little in the literature which directly provides the link with 
justification. As mentioned before, the main sources of terroristic justification 
are religious ideologues, texts and scriptures. The most important sources for 
justification are religious ideologues, who in turn use religious texts to justify 
their preaching. Religious ideologues not only justify actions but they are also 
responsible for choosing the course of action that needs to be taken. This form 
of justification is used to legitimise any actions taken by religious extremists. 
In particular assassins use such methods to justify political assassinations as in 
most cases the assassins are related to religious terrorist groups. This is, 
however, not the case with all assassins.
184
Since most political assassinations are committed by terrorist groups 
this form of justification is very important specially with reference to the 
political assassinations of Anwar Sadat of Egypt. More specifically in the 
Egyptian context the link between religion and violent acts is strong. In most 
cases of violent attacks the action is justified by religion. Therefore, the role of 
ideology is very significant. This can be seen from a statement from the leaders 
of the Islamic movement in Morocco: Abd al-Salam Yasin states that “people 
don’t come to Islam as an alternative to their social ills. People come to Islam 
in response to a call which goes deep into the human spirit” It is a vacuum 
within people that religion seems to fill and it becomes a basis for an ideology. 
Therefore, this ideology for groups is derived from religion. The evidence can 
be seen from the fact that to begin with, Anwar Sadat “was officially presented 
as the ‘believer’ president, and in photographs, interviews, speeches, and 
public appearances displayed a conspicuous attachment to religion”."^ ^^  This 
emphasised the importance of the President of Egypt as a religious person. 
Therefore, his policies towards fundamentalists, such as arresting 1500 of them 
and his policy towards Israel were also seen as dishonouring religious beliefs, 
and therefore in turn dishonouring the countries’ religious b e l i e f s . T h e  
Muslim Brotherhood was one of the main movements at the time and 
Islambouli, Sadat’s assassin, was associated with the Muslim Brotherhood. 
Hasan Al Banna, the founding father of the Muslim Brotherhood, set the tone
Valerie J, Hoffman, Muslim Fundamentalists: Psychosocial Profiles. In Fundamentalism 
Comprehended. Edited by Martin E Marty and R. Scott Appleby. p209.
Patrick D. Gaffney, The Local Preacher and Islamic Resurgence in Upper Egypt, An 
Anthropological Perspective. In Religious Resurgence. Contemporaiv Cases in Islam. 
Christianity, and Judaism. Edited by Richard T. Antoun and Mary Elaine Hegland 
(Syracuse University Press,1987). p37.
It is important to remember that the radicalisation Islamic fundamentalist ideology of  
Egypt had begun during Nasser’s era. It was during this era did Sayyid Qutb questioned the 
ideology prevalent at the thne.
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by using religion to justify violence. He stated that Islam is a homeland and 
nationality for all Muslims. This sort of statement really laid the foundations 
for Islam being regarded as a very important aspect of being Muslim. It was 
the intensity of religious belief that enabled ideologues to use religion to justify 
violence. It has therefore been the perfect tool. The main influential figures or 
the Muslim Brotherhood were Sayyid Qutb and Muhamud Al- Faraj. There 
were many previous occasions when there were proposals to assassinate Sadat, 
but there were rejected by religious ideologues as Sadat would have escaped. 
This proves that “the leadership apparatus would decide on specific targets of 
terroristic action only after seeking clearance from the majlis as legal 
justification and sanction”."^ ^^  Hence the importance of the terroristic 
justification for assassins is crucial. Sadat’s assassin Islambouli was influenced 
by the main figures in the Brotherhood.
Thus, most assassins want their actions to be legitimised. This mostly 
reflects on their personal insecurities. They want to know that others will 
support their action, and therefore the groups that assassins belong to become 
very integral to their commitment.
Do political assassinations only succeed as an existential acts?
Before answering this question one really need to understand and explain 
what is meant by the term succeed. In other words when is a political 
assassination successful? In practical terms the success of a political 
assassination can be judged in terms of whether a political assassination did
Dekmejian, op.cit. p89-90.
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achieve the desired aim. This mainly refers to specific societal changes that 
were realised as a result of an assassination. Furthermore, one needs to 
question what is meant by existential? The meaning of existential is literally 
existence. People are firee agents and are free to makes choices. It is these 
choices that determine the nature of the people. This highlights the 
importance of making choices. As a result it is these choices made by people 
that determine their existence. For example a man who joins the army feels 
that being part of the army and fighting and dying for the army is his duty and 
it determines his existence. Therefore, for a solider fighting is an existential 
act. The sole purpose of his being has been to fight and it represents him. This 
is what Christopher Coker refers to when he discusses the existential warrior 
in his book ‘Waging War Without Warriors’. Coker refers to the Japanese 
Samurai with regard to the existential warrior. He sums it up very well when 
he states “violence is not only instrumental; it is also the moral essence of the 
warrior. For true warriors, war making is not so much what they do but what 
they are”."^ ^^  Therefore, this explains the true existential nature of an assassin. 
For an assassin, the ultimate aim is to kill and sacrifice his own life if the need 
arose. Coker writes “for the samurai, death had meaning. So too did honour", 
courage and loyalty, all of which gave life meaning too”."^ ®^ Thus, 
comparisons can also be drawn with respect to the contemporary assassin. 
Just as for the samurai the concept of death for an assassin is an essential 
component of the job. In fact, an assassin will choose to be an assassin with 
the clear understanding that in most cases carrying out his job successfully 
can lead to the possibility of his death. At the same time along side this
Christopher Coker, “Waging War Without Warriors? The Changing Culture of Military 
Conflict”. (Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers,2002) p6.
Coker, op.cit. p7.
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existential side, there lies the expressive side of the actions committed by an 
assassin. Coker discusses the importance of symbolism with regards to acts of 
violence which also forms an important aspect of an assassin’s work. He 
maintains that “symbolism involves the meaning the use of violence has both 
for the victim (anxiety and humiliation, both of which were involved on 
September 11) and for the offender (status, prestige, and reputation in his own 
group, in this case the Islamic world)."^ ®® This is certainly the case for all the 
three assassins in the three political assassinations examined in this thesis. 
The importance of symbolism to the offender and victim is not only restricted 
to the Islamic world.
Related to the question of the existential act is the issue of moral right or 
wrong. Michael Walzer in his article ‘Political Action: The Problem of Dirty 
Hands’ points out when asked the question
do you think you can govern innocently? My own answer 
is no, I don’t think I could govern innocently -  nor do 
most of us believe that those who govern us are innocent 
-  as I shall argue below -  even the best of them. But this 
does not mean that it isn’t possible to so the right thing 
while governing. It means that a particular act of 
government (in a political party or in the state) may be 
exactly the right thing to so in utilitarian terms and yet
490 Coker, op.cit. p5.
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leave the man who does it guilty of a moral wrong. The 
innocent man, afterwards, is no longer innocent"^^^
Although in his article Walzer discusses the issue of dirty hands ft"om the 
point of view of leaders, similar parallels can be seen with assassins. A 
political leader has certain policies or aspects he has to pursue. Therefore the 
decisions taken by a political leader are not judged on the basis of what is 
morally right or wrong but rather it is the job of the political leader to carry 
out his duties, which may entail unpopular responses. This illustrates the 
existential nature of a political leader. The article really demonstrates that 
regardless of the moral issues sometimes it is necessary to pursue certain 
policies.
Finally, it is also important to understand the meaning of success. 
This success can be explained on three levels. The first is success in terms of 
the immediate consequence of the assassination. This implies whether the 
assassin killed the target or not. Secondly success can be implied in a general 
sense. In other words whether the assassination can be understood as an 
existential act. Finally, there is what success means to the assassin. There are 
three levels at which success can be understood in this sense.
As mentioned earlier, for an assassin, similarly to a samurai the true 
reason of his/her existence is to kill and die in the process. If we examine the 
three cases in the thesis to find out whether political assassinations succeed as 
existential acts, then the answer would be yes. Firstly, to take the political 
assassination of Anwar Sadat, the assassin Islambouli was very committed to
Michael Walzer, Political Action: The Problem of Dirty Hands in War and Moral 
Responsibility. A Philosophy & Public Affairs Reader. p63.
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the cause. He had been planning the assassination for quite some time. This 
became the mainstay of his existence. He was fully aware of the fact that by 
committing a political assassination in a military parade he was putting his 
life in danger by making himself an easy target. All this planning and 
organisation showed his commitment to the cause. Islambouli really wanted 
Sadat dead. Mohammed Heikal states that when Islambouli “came face to 
face with Sadat he forgot everything else in his hatred for the man he 
regarded as the arch-tyrant”."^ ^^  In terms of immediate success of the act the 
assassin was successful. Islambouli did successfully assassinate Sadat. The 
assassin was also successful in the existential sense as the main aim of the 
assassin was to assassinate Sadat. Thus, Islambouli was successful in carrying 
out an existential act. The death of Sadat was what the assassin lived and 
aimed for and in the end, this goal was fulfilled. Finally, Islambouli would 
have considered his actions to be a success as he assassinated his target. The 
assassination was committed in the hope that Sadat’s death would change the 
path that Egypt was following to a more Islamic way of life. The immediate 
consequences of Sadat’s death did not achieve this, but in the assassin’s mind, 
he did successfully assassinate his target.
Thus, Islambouli the assassin was very sure in his mind about what he 
was going to do. The assassin was also aware that it was inevitable that the 
action would either mean death while carrying out the act, or he would be 
arrested. This however did not distract him from his mission. So far as the 
target of the assassination was concerned, Islambouli was clear about who he
Heikal, op.cit. p255.
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wanted to assassinate and therefore planned and trained with this specific 
purpose in mind.
Conclusion
A close examination of the assassination of Anwar Sadat reveals that Egypt 
faced a number of political changes which resulted in fundamentalist 
resurgence in the early years. At the same time there was a huge revival of 
political Islam which was used to influence the political order. Sadat was seen 
as the person responsible for all the problems faced by Egypt at the time, and 
this prompted his assassination. However, analysing the assassination from a 
theoretical perspective illustrated that it is be hard to justify the assassination 
of Sadat.
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Chapter 4 
ISRAEL 
It was God. Amir replied.^ ^^  
Introduction
Yitzhak Rabin, the Prime Minister of Israel, was shot on November 5, 1995 
and was officially pronounced dead at 11:10 p.m. later that evening. The 
perpetrator was a twenty - five year old man called Yigal Amir, a Jewish 
religious fundamentalist. Rabin was bom on March 1, 1922. He was seen as 
a “soldier, political leader, peace maker and the last representative of a 
founding generation that literally created the state of Israel with its bare 
hands”."^ "^^ “Rabin was a classic product of the Zionist revolution that began 
in Eastern Europe at the end of the nineteenth century and expressed its aims 
in Palestine during the fifty years that followed”."^ ^^  The basic idea behind the 
revolution was to save the Jews from anti - Semitism. It aimed to transfer 
Jews from Europe to a country of their own. Rabin's role from the War of 
Independence up to his assassination resulted in remarkable success, yet he 
managed to make political mistakes and enemies which cost him dearly. 
However, it seems that as he was about to achieve the dream of every 
Palestinian and many Israelis, his mistakes weighed more heavily then his 
achievements in the eyes of the right - wing parties and fundamentalist 
groups. Rabin's effort to secure peace was regarded by some as his worst
Rabin’s assailant: I did stop the peace Process,7/11/1995, St. Louis Post Dispatch. 
International Herald Tribune (Paris), 8 November 1995. Rabin's Example. Eves on 
Mount Herzl.
See Micheal Karpin and Ina Friedman, Murder In The Name Of God, The Plot to Kill 
Yitzhak Rabin. (London: Granta Publications, 1998) p38-39.
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move. In 1967, Rabin was responsible for the Israeli victory in the Six-Day 
war over Jordan, Egypt and Syria and brought Palestinians under Israeli rule 
in the West Bank and Gaza."^ ^^  As a result, the Six-Day war was an 
important achievement for the Israelis as it marked the defeat of the three 
Arab states. It made the Israeli people believe the redemption process had 
already begun. However, since Rabin's most cherished dedication was to the 
Peace Process with the Palestinians which he had been advocating for some 
time, his brutal assassination left the question open as to whether the Peace 
Process would gather enough momentum to reach a positive conclusion. In 
many ways, Rabin's assassination was an attempt to paralyse the Peace 
Process.
This chapter also analyses the causes, conditions and consequences of 
the assassination of Yitzhak Rabin. Firstly, the deep desire to hold on to the 
land of Israel is also analysed within the context of the Holocaust. Secondly, 
the events leading up to the assassination of Rabin, which include the change 
in government, the Peace Process, land concessions and an increase in 
violence by fundamentalist groups is examined. Thirdly, this chapter briefly 
outlines the assassination event, and the final part of the chapter deals with 
the aftermath of the assassination and its political consequences.
Statesman, 6 November 1995. Rabin: A man of Peace.
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The Israeli Context
Creation of Israel
The long and complex history of the Fertile Crescent lies at the core of any 
understanding of the development of contemporary forms of Jewish 
fundamentalism. In addition, Jewish fundamentalism is not a new concept or 
ideology but it can it traced back to the first century However, it is
Israel's recent troubled history that figures at the core of our understanding of 
Jewish fundamentalism, and is thus revealing with regards to Rabin's 
assassination by a Jewish fundamentalist. Correspondingly, an overview of 
contemporary far -  right - wing groups in Israel is required, in order to 
establish their degree of influence on the assassination.
In essence, the most critical catalyst for the development of modem 
Jewish fundamentalism remains the symbolic significance of the Holocaust 
and the ensuing conditions underpinning the creation of the state of Israel. 
The Holocaust justified in many ways the creation of a politically and 
militarily strong safe haven for the survivors. In fact, the Holocaust has had a 
great effect upon the ways in which Israel has built its national identity and 
conducted its politics, particularly with its neighbours and its Palestinian 
population. In addition, the ancient land of Israel on which the new state was 
established had sti*ong religious significance as the homeland, or the 
promised land, of the scattered Jewish population. Indeed, “that the State of
described by David C Rapoport the Jewish fundamentalists of the first century AD were 
called Zealots or Sicariis. The Zealots were active for around twenty - five years and were 
inspired by the hope of messianic deliverance, which is similar to contemporary Jewish 
fimdamentalist groups.
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Israel was established soon after the Holocaust gave it special meaning"/^^ 
Even while attempting to put an end to the British protectorate and 
establishing their own state, the Zionist movement had to use the means of 
terrorism to accomplish its aims. The legacy of the conditions of the creation 
of the state of Israel was thus two - tiered. On the one hand, with the inherent 
connection between religion and politics forming the founding principles of 
the Israeli state, Israeli politics acquired an explicit religious dimension 
making religious groups legitimate political actors. On the other hand, 
violent means became institutionalised as legitimate means to political 
success in the eyes of fundamentalists.
Fundamentalism and Israeli Society
Religion has always played an important role in Israeli society. Judaism is 
the religion and nationality whereas Zionism is the political programme. 
Jewish extremists have completely misconstrued these ideals. As mentioned 
before, Jewish fundamentalist ideology has an explicit messianic component. 
This is evident from the common belief among the fundamentalists that the 
destruction of the Mosque on the Temple Mount and the building of the 
temple will pave the way for the Messiah to come. Furthermore, another 
important element is that fundamentalists rely on religious texts, the Torah 
along with the Rabbi's interpretation of the Torah, and the Halakha, the 
Jewish law, to justify themselves. In other words, the Torah provides sacred 
legitimacy to the ideology and violent means advocated by fundamentalists.
‘*^ *Ziva Flamhafl, Israel On The Road To Peace. Accepting the Unacceptable. (Boulder: 
Westview Press, 1996) pl36.
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For example, the words of Kook (son) were given the status of “da'at Torah, 
literally Torah Wisdom"/^^ Kook (son) further stated that the annexation of 
the Occupied Territories was the truth, justice and religious fulfilment 
contained in the Holy Book. Furthermore, splinter organisations like the Lehi 
acknowledged their source of inspiration was the Torah.
Not only has the establishment of the state of Israel always been 
justified in religious terms, but the political developments in Israel since its 
creation have also been framed in religious terms, in turn, influencing the 
growth and militantism of Jewish fundamentalists - and, most notably, of 
Gush Emunin and the Kach Party. Most importantly, the territories occupied 
after the 1967 Six Day War have been regarded as biblical land which was 
intended to be a part of Israel: “...victory in the Six Day War was interpreted 
as a manifestation of God's intervention”.^ ®^ Thus, it restored Eretz or 
Ancient Israel to them. It strengthened the connection between political and 
religious gains, thereby further increasing the importance of religion: “the 
astonishing Israeli victoiy in the Six Day War provoked a religious 
awakening among orthodox and secular Jews”.^ ®’ This clearly illustrates the 
significance of both politics, the conquering of the Occupied Tenitories, and 
religion, involving a messianic component. But after defeat in the 1973 war, 
Israel suffered a huge setback. Israel's notion of being an invincible state was 
shattered and “in the 1970s the entire Jewish world was affected by a 
teshwah (or tshuvah, a term which signifies return to Judaism and repentance
Gideon Aran, “The Father, The Son, and the Holy Land”, edited by R Scott Appleby, 
Fundamentalist Leaders o f the Middle East. Spokesmen For The Despised. (Chicago: 
University o f Chicago, 1977) p315.
Yehoshafat Harakabi, Israel's Fateful Decisions. (London: I.B.Tamis & Co Ltd, 1988) pl46. 
Flamhafl, op.cit. pl35.
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that is to say the return to M l observance of Jewish law, the Halaka)”.^ ®^ The 
general notion was that Jews had altered their traditional religious path and 
the idea of establishing secular society was not in accordance with Jewish 
religion. In short, they interpreted the 1973 defeat as God's way of punishing 
the Israelis for straying from the righteous path.
Gush Emunim is one of the most important groups of 
Jewish fundamentalism established in 1974, just after the Jewish defeat in 
the Arab-Israeli war of October 1973. In many ways, Israeli flmdamentalism 
was embodied in the hard core of Gush Bmunim.^®  ^ Gush is said to have 
“wielded tremendous influence over the Likud administrations of Menachem 
Begin and Yitzak Shamir”.^ ®"^ In essence, “Gush and its contemporary 
followers pursue their political activism with a holistic view of a better future 
in opposition to the predicament of the present”.^ ®^ Gush tried to maintain an 
Orthodox dimension yet at the same time did not deny any of the advantages 
of the modem world. Gush's main aim was to prevent the partition of Eretz 
Israel by establishing wild settlements in the Occupied Territories and by 
trying to pursue a policy of re-judaization from above. Thus, “the Gush was 
replacing the legal concept of the state of Israel by the biblical concept of the 
land of Israel which legitimised the occupation of the territories by virtue of 
the specific pact that God made with the chosen people”.^ ®® In short, it is
Gilles Kepel, The Revenge of God. The Resurgence of Islam. Christianity and Judaism 
in The Modern world, op.cit p i42.
Aran, op.cit. p274.
^  Lawerence Joffe, Keesing's Guide to the Middle East Peace Process. 1®‘ Edition. 
(London: Catermill International Ltd, 1996) pg 153.
Samuel Peleg , "They shoot Prime Ministers too, Don't they? in Religious Violence in 
Israel: Premises, Dynamics, and Prospects”, in Studies in Conflict and Terrorism Vol.20, 
No.3 September 1997. p228.
Kepel, op.cit. pl41-142.
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regarded as a revitalised messianic movement to fulfil unaccomplished 
political and social aims, including the acquisition of political power^® .^
With regard to Gush Emunim, the ideals and vision of Rabbi 
Avhraham Yitzhak ha Kohen Kuk (Kook) are important, as he was 
considered the spiritual authority of Gush. He was against the entire concept 
of ultra-orthodoxy and appreciated certain aspects of secular nationalism. 
Kook stated:
the return of Jews to their homeland is the advent of 
redemption and although final redemption requires that 
all Jews repent as a return to the way of religion, the 
preparatory work done by secular Zionists was 
potentially sacred nonetheless^®^
Kook tried to marry secular nationalism and religious sentiment. Yet, he 
believed that the coming of the Messiah would be imminent if Jews followed 
a religious path. His form of religious nationalism was based on the belief 
that God was leading Jews, the secular no less than the religious, to return to 
Israel.^®  ^ Thus, he viewed the capture of the Occupied Territories as a 
religious victory. His intention was to connect the political and social 
foundations of the state of Israel to religion. To him, establishing a modem 
state which would be govemed tmly by the Halaka or religious law, would 
lead to Redemption, and it laid the foundations for the coming of the
“^^ Flamliaft, op.cit. pl41.
Samuel Peleg, They Shoot Prime Ministers Too, Don’t they? Religious Violence in 
Israel: Premises, dynamics and Prospects. In Conflict and Tenorism Vol.20, No.3 
September 1997. p237.
Appleby, ‘Spokesmen for the despised’op.cit. pg274.
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Messiah. His son Rabbi Zvi Yehuda Kook used some of the same ideologies 
as his father, but radicalised them further. In other words, he had a more 
radical approach. He, along with his father, was to design what would come 
to be known as 'Kookist ideology'. The principles of this ideology were 
anchored in him when witnessing the birth of Israel and then the victory in 
the Six Day War which convinced him of the inevitability of redemption. It 
also led him towards a path of activism involving the use of violent methods, 
including terrorism. He blamed the fear of his disciples as the reason for the 
crises in Israel which in turn slowed the process of redemption. Kook (the 
son) claimed that everything was Jewish and that Judaism was everything, 
making secular government illegitimate. He focused only on Jewish 
nationalism and its attainment through religion.
Most of the militant, violent, acts of Gush Emunim were committed 
after the Yom Kippur War.^ ^® This was the period when decisions had to be 
made about the return of the territories in Sinai, the Golan Heights and the 
West Bank to the Egyptians, Syrians and Palestinians. In this respect, Rabin 
was seen as failing to protect his people and instead was sacrificing the land 
of the Israelis. Underpimiing these goals is the belief in the ultimate arrival 
of the Messiah. There has even been a conspiracy to blow up the Muslim 
Dome on the Temple Mount in Jerusalem, designed to accelerate this 
event.^”
'^®Ehud Sprinzak, “Three Models o f Religious Violence: The Case o f Jewish 
Fundamentalism in Israel”, edited by Martin E Marty and R Scott Appleby in 
Fundamentalism and the State. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1993) p471. 
‘^ F^or further reference see, Bruce Hoffman, Inside Teixorism. op.cit. p i03.
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Catalysts
The immediate catalysts which culminated in Rabin's assassination consist of 
political choices, land concessions, the Baruch Goldstein massacre and an 
increase in violence, and these are analysed in order to understand the 
political environment existing during that period.
Political Choices
The politics of the state of Israel have been the main cause for the growing 
resentment among right-wing sections of the Israeli population. It is these 
grievances which have furthered the use of violence in order to exert 
influence over politics and prevent any unwanted changes. In other words, 
the case of Israel exemplifies how “political violence exists wherever there 
are politics, power struggles, and incompatible interests”.^ ^^  The elections of 
1992 restored to power the Labour party under Rabin and a coalition 
government was formed with the Meretez and Shas parties.^^^ This 
consequently ended the fifteen - year - old rule of the Likud party first under 
Menachem Begin and then under Yitzhak Shamir.^ "^  ^The reign of Likud was
^^^Peleg, op.cit. p227
^'^Religious right wing parties in the Knesset. In due course, the United States as a constant 
partner in the Peace Process made attempts to continue the talks in Washington D.C. It 
involved ten rounds of bilateral talks between Israeli and Palestinian-Jordanian delegates 
from November 3, 1991 to July 1, 1993. Several proposals were made during the course of 
these peace talks by both Israelis and Palestinians but were rejected. However, the most 
important event was the decrease in support o f the right wing parties to the Likud which in 
turn slowly took away their authority in the Knesset forcing Shamir to call for early 
election.
^^%xcept the period between 1984 to 1986 when the Labour party under Shimon Peres led 
the national unity government.
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to be very important in sowing the seed leading to the growth and influence 
of the religious parties in political affairs. However, one important 
achievement of the Likud party was the peace treaty between Israel and 
Egypt in 1979, thereby removing the threat of attack from Israel's biggest 
Arab neighbour.
Most importantly, it is apparent that Rabin gave top priority to the 
Peace Process. He was trying to steer Israel towards peace. He was fully 
aware of the problems in retaining the Occupied Territories and thus 
recognised the need for Israel to “negotiate with any group that will 
recognise Israel's right to exist in agreed and secure boundaries as specified 
in UN Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338 and that will abjure the use 
of terror and violence in resolving problems with Israel”.®^® Furthermore, in 
assimilating its Palestinian population, Israel would thereby dilute its Jewish 
national identity. This view was in sharp contrast to that of his predecessor 
Shamir who did not envisage a Peace Process. In turn, these peace initiatives 
struck a chord with a small majority of the Israeli population, with the 
exception of the religious right, which objected to negotiation based on land 
concessions. As pointed out by Theodore H. Friedgut, “for majority of the 
population, neither of these alternatives was acceptable”.^ ®^ Furthermore, 
“...enormous encouragement that Gush received from religious parties and 
the parties of the extreme right (such as the NRP^^ ,^ Morsha, Tehiya Tzomet, 
Kach Moledat and even a Jewish underground), in effect created an ultra
Theodore H Friedgut, “Israel's Turn Toward Peace”, edited by Robert O Freedman, 
Israel Under Rabin. ( Westview Press, 1995) p71.
Ibid. p73.
National Religious Party.
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nationalist alliance in the Israeli polity capable of undermining any peace 
initiative”.®^^
Peace Process and Land Concessions
Furthermore, in the context of peace negotiations, Rabin came to the 
conclusion “that settlements were becoming increasingly unpopular with 
Israel’s growing middle class, who were more concerned with the 
improvements in quality of l i fe . . .Never theless ,  this process fuelled anger 
and all Jewish fundamentalist groups began to label Rabin as a traitor. 
Fundamentalists began to point out that Rabin’s election campaign did not 
mention giving up land for peace, histead, once he assumed power he 
propagated self - rule for the Palestinians which would in turn reduce the 
terrorist violence. “...Rabin stressed that his immediate concern was to 
separate the two distinct religious, ethnic, and political entities as much as 
possible”.®^®
Briefly, the efforts of the Peace Process can be traced to when George 
Bush former president of the United States, took it upon himself to achieve 
peace for the Middle East, identifying Israel’s hold over the Occupied 
Territories as the core obstacle to conflict resolution. Eight trips were made 
to the Middle East by Secretary of State, James Baker, during the summer 
and autumn of 1991 to win support for the Peace process. “Baker’s goal was 
to make progress on the mutual recognition of a shared problem.
Flamhaft .op.cit. p i44-145.
David Makovsky, Making Peace With The FLO. The Rabin Government's Road to the 
Oslo Accord. (Boulder: Westview Press, 1996) p84.
Ibid. p86.
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development of a commitment to negotiate, and establishment of procedural 
parameters for subsequent discussions”/^^ Baker's proposal was rejected by 
the Syrians, Israelis and even the Palestinians on their respective grounds. 
However, with time, countries began to realise the need for a proposal and 
this finally led to the peace talks to be held in Madrid on October 30, 1991, 
by Egypt, Syria, Lebanon, Jordan, Palestine, Israel and representatives of the 
European Community and the Gulf Cooperation Council. This was important 
for the Palestinians who for the first time represented themselves in peace 
talks.^^  ^ The United States continued to make efforts to hold talks in 
Washington D.C. There were ten sessions of bilateral talks between Israeli 
and Palestinian-Jordanian delegates.
However, during the peace talks several proposals were presented by 
both sides, for example, in the third round of talks, January 13-14, 1992, 
Palestinians were offered limited authority by Israel over agriculture, 
education, trade and taxation, and Israel would retain control over security, 
Jewish settlers in the Occupied Territories and foreign affairs. Palestinians 
suggested self - rule for the residents of Jerusalem, a freeze on all Jewish 
settlements or internationally supervised elections for a parliament assuming 
authority over the people. The proposal by the Israelis was rather 
conservative, keeping Israeli hold over the most important sections of the 
economy, which was unacceptable to the Palestinians. The Palestinian 
proposal illustrated the desire to gain control over important sections of the
Deborah J Gemer, One Land. Two Peoples. The Conflict Over Palestine.fBoulder ; 
W estview Press, 1990)
This was followed by bilateral talks between Israel and Palestinian-Jordanian delegation. 
However, the conference came to an abrupt halt when a quarrel started in which the Israeli 
delegation wanted to move the talks to the Middle East and the Arabs wanted it to remain 
in Madrid but in the end both teams left Spain without any decision for future talks.
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economy, which was not agreed by the Israeli side. However, it made the 
Israelis realise that the process of securing peace would involve land 
concessions. The final agreement involved the Israeli withdiawal from Gaza 
and Jericho, and negotiations would follow with regards to security, borders, 
refugees and so on. Thus, these land concessions were to become one of the 
major factors instigating Rabin's death, as by such agreements he was giving 
away land acquired after the victory in the 1967 war.
It was shortly before the sixth round of talks that Rabin was elected to 
power. Amidst the bilateral talks “an opportunity for a unique kind of quasi­
citizen diplomacy presented itself through a Norwegian channel”. A 
suggestion was made to hold secret talks between Israel and the Palestians. If 
social and political conditions for Palestinians were improved, long-lasting 
peace had a chance of being built in the region. It should be noted that Rabin 
would have never initiated such talks. “He lacked a grand design or 
comprehensive plan for a breakthrough with the PLO, Rabin's willingness to 
explore the Oslo option -however tentative - was crucial”.^ "^^  He clearly was 
in favour of bilateral talks as they enabled him “to play one Arab negotiating 
partner off against the other, and met his domestic political needs as well”.^ ^^  
Thus, on September 13, 1993, the Declaration of Principles on Interim Self- 
Government Arrangements was signed by Mahmoud Abbas, the PLO official 
and Shimon Peres, Israeli foreign minister.
Helena Cobban, “Israel and the Palestinian: From Madrid to Oslo and Beyond”, edited 
by Robert Freedman In Israel Under Rabin, p 101.
Makovsky, op.cit. pg 118.
Ibid. pl20.
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Increase in Violence
Rabin was responsible for the increased violence in the Occupied Territories 
as a result of his Iron Fist policies of hard punisliment, the deportation from 
Israel to Southern Lebanon of 400 Palestinians suspected of having 
connections with the Islamic terrorist organisations like the HAMAS or 
Islamic Jihad. Also, Israel sealed off the West Bank and Gaza because of 
increased Intifada violence on the local Israeli population. The United States 
presented a Israeli-Palestinian Joint Declaration of Principles which was 
rejected by the Palestinians.^^® The tenth round meeting marked the end of 
the peace talks as both sides reached no significant agreement. Instead there 
was further violence as Palestinians resorted to extreme violence, as in 1992 
when security personnel were fired at, two Jews were stabbed and finally a 
GSS handler was murdered. The reason for such acts by the Palestinians was 
primarily the need to reach a peace agreement that would ensure security and 
safety to Palestinian populations in the Occupied Territories. The Oslo 
Accords also accelerated the radicalism of religious fiindamentalism. In 
Rabin’s opinion the best way to attain peace lay in stating that the Gaza strip 
had no religious significance for the Israelis. Although this view was 
supported by many secular Israelis there was strong rejection by the religious 
parties, which fuelled the Jewish fundamentalists. Fundamentalists began to 
stress that Rabin’s election campaign did not mention giving up land for 
peace. The fundamentalists and the settlers felt betrayed by a government 
willing to give away land.
Declaration was similar to the Israeli proposal offered earlier. For further reference 
see, Deborah J Greener, One land Two Peoples. The Conflict Over Palestine, op.cit. pl82- 
186.
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However, in retaliation for such atrocities on the Jewish population, 
and also to prevent the Peace Process, the Baruch Goldstein massacre 
occured. By far the most important event in terms of violence triggering the 
assassination of Rabin was the Goldstein massacre. On February 24, 1994 
Baruch Golstein, a Brooklyn immigrant and a follower of Meir Kahane, 
entered a mosque in Hebron and killed forty Muslim worshippers. His attack 
occurred in the middle of the Muslim holy month, Ramadan. It also 
coincided with the Jewish festival of Purim. His attack resulted in his being 
considered a martyr, as it was a significant event illustrating defiance to the 
Peace Process. As pointed out by Moshe Brawer, “the massacre in the 
mosque at Hebron on 25 February 1994, was intended to derail the peace 
process and very nearly did”.^ ^^  It provided fundamentalists like Amir with 
further incentives to engage in violent action to stop the Peace Process. This 
Amir interpreted as implying the assassination of the chief promoter of the 
Peace Process, which would end the peace efforts if it resulted in his death. 
Amir was quoted as saying “I did this to stop the Peace Process”.^ ^^
To sum up, it can be said that Israelis are divided in their 
political visions for Israel. Some Israelis recognise the establishment of a 
secular state, while others recognise the establishment of a secular state 
underpinned by religious principles, and finally, some Israelis recognise the 
establishment of only a religious state. Jewish fundamentalists are located at 
the right pole of the political spectrum and only recognise a religious form of 
state as legitimate.
Beloff, “The Diaspora and die Peace Process”, edited by Karsh Efiaim, Peace in the 
Middle East.(England: Frank Cass & CO. Ltd, 1994), p37.
Rabin’s assailant: I did this to stop the Peace Process, St Louis Post Dispatch.
7/11/1995.
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The Assassination
Yitzhak Rabin was shot dead on November 5, 1995 by Yigal Amir. Rabin 
was attending a peace rally in Tel Aviv where he had just sung the Song of 
Peace and then tucked the lyrics into his breast pocket. Rabin said at the 
peace rally, “there are enemies of the peace process, and they try to hurt us, 
but violence undermines democracy and must be denounced and isolated”.®^® 
As he walked off the podium and down the stairway leading to a sheltered 
area, where his car awaited him, Amir approached and shot three bullets. The 
Song of Peace was drenched in blood. Rabin apparently caught his stomach 
and was rushed into the car and taken to hospital, where he was pronounced 
dead after a few hours.
Religious justification
As mentioned before, the fundamentalists’ ideas developed by the Kach 
Party and Gush Emunim were influential in right-wing and orthodox 
circles, influencing young people such as Yigel Amir. Amir was 
associated with a fundamentalist group called Eyal which was a splinter 
organisation of the Kach Party. It is a right - wing group which emerged 
in 1995, centred in Hebron and Kiryat, and is headed by a history 
student called Avishai Raviv.
^^^Wulf Steve, “Thou Shalt Not Kill, The assassination of Yitzhak Rabin hits at the soul of 
Israel and its torturous quest for peace”, in Time Magazine. November 13, 1995 Volume 
146, No. 20. Intemet-
http://www.pathfinder.com/time/magazine/archive/l 995/95 111 3/cover.html
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Amir's justification for the killing had several intertwined facets 
including personal, political and religious motivations. Amir did not 
question that, “Rabin government's formal legitimacy; it was political 
and moral wisdom in pursuing a course that Israel ferociously against 
itself on a matter of utmost historical gravity”. As mentioned before, 
he was a law student in a prestigious Orthodox university in Israel. 
Additionally, he attended religious yeshivas where religious studies and 
military seiwice were combined. He felt he lived in a hostile environment 
and came in constant contact with violent speeches of rabbis and was 
tuned to take an anti-Rabin view. This is obvious since he was associated 
with Eyal, a splinter organisation of the Kach party. Continuous attacks 
were made by portraying pictures of Rabin as a Arab Kaffiyeh, and 
posters depicted him and his supporters as 'mosrim' (traitors), 'rodfim' 
(attackers) and 'rozhim' (murderers). He considered Rabin to be an 
apostate. His image of Rabin as the hero of the 1967 war was destroyed 
as Rabin signed a peace agreement with the PLO giving away the part of 
the Jewish Holy Land. The militancy of the religious right was felt even 
in the messianic dimension. This came to be established firmly only after 
the capture of the biblical land which would restore Eretz Israel after the 
1967 war. Therefore, the concession of land was unthinkable. This 
notion was very much embedded in the ideology of Rabbi Zvi Yehuda 
Kook (son), who stated that there exists a deep holy connection between 
the Jewish people and the land of Israel, which depends on maintaining
^^°Hillel Halkin, “Israel & the Assassination: A Reckoning”, in Commentary. January 1996.
p26.
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the integrity of both and cannot be separated/^^ As an atmosphere of 
violence was created before the assassination it became inevitable that 
all the hatred was to be directed against the leader.
In messianic terms, the assassin believed that Rabin was 
responsible for preventing the coming of the Messiah. He had been 
unfaithful to the age old history of Jewish messianism. After his arrest he 
stated that if nonviolent methods failed, killing Rabin was necessary to 
initiate the Messiah's arrival. This religious dimension was intertwined 
with more pragmatic political considerations. The system that the 
government was pursuing was not the right path for the establishment of 
a Jewish state. Amir felt that Rabin was giving too much away to the 
Gentiles (Arabs) who were responsible for humiliating the Jews. Thus, 
when there is a clash between God and leader, one’s obedience should 
be towards God. Amir viewed the Peace Process as leading to another 
Holocaust. Thus, according to Amir, Rabin's collaboration with the 
enemy in the Peace Process was a total reversal of policy, and Amir's 
strong messianic belief, reliance on Jewish sacred texts and Rabbi 
teachings were enough to motivate him. Amir had sought rabbinical 
sanction for the assassination, which was not given, but he went ahead 
following his own instincts for Jewish law and messianic belief. His first 
instinct was to receive religious sanction but since removal of the leader 
was bound upon him, Amir went ahead with the assassination.
^^ ‘For further reference see, Appleby R Scott, Spokesmen of the Despised. Chapter Six, 
“The Father, The Son and The Holy Land”.op.cit.
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The Aftermath
In the Israeli case, the consequences of the assassination are quite 
evident. Even after the signing of the Accords, there was a mai'ked 
increase in violence on both sides of the camp. Severe violence was 
witnessed in Gaza and a curfew was imposed in the region. However, 
the violence had been further accelerated by the social problems like 
unemployment, housing, sanitation and further decline in the standard of 
living that were becoming more prominent in Gaza. With the death of 
Rabin, Israelis felt the Peace Process would come to an end. This was 
evident from the fact that, with the victory of the Likud party and 
Benyamin Netanyahu as Prime Minister, no significant progress can be 
expected as even before elections he declared that if  he became the 
Prime Minister, “he would not feel obligated to honour the peace 
agreements... reached with A r a f a t . . . H e  made it clear that he was 
against concession of any land which constitutes the home of the Israeli 
people and is also a part of Eretz I s r a e l . I t  is, therefore, inevitable that 
high expectations of concrete results from any future talks on peace in 
the region are doubtful because of the negative attitude of Benyamin 
Netanyahu. All this increased his popularity and his victory seemed 
imminent. Yigel Amir did achieve the desire of many Israelis to prevent 
the implementation of the Peace Process but at the same time a slim 
chance exists of conceding land for peace, which may be due to
A Promise o f Peace?: The Israeli-Palestinian Accord in the Context o f World and Regional 
Events. 1984-1995. p330.
For further reference see, Ibid.
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international pressures, or increased violence. At the same time, the 
religious components cannot be overlooked. Messianic elements, hatred 
of Gentiles and a strong belief in the biblical notion of the Land of Israel 
will continue to play significant roles and thereby dominate any fixture 
talks on the Peace Process.
The case study of the assassination of Rabin will help to understand the 
questions that were set in Chapter One. The tliree question will thus be 
answered below in relation to the question.
Can the assassinations analysed in the thesis be categorised as a political 
assassinations?
Chapter One and the previous chapter it was established that the definition put 
forward by Kirkham, Levy, and Crotty is the best available definition that can 
be used. As a result, this illustrates that the assassination of Rabin contains 
elements from three different categories, namely elite substitution, terroristic 
assassination and an anomic assassination. Rabin's assassination can be 
categorised as an elite substitution. Rabin was the most important political 
figure in the country. There was an underpinning systemic change behind 
Rabin's assassination. The main aim was to remove Rabin, who was 
responsible for furthering the Peace Process, and this would put an end to the 
Peace Process. Rabin was giving away biblical land meant only for the Israeli 
population, and thus deserved to die according to the fundamentalists. Thus, 
the major systemic change was to stop the Peace Process. At the same time.
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the assassination of Rabin was not a conscious part of any kind of power 
struggle. He was not removed in order to be replaced by someone from the 
opposing group. The political assassination of Rabin cannot be categorised as 
tyrannicide. This is simply because the assassination was not targeted at 
Rabin to replace him with a better, less oppressive, more rational leader. 
Although he may have been considered a tyrant by his assassin, Rabin was 
not a tyrant for pursuing policies that would reduce tension within the 
Palestinian-Israeli context. There was only one major reason to assassinate 
Rabin. Rabin’s assassination can be considered as a teiToristic in so far as the 
assassin was connected to a tenorist group and the assassination was very 
discriminate, as it specifically targeted Rabin. There was no intention of 
illustrating the government's inability to rule or to let a minority govern a 
majority. In a way, it was about ensuring that the minority opinion on the 
Peace Process prevailed. Therefore, the assassination cannot be categorised as 
a terroristic assassination according to the definition put forward by Kirkham, 
Crotty and Levy, but it is a terroristic assassination according to the amended 
definition. The assassination to a large degree can be categorised as an 
anomic assassination. Yigal Amir was a lone assassin who had private 
reasons for acting as he did. Yet, at the same time, the fundamentalist 
community shared the same grievances as Amir. As a result, his reasons were 
not private in the sense that they were personal reasons. As stated before, 
Amir's main reason was to put an end to the Peace Process by assassinating 
Rabin. He felt this was his duty and that God chose him to assassinated 
Rabin. He wanted to die a martyr. He justified his action by religion, and by 
what the Torah stated and what the Rabbis preached. However, Amir did not
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appear to have any psychiatric disorder. He was completely aware of what he 
was doing. Therefore, anomic assassination seems to be the best suited 
category for Rabin's assassination. The assassination was not propaganda by 
deed. This is because there was no intention of directing attention to a specific 
problem. It was assumed that people were already aware of the problem of the 
Peace Process and the only thing to be done was to put an end to it. The 
assassination of Rabin would achieve just this. Here again, it is difficult to 
analyse what category best describes the Rabin assassination. The Yitzhak 
Rabin assassination was an elite substitution, a terroristic assassination and an 
anomic assassination. Furthermore, as mentioned before, the different 
categories are not mutually exclusive and hence further the difficulty of 
providing a perfect classification.^^"^
Can the justifications that are analysed justify the political assassinations 
in this thesis?
When trying to answer this question it is important to keep in mind the basic 
premises of the consequentialist/utilitarianist debate, whereby if the 
consequences of an act promote happiness, or an act produces greater utility, 
then the act would be justified. Amir the assassin did believe that the 
assassination of Rabin would lead to greater happiness. However, this was not 
the case, and in this respect the consequentialist/utilitarianist debate failed to
For further reference on the contextual aspects o f the assassination refer to Edward W. Said 
The End o f the Peace Process. Oslo and After’, Yoram Peri T he Assassination o f Yitzhak 
Rabin’. David Mokovsky, ‘Making Peace With the PLO. The Rabin Government’s Road to the 
Oslo Accord’. Also the case study in the thesis offers a context to tlie assassintion.
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meet the claims of the debate. This will become clear in the following 
discussion.
According to consequentialism an act is right or wrong depending on 
the consequences. That is, it is important that the political assassination of 
Rabin would depend on the consequences of the act, and whether it promotes 
the consequences further. It could be said that since the consequences of the 
assassination of Rabin seem to have promoted happiness and pleasure, 
primarily by putting an end to the Peace Process, the act seems to have been 
justified. In other words, the ending of the Peace Process promoted happiness. 
As a result, in broad terms consequentialism justifies the act of political 
assassination of Rabin. According to the fundamental precepts of all forms of 
utilitarianism, the assassination of Yitzhak Rabin cannot constitute a justified 
act since utilitarianism preaches that an action is right when it promotes 
happiness or pleasure. By implication this means that the happiness or 
pleasure would be felt by the whole of society. The assassination did result in 
promoting happiness as it meant that the Peace Process had been stopped. 
However, it is important to remember the ending of the Peace Process 
resulted in happiness only for a small minority of people, similar to the 
situation following the assassination of Anwar Sadat. It was again only the 
fundamentalist section of the population that was happy as a result of the 
assassination and the subsequent ending of the Peace Process. In fact, even 
amongst the fundamentalist section there was a section that was unhappy with 
the assassination of Rabin. Thus, the assassination of Rabin cannot be 
justified according to utilitarianism.
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The element of self - interest which is part of theological utilitarianism 
believes that promoting happiness is the aspiration of God. This specially 
applies to the assassination of Yitzhak Rabin. The assassination was a 
combination of self-interest and the desire to promote happiness. There was a 
significant religious aspect, as Amir believed that he was chosen by God to 
assassinate Rabin. He felt that it was his duty. Rabin's desire to give away 
biblical land was seen as disagreement with God's desire. Furthermore, 
sanctions from religious ideologues to assassinate Rabin gave the 
assassination a special religious angle. There also was significance in the date, 
place and time of the assassination. As a result, theological utilitarianism 
justifies the assassination of Yitzhak Rabin.
Furthermore, in the contemporary usage of utilitarianism, where the 
focus is now on utility or usefulness it cannot justify the assassination of 
Rabin. However, the assassination was extremely useful as it stopped the 
Peace Process. The assassination also prevented the giving away of biblical 
land. According to both versions of Act utilitarianism, the assassination of 
Rabin cannot be justified because the first version maintains that the 
consequence of the assassination was far greater than any other alternative. 
However, no other alternative to committing an assassination was even 
considered. Rabin had conducted the worst mistake of his life by trying to 
initiate a Peace Process. As a result, no other alternative was even 
considered. Secondly, the utility produced by the assassination was as 
much as any other method might have produced. Once again no other 
method was used, therefore it cannot be concluded that the utility arising 
firom the assassination was much greater than any other option. Thus, both
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versions do not justify the assassination of Rabin on the basis of utility. 
According to Rule utilitarianism, an assassination can produce greater 
utility than if the assassination does not take place. There is no way of 
knowing if Rabin’s assassination did have this effect. It was only in the 
assassin’s eyes that the assassination put an end to the Peace Process. Thus, 
in conclusion, none of the forms of utilitarianism justify the political 
assassination of Rabin.
Just War
This section will analyse the six requirements of Just War in order to 
decide whether the assassination of Rabin can be justified.
The first requirement of Just War is Just Cause, which maintains 
the importance of there being a real danger. As a result, with regard to 
Yitzhak Rabin, a just cause does not seem to exist. According to Amir, 
there was a just cause which happened to be the end of the Peace Process. 
However, it seems that Amir was not entirely but partially successful in his 
mission. Once again there were other possibilities rather than assassinating 
Rabin. The obvious reason for the assassination was that eventually the 
whole issue of the Peace Process would have to be addressed, and Rabin, 
being the Prime Minister, happened to be at the time at the fore - front of 
the entire peace process. Therefore, a just cause does not legitimise the 
assassination as this might not have solved the problem.
The second requirement states that a state can use force only if 
there is a right intention. There was no right intention behind the
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assassination of Rabin. Amir may have thought that his desire for putting 
an end to the Peace Process would constitute right intention however, this 
was not the case and there was no guarantee that Rabin’s death would end 
the Peace Process. As a result, there was no right intention behind his 
assassination.
The third requirement is popular authority and public declaration, 
which states that the authority for the use of force needs to come from the 
appropriate authority. According to this requirement the assassination of 
Rabin did not come from popular authority. Amir was loosely associated 
with a terrorist group, and by no means does a terrorist group constitute 
popular authority, as they are always a minority in any society. 
Furthermore, it is impossible to have a public declaration of an 
assassination, as it would be impossible to carry out an assassination if it 
were made public. Therefore, popular authority and public declaration do 
not justify Rabin’s assassination.
Last resort is the next requirement. In the mind of the assassin, the 
assassination was the last resort in order to stop Rabin from furthering the 
Peace Process. However, it can safely be said that Amir would never have 
considered any other option, and that the assassination would have been the 
first choice of action. Thus, the assassination was the last resort for Amir. 
According to probability of success, which is the next requirement, there 
has to be an impact from the action taken. Rabin’s assassination was 
carried out in the hope of putting an end to the Peace Process. However, an 
impact cannot be guaranteed.
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Finally, according to proportionality, it is impossible to state that 
the assassination of Rabin produced good. Rabin’s assassination has not 
really produced further good and in this way the assassination cannot be 
justified.
Terroristic Justification
This form of justification is very important when referring to the 
assassination of Yitzhak Rabin. As already mentioned, ideologues, texts 
and scriptures play a prominent role for terroristic justifications. Rabin’s 
assassin Yigal Amir claimed to have carried out die assassination on his 
own, however, there is evidence to show that he was loosely associated 
with Gush Emunim, a terrorist group. Both Abraham Isaac Kook and Zvi 
Yehuda Kook (son) influenced the Gush Emunim. Their teachings were 
very aggressive in nature. On many occasions both believed that giving 
away Israeli land was out of question as the land was given to them by God 
and it was the Holy Land. Kook the elder believed that “his form of 
religious nationalism was based on the belief that God was leading Jews, 
the secular no less than the religious, to return to the Holy Land”.^ ^^  
Furthermore, “the Kookist vision was the conviction that Israel’s chosen 
status among nations is betokened and even guaranteed by its inner 
character as an Orthodox Jewish nation”.^ ®^ This statement clearly signifies 
the importance of religion in Israel, and how everything is related to 
religion. Kook the son was more extreme in his views than his father,
Gideon Arran, op.cit. p298. 
Arran, op.cit. p299.
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although he borrowed and interpreted most of his father's teachings. Kook 
the son relied more heavily on religion. This can be seen when he 
established the celebration of Independence Day as a key religious event. 
Furthermore, when there was talk of withdrawal from occupied territories, 
Kook “issued the authoritative call ‘Be killed rather than transgress 
This attitude illustrates the relation between religion and violence and 
indirectly supports the use of religion to justify violence. Apparently there 
is “no conclusive evidence that Yigal Amir found formal Halakhic 
justification from any religious authority for carrying out tlie slaying, 
although a documentary film claims that he did”.^ ^^  Moreover, “Amir may 
have concluded from things he heard and to which he was exposed that his 
deed would receive religious approval, or he may have actually thought that 
he had such justifications”.^ ^^  Therefore, this really stresses the importance 
of legitimacy and that an assassin wants it before committing a political 
assassination. Although an assassin is convinced about what he going to do, 
the added religious significance helps to give additional support to the 
mission.
Do political assassinations only succeed as existential acts?
Rabin’s assassination also did succeed as an existential act. In similar 
ways to the case of Sadat, the assassin Yigal Amir’s main aim was to 
assassinate Rabin. Amir had tried on two previous occasions to assassinate
Arran, op.cit. p313.
Nachman Ben Yehuda, One More Political Murder by Jews edited in The Assassination of 
Yitzhak Rabin by Yoram Peri. (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2000) p82.
Yehuda, One More.. p82.
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Rabin. This illustrates that Amir was truly committed to the cause and was 
only waiting for the most appropriate time. The rally was the first time that 
Amir was able to get close enough to carry out his plan. Amir was also aware 
of the fact that carrying out an assassination in the public would mean that 
either he would be shot or captured. He therefore fully expected the 
repercussions of the assassination. Amir successfully killed Rabin, and in this 
way the assassination did succeed as an existential act. In terms of immediate 
success Amir was successful. In existential terms the assassin’s main goal 
was to assassinate his target which was carried out successfully. In terms of 
success for the assassin, Amir’s action was a success, as he got rid of his 
target. Furthermore, Amir’s actions did affect the Peace Process and this 
would count as a successful assassination.
Conclusion
The discussion of the assassination of Yitzhak Rabin sets out a clear picture 
surrounding the assassination. It reveals the importance of history and how 
it plays an integral part in Israel’s contemporary existence. The chapter 
highlighted the political choices which played key factors leading to the 
assassination of Rabin. In addition the role of fundamentalism is important 
to the history of Israel. The ideology of most of the groups contains a 
strong messianic component, justification is sought in sacred texts and from 
religious leaders. There exists the belief in violence to attain goals, and the 
inherent aim is to affect change in the political structures of society.
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Finally, analysing the various forms of justification shows that the 
assassination of Rabin cannot be justified.
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Chapter 5 
India
Innocent who made too many foes was doomed^ '*®
Introduction
A powerful bomb explosion at 10:20 p.m. on 21st May, 1991, killed Rajiv 
Gandhi, the former Prime Minister of India. The venue was an election rally in 
Sriperumbudur in Tamil Nadu, a southern state of India. This forthcoming 
election was to mark the comeback of the popular, young and dynamic leader, but 
all hopes of an electoral gain died with just one explosion. The assassin was a 
woman named Subha, but the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Elam (LTTE) were the 
group directly responsible for the assassination.^"^’
In this chapter, the causes, circumstances, and consequences of the 
assassination, and the justification behind the assassination, will be outlined to 
illustrate the specific ways in which political factors have played an important role 
in leading to hostility and eventually culminating in the assassination. The first 
part of this chapter plots the emergence of the LTTE -  linking the emergence of 
the LTTE to corresponding political developments in the comitry.
The growing tensions and hostilities that prevailed during this period are 
highlighted within the course of the chapter. Also, it is important to remember that 
not only did Rajiv Gandhi face danger from the LTTE, but also he faced threats
“Innocent who made too many foes was doomed” Times. London, 22/05/1991.
The assassin Subha’s motives, ideology or justifcation are not as relevant because the 
mastermind of the attack was the LTTE. Subha did not even know who the target was until the 
day.
222
from different factions both inside and outside the country; these will be 
mentioned within the course of this chapter. Furthermore, to date the LTTE has 
denied any responsibility for the assassination. However, all the evidence that has 
been found shows strong signs of LTTE involvement. As a result, the chapter 
traces and analyses the history of the LTTE by tracing the development of the 
group and its relations to the various political developments in the country. 
Finally, this chapter attempts to use the Gandhi assassination to prove how 
political factors were the primary reasons behind committing the assassination. 
Furthermore, a step -  by - step analysis of the entire assassination event is 
outlined, which is followed by discussion the consequences of the assassination.
Rajiv Gandhi was the eldest son of Indira Gandhi. In his youth, he showed 
no signs of any interest in politics. Barry James, in the International Herald 
Tribune described him thus: “Rajiv, a former airline pilot, who never before had 
shown any interest in politics, and always seemed aloof from the party turmoil of 
the world’s most popular democracy”.^ "’^  His passion lay with flying and he 
became a commercial pilot for the domestic earner, Indian Airlines. Rajiv’s 
enthusiasm for flying was similar to that of his brother Sanjay. At the age of 33, 
Sanjay died in an aerobatic stunt over New Delhi in 1980. “Sanjay was the chosen 
one, the one who was to carry on the nascent Gandhi dynasty”. But with his 
tragic death, all focus fell on Rajiv. He was much quieter, more amiable and had a 
youthful charm. He was seen by his mother and many others as the likely heir, 
and was given the post of general secretary of the Congress (I) Party. In 1981, he 
was elected in a by-election to the Lok Sabha. “He also travelled with Mrs Gandhi
“Bomb Kills Rajiv Gandhi at an Election Rally, Closing a chapter on Indian Political Dynasty”, 
International Herald Tribune. 22/05/1991.
“Bomb kills Rajiv Gandhi at an Election Rally, Closing a chapter on Indian Political Dynasty” 
International Herald Tribune. 22/05/1991.
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and presided at government functions, throwing his energies into a major effort to 
reorganise the party and bring in younger politicians, with the aim of ridding it of 
its reputation as tolerant of corruption, bribery and even lawlessness among 
workers”.^ "’"’ This marked the entry of Rajiv into the political forefront. He wanted 
to promote regional cooperation and deal with problems directly. An example of 
this can be seen in the Assam and Punjab accords. Furthermore, the way he 
handled the two issues revealed his intelligence and interest in solving issues. 
Rajiv Gandhi’s commitment towards international economic order and world 
peace made him popular amongst the international community. “Mr Gandhi 
developed a low key style that was initially popular with the elites of the cities, 
especially the community”.^ "’^  In short, as summed up by Shekhar Gupta of India 
Today, “For a deposed monarch, out to reclaim his kingdom, Rajiv Gandhi could 
not have asked for a better build up. Shorn of security, shorn of the aloofness he 
exhibited in the past, displaying so far unknown panache for mixing with the 
people, the Rajiv, on the 1991 campaign trail, has come a long way from the Rajiv 
of 1989, with that defensive in-the-ropes look.... People yearn to see him from 
close, shake his hand feel him, even push him a r o u n d . . . T h u s ,  with the 
assassination of his mother, Indira Gandhi Rajiv, took over as Prime Minister until 
the congress party was defeated in 1989. In other words, “circumstances arising 
out of a personal tragedy necessitated the entry of Shri Rajiv Gandhi in the arena 
of national politics”.^ "’^  As a result, it can be observed that political assassinations 
have always played a prominent part in politics in the sub-continent.
544 Thwarted Dream: Ethnic Harmony” International Herald Tribune. 22/05/1991.
545 Thwarted Dream: Ethnic Harmony” International Herald Tribune. 22/05/1991.
R.K. Murthi, Historic Assassinations. (New Delhi: Konark Publishing Pvt Ltd, 1991) p3.
Jain Commission Renort-Threats to Raiiv Gandhi-Chapter 1 Sections 1&2, http:/www.India-
today.com
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Immediate causes
There are numerous factors that contributed to the assassination of Rajiv Gandhi. 
However, “three cataclysmic events followed one another in rapid-fire sequence:
• The Bofors scandal, the single most divisive, bitter controversy since 
independence.
• The Nusli Wadia- Dhirubhai Ambani feud that would involve V.P Singh, 
Rajiv Gandhi, the Indian Express, Michael Fairfax Agency and a bizarre 
murder plot.
• The Zail Singh-Rajiv Gandhi confrontation which led to an abortive coup 
engineered by Congress (I) dissidents and Opposition leaders - a coup that 
could have permanently change Indian’s political landscape had it 
succeeded”.^ "’^
In addition to the above-mentioned factors, other reasons were political violence 
in Punjab and Assam and the most important of all other major reasons was the 
creation and the subsequent development of the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Elam. 
“Bofors began the slide, eroding Rajiv’s credibility. Punjab, with its unending and 
horrific terrorist violence, damaged his reputation as a political negotiator. Assam 
deepened the mood of secessionism alienating the entire north-east. Sri Lanka 
quickly developed into a major foreign policy misadventure”.^ "’^
548 Minhaz Merchant, Rajiv Gandhi: The End o f a Dream (New Delhi: Viking publishers, 1991) 
Ibid.
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It is of great importance to remember that the first three events were 
directly related to Rajiv Gandhi and affected his political role. All these factors 
“eroded his image amongst the vote-group which had been initially the most 
enthusiastic about him; the middle class. Second, it reduced his authority with the 
party’s rank and file”.^ ’^’ Therefore, the 1989 elections were to mark his successful 
return to his political career. However, the LTTE factor was not his creation and 
has a long and violent history of its own. There were factors that during Rajiv’s 
tenure as Prime Minister precipitated the entire LTTE episode, which can be 
closely related to his assassination. Hence, in this chapter, an attempt will be made 
to analyse the complex intricacies linked with the LTTE in detail in order to 
illustrate the role of the LTTE in the assassination.
Background of the conflict
As has been mentioned before, the Tamil problem dates far back in history. It is 
understood that while Tamil nationalism dates back to the 1920s, the ethnic 
conflict in Sri Lanka can be traced back to the first century BC, at which time the 
Tamil adventurers fiom southern India challenged the authority of the Sinhalese, 
who had settled on the island firom Northern India five hundred years e a r l i e r . I n  
fact, the Sinhala chronicles like the Mahawansa and the Chulawansa records 
violent wars between the Tamil and Sinhala kings, and invasion from South 
Indian Tamil empires. It is claimed, by historians that the Tamils lived in the north 
and east of Sri Lanka and the Sinhalese occupied the rest of the country. It was 
during this period that the Ceylonese campaigned against the colonial domination
Ibid551 Gamini Samaranayake, “Ethnic Conflict In Sri Lanka And Prospects of Management: An 
Empirical Enquiry”, Terrorism and Political Violence Vol. 3, No. 2 (Summer, 1991) p76.
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that had lasted 400 years and saw Sri Lanka governed by three colonial powers. 
The Dutch from 1667-1796 followed by Portuguese who governed from 1505- 
1667. The Dutch and the Portuguese ruled the Tamils and the Sinlialese as 
separate entities. Finally, from 1815-1948, Sri Lanka was administered under the 
British Raj.^^  ^ It was the British who amalgamated the two states in 1833, 
irrespective of the ethnic differences that existed.^^  ^ However, both groups 
maintained their own language, religion, culture and social systems. That is, “the 
Sinhalese and the Tamils of Sri Lanka are by no means homogenous collectivities 
of people; a vast degree of internal differentiation is to be found among both 
groups.”^^ "’ As a result, both groups now claim that they are the original settlers on 
the island. Furtheimore, according to Rohan Gunaratna, the Tamil-Sinhala 
conflict further accelerated when the British decided to bring Tamils from South 
India to work in the plantation sector of Sri Lanka. “Sri Lanka changed 
profoundly under the British who developed an export-orientated plantation 
economy”.^ ^^  They worked under miserable conditions including low wages and a 
poor standard of living. They were barred from buying their own land or their 
own homes. It is important to remember that under the British, the three major 
groups that existed were the Sinhalese, the Sri Lankan Tamils and the Indian 
Tamils. However, no sense of community existed between the two Tamil groups, 
irrespective of the fact that they shared a common language.^^’’ One very 
important development that came about because of the British was the spread of
Gamini Samaranyake, “Political Violence in Sri Lanka: A Diagnostic Approach”, Terrorism 
and Political Violence Vol.9, No2, Summer 1997. p99.
Rohan Gunaratna, War and Peace in Sri Lanka. (Sri Lanka: Institute of Fundamental Studies, 
1987) pl5.
Sumantra Bose, States. Nations. Sovereignty. Sri Lanka. India and The Tamil Eelam 
Movement. (New Delhi: Sage Publications, 1994) p40.
K.V. Nagarajan, “Troubled Paradise: Ethnic Conflict in Sri Lanka”, Conflict Vol.6, No 4. 1986. 
p336-337.
Ibid. p337.
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the English education. It so happened that “the Tamils were especially assiduous 
in inculcating English because of the prevailing geo-economic reasons”.^ ’^ 
However, in 1915 following the Sinhalese and Muslim riots, the Ceylon National 
Party was formed in 1919 after the brutal methods used by the British. This was to 
mark one of the first instances of trouble on the political front between the 
Sinhalese and the Tamils. Serious differences over power sharing began to emerge 
between the two. The Doughmore commission came to the island in an attempt to 
find a way for self - government. During this period, the Tamil leaders expressed 
their reservations which maintained that under universal suffrage, the Sinhalese 
would gain an overwhelming majority. However, this appeal was rejected, and 
based on the commission a new constitution was written, hi 1947, the transfer of 
power was formalised by the Ceylon Independent Act and the United National 
Party won a majority. On February 4, 1948, the Dominion of Ceylon was 
proclaimed.
Thus, in 1948, unlike in many other countries, Sri Lanka gained 
independence by peaceful means. In other words, “the whole process of the 
transfer of power was so smooth that Sri Lanka in 1948 was even described as an 
oasis of stability, peace and order”.^ ^^  After independence, the political arena was 
dominated by westernised attitudes along with orthodox left - wing parties. 
However, the conflict between the Tamils and the Sinhala seemed to slowly gain 
momentum. In fact, “ideas and myths regarding the political stability of Sri 
Lanka’s democratic process were shattered by the political violence manifested in
557 Ibid.
Samaranayake, op.cit. ‘Ethnic Conflict in Sri Lanka’, p75.
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the ethnic separatism led by the Tamil (minority) youth and the revolutionary- 
motivated violence led by the Sinhalese (majority) youth”/^^
However, “at independence, one of the most vexing problems was the so 
called Indian question which concerned the political status of the Indian Tamil 
plantation workers brought to the island in the nineteenth and early twentieth 
centuries”/^ ’’ The disenfranchisement of the Indian Tamil plantation workers 
strengthened the two main Sinhalese parties, the United National Party and the Sri 
Lanka Freedom Party. A split was soon to occur between the Sri Lankan Tamils 
and the Indian Tamils. “However, a faction in the (Ceylon) Tamil Congress, an 
organ of the Sri Lankan Tamils, broke away to form the (Tamil) Federal Party”.^ ’^ 
The Tamil Federal Party in 1951 declared “the Tamil people’s unchallengeable 
title to nationhood and .. .their right to political autonomy and desire for federal 
union with the Sinhalese”.^ ^^  The main aim of the Federal party was to fight for a 
federal state.
Another major area of discontent was the issue of the official language. In 
the 1940s it was agreed by both the Sinhala and the Tamil leaders that both Tamil 
and Sinhala would be considered the official languages, instead of English. 
However, in 1956 the Sri Lanka Freedom party declared Sinhala to be the only 
official language, by the Official Language Act. This was to become a long and 
bitter dispute. However, the Tamil Language Act of 1966 recognised Tamil as the 
official language of the Northern and Eastern provinces. In 1972 a Republican
Ibid.
Nagarajan, op.cit. p338.
Ibid.p339.
The formation o f the Federal party was regarded as the important development which was to set 
the tone for its political agenda. As Nagarajan has stated that the conciliatory tone of the Tamil 
Congress gave way to the stridency of the Federal Party.
Alfred Wilson, The Break-Up Of Sri Lanka: The Sinhalese-Tamil Conflict. (London: 
Christopher Hurst, 1988) p55.
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constitution was passed. “It granted recognition to Buddhism as the de facto state 
religion, and re-affirmed the pre-eminence of the Sinhalese language in all aspects 
of public life” .^ "^’ The issue of language was directly related to the issue of public 
sector employment. The Northern and Eastern provinces were not conducive to 
agriculture. As a result employment in the agricultural sector was difficult, which 
led to Tamils seeking employment in the state and private sector. “Considering 
the added facilities for English education made available to the Tamils a larger 
segment of the Tamil people were absorbed into the state sector”. As a result 
the Sinhala act was seen by the Tamils as a deliberate attempt to restrict the 
number of Tamils being absorbed into the public sector. What was worse was the 
fact that Tamils had to prove their proficiency in Sinhala. This conflict between 
language and employment was further accompanied by competition for university 
education. In the 1970s medicine and engineering was dominated by Tamil 
students. Between 1970 and 1973 a system of standardisation was introduced 
according to which “...the pattern of marking was readjusted according to the 
media of study combined with a district quota system”.^ *^^ The aim of the 
standardisation programme was to make sure that senior posts and higher 
education reflected the ethnic ratio, which further angered the Tamils. However, it 
can be stated that “a system was devised whereby the average Tamil student 
would have to score substantially higher marks than the average Sinhalese student 
in qualifying entrance examinations in order to gain admissions to university 
medicine and engineering courses”.^ ^^  As result the number of Tamil students 
declined tremendously. “This action only heightened the sense of discrimination
Bose, op.cit. p68.
Samaranayake, ‘Ethnic Conflict in Sri Lanka’, op.cit. p77.
Samaranayake, ‘Ethnic Conflict in Sri Lanka’, op.cit. p78.
^  Bose, op.cit. p69.
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felt by the Tamils.”^^  ^Furthermore, anti-Tamil riots of 1977, 1979, 1981 and 1983 
saw the deaths of three thousand Tamils in Sinhalese - dominated areas. Thus, all 
these factors considerably added to the ethnic conflict that already existed.
The hopes of achieving a federal state were soon to be accompanied by the 
desire for a separate state. In 1972 the Federal party joined other Tamil political 
parties, such as the Tamil Congress first being called the coalition Tamil United 
Front (TUF) and later known as the Tamil United Liberation Front (TULF). 
“Although the TULF continued to pursue a non-violent strategy, the other 
breakaway factions mainly comprised a Tamil youth resorted to guerrilla-cum- 
terrorist tactics”.^ ^^  Furthermore, the TULF was planning on forming a terrorist 
group. To summarise, “Sri Lanka’s opposition Tamil United Liberation Front 
(TULF) is planning to form a new terrorist group and join others in an anned 
struggle for a separate Tamil state, according to the Sri Lanka Govemment”.^ ’^’
Creation of the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam
As a result, the aggravated Tamil youth, who had no hopes of higher education 
and employment, began to carry out armed attacks against the govermnent. 
Therefore, as Bose points out, “the Tigers can be regarded, from one angle, as 
being the products of state policy and the radicalisation of Tamil opinion over 
four decade”.^ ’^ “The Tamil youth felt that the TUF was not accommodating 
them, and not allowing them a platform to air their grievances”.^ ^^  At the outset it 
is important to clarify whether the LTTE is a terrorist group or a guerrilla
Robert C. Oberst, “Sri Lanka’s Tamils Tigers”, Conflict Vol. 8, Number 2/3, 1988. pl90. 
Samaranyake, ‘Ethnic Conflict in Sri Lanka’, p79.
“Sri Lanka Tamils Plan Terrorism” DT 15/10/1983.
Bose, ‘Ethnic Conflict in Sri Lanka’, op.cit. p83.
Rohan Gunaratna, War and Peace, (Sri Lanka: Institute of fundamental studies, 1987) p31-32.
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movement. The US State Department refers to them as terrorists, whereas 
others like Sumantra Bose refer to them as guerrillas. It is true that terrorists are 
often similar to guerrillas, as they both use methods such as shooting and bombing 
to intimidate and create fear amongst targets. However, where they do differ is, 
for example, in the use by guerrillas of armed personnel in large numbers, in their 
inclination to use military units to attack the enemy in the open, to seize and 
control territory when they are able to, and to exercise sovereignty and control 
over an area and its people.^^"’ The LTTE is known to have gained de facto control 
of territories in the North because of their money, guns, power and prestige, as has 
been pointed out by Purnaka De S i lva .Laks i r i  Fernando asserts that the “the 
LTTE in fact ran a mini-state in Jaffna between 1989 and 1995 and still controls 
certain areas in the Northern Province”.^ ^^
Beginning of violence
The first sign of violence came in mid-1975 when Velupillai Pirabhakaran, then 
leader of the LTTE, shot the Tamil mayor for Jaffha.^^^ This incident was 
followed by a successful bank robbery of half a million rupees the following year.
 ^  ^Agence France Presse, 8* October 1996, International News, “US To Define Tamil Tigers As 
Terrorists: Minister”.
For further reference see Bruce Hoffman, ‘Inside Terrorism’, op.cit. p41.
Purnaka De Silva, “The Growth o f Tamil Paramilitary Nationalism: Sinhala Chauvinism And 
Tamil Responses”, South Asia Journal of South Asian Studies Vol. XX, 1997, p i03.
Laksiri Fernando, “Etlinic Conflict And The State In Sri Lanka: A Possible Solution?”, South 
Asia. Journal Of South Asian Studies Vol. XX, 1997, p93.
577 "Yhere have been three insurgencies of different origins and forms. Two represent left-wing 
insurgencies based on class, while one represents the secessionist insurgency based on the basis of 
ethnicity. The April insurrection o f 1971 by the Janatha Vimukthi Peramuna (JVP) and its second 
insurrection from 1987 to 1989 represent the left-wing insurgency, while Tamil Guerrilla warfare 
o f the Liberation Tigers o f Tamil Ealam (LTTE) since 1972 expresses the separatist or 
secessionist insurrection”. For further reference see Gamini Samaranayake “Political Violence in 
Sri Lanka: A Diagnostic Approach”. Terrorism and Political Violence, Vol. 9, No. 2, Summer 
1997. Pg99. ( The JVP or the People’ Liberation Front was a initially a breakaway group from 
the pro-Communist Party in the mid 1960s.)
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It was after this that Pirabhakaran formed the Tamil New Tigers, which became 
the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE).^^^ In 1978 the group successfully 
blew up an Air Ceylon passenger jet. Today, many would agree that the LTTE is
one of the world’s most highly disciplined and effective 
guerrilla movements, as way and ahead the most 
developed, resourceful and powerful of South Asian 
extremist organisations, or simply as the most fearsome 
terrorist group the world has seen since Sheikh Hassan 
bin Sabbah founded the sect of assassins^^^
The view is held that “on the political plane the Tiger movement has emerged as 
the sole spokesman of the Tamil quest for sovereign statehood”.^ ®^ Apart firom the 
Tigers, some of the non - Tiger groups that exist are the Eelam Revolutionary 
Organisation of Students (EROS), the Tamil Eelam Liberation Organisation 
(TELO), People’s Liberation Organisation of Tamil Eelam (PLOTE), the Eelam 
People’s Revolutionary Liberation Front (EPRLF) and so on. LTTE and TELO 
are more nationalist orientated than the other groups. It is known that all groups 
maintain their own connections. For example, many of the LTTE cadets have 
been trained in Lebanon and Syria in the Middle East.^^’ LTTE receives most of 
its finances from expatriate Tamils, bank robberies and drug trafficking to carry
The leadership of the Tamil Tigers is made up of charismatic leaders who are the driving force 
behind the movement. The leaders are usually university educated who speak English and have 
connections with the western world. However, Prabhakaran is from humble origins. He is o f a 
middle - class caste and does not speak English fluently. He is a professional revolutionary and 
had no career before this. He is not an able orator. For further reference see Roberst C. Oberst “Sri 
Lanka’s Tamil Tigers”. Conflict Vol. 8, Number 2/3, 1988. pl93.
Bose, op.cit. p85.
Bose, op.cit. p87.
Oberst, op.cit. p i95.
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out its activities. “The ultimate objective of all these groups is to establish a 
separate Tamil state, which would be named Eelam”. T h e  Tiger movement can 
been seen to have grown in stages, the first stage being between 1972-1987, the 
second between 1987-1990 and the third from 1990 onwaids. Initially, the Tigers 
concentrated on assassinating Tamil politicians who collaborated with political 
parties in office, and police i nformers .From 1977, the targets of attacks were 
police and armed forces, and from 1984 the targets were Sinhala civilians living in 
isolated northern and eastern provinces. Soon the attacks on civilians increased to 
large scale massacres. Some of the worst massacres were when “more than 200 
people were killed in May 1985, the mass massacre in Trincomalee where 175 
people were killed in April 1987, a bomb blast in Colombo which killed 200 
people in 1987.” ®^"’ It can be concluded that the scope of the movement grew in all 
forms due to the government’s failure to acknowledge the problems faced by 
Tamils. During this period India showed a keen interest in the activities of the 
militant groups in Sri Lanka. In fact, Indian intelligence organisations were 
known to have trained a large number of the militants in camps in South India and 
there can be no question that the primacy source of outside support for the Tigers 
came from India”.^ *^
Measures to counter violence and the IPKF
In 1979, the Prevention of Terrorism Act was implemented. There was the 
removal of the standardisation policy, the status of the national language was
Samaranayake, ‘Ethnic Conflict in Sri Lanka’, op.cit. p80. 
Ibid.
Ibid. p81.
Oberst, op.cit. p i94.
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altered and political decentralisation was introduced by the District Development 
Council/^^ However, the DDC scheme failed, and there was a further increase in 
violence. “As the guerrilla warfare grew in scope and intensity the government of 
Sri Lanka turned to foreign countries for assistance”.^ ^^  At this point India feared 
that the Tamils’ call for a separate state would affect its own population’s desire 
for statehood. It is understood that the
principal reason for Indian intervention in the affairs of 
Sri Lanka was to prevent the aggressive assertion of a 
Tamil Identity in Sri Lanka from having reflex influence 
in Tamil Nadu^^^
With Indira Gandhi’s assassination in 1984 India shifted her focus towards Sri 
Lanka. As a result, in an effort to help solve the Sri Lankan Tamil problem, Rajiv 
Gandhi got involved with the ethnic conflict as a peace broker in 1985. “He first 
attempted to play honest broker between the Tamils and the Sinhala-dominated 
government of Sri Lanka”.^ ^^  The first round of talks was held when Sri Lankan 
lawyers and jurists met representatives of five of the Tiger groups (PLOTE, 
EPRLF, EROS, LTTE, and TELO) in August 1985. The second round of talks 
was held in New Delhi between the government’s chief negotiator and the Indian 
foreign ministry. A ceasefire was attained with the Tigers. “It ultimately broke 
down in the fall of 1985 amidst claims by the government that the tigers were 
using it to attack government positions and the “tigers” claiming that the
Samaranayake, ‘Ehnic Conflict in Sri Lanka’, op.cit. p82.
Ibid. p82.
Manoj Joshi. “On the Razor’s Edge: The Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam”, Studies in 
Conflict and Terrorism. Vol. 19, N o .l, 1996, p23.
Ibid. p24.
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government was using the ceasefire to amass men and weapons for an offensive 
against the Tamils”.^ ’^’ This was followed by a new series of meetings with the 
government, and for the first time, the government made serious concessions to 
the Tamils. They agreed to establish provincial councils, give control over police 
power, and power to control some aspects of the colonisation.^^’ However, Rajiv 
Gandhi made it quite clear that “he was not in favour of Tamil secession and that 
a solution within the federal framework of Sri Lanka, possibly conceding greater 
regional autonomy to the northern and eastern provinces, was the only way 
out”.^ ^^  In 1987 it was starting to become apparent that Colombo was gearing 
towards a military solution and, “increasingly, the distinction between civilian and 
guerrilla in the northern province was ignored by the Sri Lankan army” .^ ^^  At this 
stage India started interfering by supplying humanitarian aid to the Tamils. It was 
against this backdrop that the Indo-Sri Lankan Peace Accord of June 1987 was 
negotiated. This accord meant that now the government would have “the powerful 
Indian army to disarm the rebels; for the Tamil rebels, it meant the intervention of 
a neutral, even friendly, power, for the Indians, an opportunity to flex its newly 
acquired muscle, to assert convincingly their regional hegemony, and to 
marginalise the Americans and Pakistanis from the conflict; and for the Congress 
Party and Rajiv Gandhi, a likely fbreign-policy bonus in the upcoming 
elections”.^ "^’ According to the Accord, India had committed to preserving the 
unity of Sri Lanka. Sri Lanka would grant autonomy to the Northern and Eastern 
provinces to form a Tamil majority state. India committed itself not to support
Oberst, op.cit. pl97.
' ‘^ Ibidpl97-198.
Sankaran Krisha, “India and Sri Lanka: A Fatal Convergence”, Studies in Conflict and 
Terrorism. Vol. 15, No.4, 1992 p274.
=^Ibid.^^ I^bid. p275.
236
militancy among the Tamils and, indeed, to disarm them within a week of a 
ceasefire. However, from the beginning the Accord was doomed. “First, 
Velupillai Prabhakaran, the leader of the LTTE, despite strenuous efforts to secure 
his agreement to the treaty, refused to endorse it explicitly.... He made his 
feelings clear on the matter: “India was overly keen on striking an Accord 
[because it] protected India’s interests in the region”.^ ^^  Furtheimore, the Accord 
was seen as providing little to the LTTE. Prabhakaran claimed that he agreed to 
the treaty because he was being held hostage in New Delhi. It is important to note 
that while the Indian Peace-Keeping Force (IPKF) was stationed in Sri Lanka they 
killed significant number of Tamils. At the same time the LTTE inflicted heavy 
casualties on the IPKF. Rough estimates tell us that 500 were killed and 1500 
injured.^^^
The IPKF was soon to become a means of uniting both the Northern 
Tamils and the Sinhalese, as both were constantly fearful of the intentions of the 
regional superpower. Therefore, for once the Sinhalese and the Tamils had 
something in common - the desire to get rid of the IPKF. With this in mind the 
LTTE entered into talks with the government in August 1989. At this point the 
LTTE established the political wing called the People’s Front of Liberation Tigers 
(PFLT) and they made a real effort to show that they were entering the political 
stream. However, in reality the LTTE had established the PFLT as a tactical, 
temporary measure to gain the government’s confidence with the real objective of 
securing the departure of the Indian forces from its Northern homeland. The IPKF 
left in March 1990 and this was followed by the dissolution of the PFLT. With the 
departure of the IPKF the widely - held view was that the LTTE was the only
595 Ibid.
Pauletta Otis and Christopher D. Carr, “Sri Lanka and the Ethnic Conflict” in Conflict Vol. 8, 
No 2/3, 1988. p213.
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means for the Tamils to express their views. “The extreme harsliness of the Indian 
occupation brutalised Tamil society almost beyond redemption, and convinced 
thousands of young Tamils, of both sexes and all the socio-economic 
backgrounds, that the Tiger path was the only path for them to take”.^ ^^  The group 
had grown from 4000 to 10,000 fighters. The Tamils came to believe that violence 
was the only way forward. The ceasefire initiated in August came to an end when 
hundreds of policemen were killed in 1990. At this time Rajiv Gandhi, who was 
responsible for the IPKF, was running for office, and was assassinated by an 
LTTE suicide bomber. In this context “as the Tigers have themselves observed: 
the struggle for self determination of the Eelam Tamils has an evolutionary 
history extending to over 40 years...the armed struggle is a historical product of 
intolerable national oppression; is an extension, continuation and advancement of 
the political struggle of our oppressed people”.
The Assassination
May 21®’, 1991 was like any other day for Gandhi before the elections He was 
campaigning for the upcoming elections in Sripemmbudur near Madras. He was 
trying to fit in as many constituencies as possible during the day, and was then 
scheduled to fly to the Southern states. At dusk, just before his flight, the airport 
authorities informed him that due to poor visibility he should avoid flying to 
Madras. Additionally, the aeroplane had developed some technical problems and 
the airport did not have night take - off facilities. Rajiv reluctantly had to go to 
Madras the following day or cancel going to Madias altogether. On the way back
Bose, op.cit p i72. 
mid. pg93.pg.80.
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to the city, a message was given to Rajiv Gandhi stating that visibility had 
improved, and asking whether he would like to travel to Madras after all. Rajiv 
decided to fly to Madras. He arrived in Madras an hour behind schedule. 
Meanwhile also on 21®’ May, two women and a man surveyed the location where 
Rajiv was to deliver his speech. No one took any notice of the three as they 
decided to put their plan into action. As Rajiv emerged from the car and walked 
towards the dais the assassin and accomplices waited with the crowd. As the 
accomplice’s turn came to greet Rajiv she placed a garland around his neck and 
then bent down to touch his feet as a sign of respect. The assassin Subha pulled 
the trigger to the bomb, which was a belt strapped to the assassin’s waist. It 
consisted of six lethal grenades. The nation was shell-shocked. As time passed it 
became apparent that the LTTE were the primary suspects behind the 
assassination. “The gruesome incident brings to the fore the diabolical plans of the 
Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE)”.^ ^^
Having examined the assassination of Rajiv Gandhi this chapter will now 
analyse the three questions once again with reference to this assassination.
Can the justifications that are analysed justify the political assassinations in 
this thesis?
Consequentialism maintains that the political assassination of Rajiv Gandhi did 
not have good consequences for all the people in Sri Lanka. The good 
consequences were restricted to the Tamil population, and they did not apply to
Rajiv Sharma, “Bevond The Tigers. Tracking Raiiv Gandhi’s Assassination”. (New 
Delhi'.Kaveri Books, 1998) pg xxi.
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the larger population in Sri Lanka. Furthermore, assassination of Rajiv Gandhi 
cannot be considered the best option available to the assassin, as other options 
were not considered. Thus, consequentialism cannot be used to justify the 
assassination of Rajiv Gandhi. According to utilitarianism, an action is right if it 
is responsible for promoting further happiness or pleasure. As a result actions 
which produce further happiness and pleasure are good and actions that promote 
pain and unhappiness are bad. According to Classical or Hedonistic 
utilitarianism, the most important principle is that an action needs only to 
promote happiness. In this case, the political assassination of Rajiv Gandhi was 
committed by the LTTE in order to bring happiness to the Tamils of Sri Lanka, 
who form a minority in Sri Lanka. The happiness produced by the assassination 
was not felt by the Singhalese population of Sri Lanka. Therefore, the 
assassination cannot be justified. According to another form of utilitarianism, 
which is Ideal utilitarianism, there are other things that are also important, like 
virtue, love, knowledge and beauty. However, at the end, the most important 
thing is to promote happiness. This did not occur with the assassination of Rajiv 
Gandhi. Furthermore, a significant aspect of utilitarianism is that it believes that 
people act out of self - interest. In fact, this concept of self - interest is related to 
theological utilitarianism where promoting happiness is regarded as the purpose 
of God. However, this is not always true, especially with regard to the 
assassination of Rajiv Gandhi, There was no religious angle to the entire 
assassination event. That is, the assassins were not acting out of any obligation to 
God nor was there any religious significance to the date, time and place of the 
assassination. The ultimate goal was the promotion of happiness, which did not 
happen, and therefore did not justify the assassination. According to
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contemporary utilitarianism the assassination of Rajiv Gandhi did not result in 
greater utility for the Tamil population of Sri Lanka and cannot therefore be 
justified. More specifically, according to both versions of act utilitarianism, it is 
interesting to note that the political assassination of Rajiv Gandhi was not 
justified. This is because there was no way of knowing what the consequences 
would be of alternatives. In summary, none of the versions justify the 
assassination based on the level of utility, which was high. Rule utilitarianism 
justifies an act on the basis of rules and the utility of these rules. Rule 
utilitarianism states that prohibiting acts of murder, torture, political 
assassinations and so on can be justified, because prohibiting them may produce 
more good than rules against prohibiting them. However, these acts are only 
justified if they have greater utility then prohibiting them. It is apparent that 
Rajiv Gandhi’s assassination did not have greater utility than not carrying out the 
assassination. Thus, from the above analyses, it can be concluded that 
consequentialism and utilitarianism do not justify the assassination of Rajiv 
Gandhi.
Just War
As has been previously mentioned, there are six requirements that need to be 
fulfilled for the use of force to be justified.
Just Cause is the first requirement which maintains that the use of force is 
permitted if there is a real danger. The Just Cause requirement camiot really be 
addressed with Rajiv Gandhi’s assassination. It was the Sri Lankan government 
that approached the Indian government for help in order to restore peace in Sri
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Lanka. The Tamil population over - reacted to the Indian involvement, and made 
it out to be something more than it was. The enemy in this case should have been 
their own govermnent, and as a result there was no Just Cause to the assassination.
According to right intention, the assassination of Gandhi cannot be 
justified because there was no right intention. Gandhi was assassinated for 
interfering in Sri Lankan affairs, which has been encouraged by Sri Lanka. As a 
result, right intention does not justify the act.
According to popular authority and public declaration the assassination of 
Rajiv Gandhi cannot be justified, because the decision to assassinate him was 
made by a terrorist group which does not constitute popular authority, as the 
terrorist group represents a minority of the community. Also, public declaration of 
the act was not possible as it would then have become difficult to carry out the 
assassination.
The next requirement is last resort. Rajiv’s assassination was not the last 
resort. The assassin did not even consider any other action before assassinating 
Gandhi. The assassin wanted revenge and assassinating Gandhi was the only 
option.
Regarding probability of success, the assassin was going to carry out the 
assassination not knowing what the outcome was going to be. There was no 
guarantee that the act would actually have the desired effect. Therefore, the 
probability of success could not have been known.
Finally, according to proportionality which states that the cost of the use 
of force must be in proportion to the good expected from taking up arms. Rajiv 
Gandhi’s assassination, however, was different as the good that came out of it 
was expected. It did end the Indian involvement in Sri Lanka.
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Terroristic Justifications
What is interesting about Rajiv Gandhi’s assassination is that it did not have the 
religious element which played a strong role in the other two assassinations. The 
Tamil Tigers did not seek permission from any religious authority. Subha, the 
assassin, did not exhibit any specific religious inclinations and no religious 
justification was sought for committing the act. The assassination was carried 
out for very practical reasons. Thus, the role of terroristic justification in this 
case did not form a significant part of the assassination.
Do political assassinations only succeed as existential acts?
Finally, Gandhi’s assassination did succeed as an existential act. Subha 
chose to join the suicide squad and was therefore trained to be an assassin. The 
assassin Subha was part of the suicide squad of the Tamil Tigers. She was 
trained in the knowledge that her mission would ultimately lead to her death. 
This suggests that being an assassin was an important part of her existence. 
Another important point about Subha was that she did not know who her target 
was going to be until the day before the assassination. Therefore, it did not 
matter who the target was only that she was out there to catiy out a mission 
successfully, irrespective of who the target was going to be. This shows the 
existential nature of assassintion. Hence this is a good example that illustrates 
that a political assassination does succeed as an existential act. Once again, in 
terms of immediate success, the assassin Subha did successfully assassinate
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Rajiv Gandhi. The assassin was also successful in existential terms as has been 
illustrated above, and finally the assassination was a success as she had removed 
the person responsible for interfering in Sri Lankans’ internal political affairs.
Conclusion
In conclusion, the chapter illustrated the history of the political problems in Sri 
Lanka and the connections of these problems with hidia. It showed how the 
Tamils wanted to end Indian involvement in future affairs of Sri Lanka. Gandhi 
was the person mainly responsible for Indian involvement in Sri Lankan affairs 
and this made him the target of a political assassination by the LTTE. Again, 
Gandhi’s assassination cannot therefore be justified by the consequentialist, non 
consequentialist and terroristic justifications.
Thus, having now examined the thiee case studies, the next chapter 
will seek to answer the typology posed in Chapter One and present conclusions. 
The following chapter will also include an examination of the similarities and 
differences between the cases which are important in order to have a well - 
rounded understanding of the phenomenon of the political assassination. This will 
be followed by the conclusion to the thesis.
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Chapter 6 
Political Assassination Regimes
One important thing that this research has established is that political 
assassination is a very interesting phenomenon and that there is room in the 
socio scientific field for further research to be carried out into political 
assassination. Political assassination is a phenomenon, which has occurred 
for centuries and continues today. With the development of 
communications and technological advances it is only more likely that the 
capacity to commit political assassinations will be greater. This has always 
been an area which has not attracted enough attention, but such 
developments should encourage people to study the phenomenon in greater 
detail, as the potential for such acts to be committed more successfully may 
well increase. This is an issue that needs to be addressed as political 
assassination can destabilise a country, and in turn, create further unrest. 
This was seen in the recent assassination of the Serbian Prime Minister, 
Zoran Djindjic. It was been reported by correspondents that “assassination 
of the prime minister heralds the start of turbulent days for Serbia, leaving 
the country with a potentially dangerous political power vacuum”.^ ®^ 
Therefore, there has to be an effort to try and counter such attacks in the 
future, and especially to try and prevent any increase in such activity.
This thesis has so far only looked at political assassinations 
committed by non - state actors against state actors. However, attention 
should also be paid to political assassinations committed by state actors
BBC News, Serbian premier assassinated. Wednesday 12*' o f March. 
http://news.bbc.co.nk/ldii/world/enrope/2843433.stm
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against other state actors or non - state actors. This is because recent events 
with America attempting to take out Saddam Hussein, and the United 
States’ numerous attempts at assassinating various terrorist leaders, clearly 
show how the United States is violating its assassination policy ‘Executive 
Order 12,333’. This is evident from the fact that President Bush has 
“authorized the Central Intelligence Agency to assassinate anyone on a list 
of suspected terrorists, at will, if  it can "minimize civilian casualties”.
The Treaties on Assassinations
An important point about bans on assassination is that “a proper 
understanding of present prohibitions on assassinations requires a 
recognition that these prohibitions are the product of long and systemic 
refinement of the rules governing the use of force”.^ ®^ The Executive Order 
was based on the Hague Convention of 1907, Article 23(b) which stated 
that “it is especially forbidden ... to kill or wound treacherously, 
individuals belonging to the hostile nation or army”.^ ®^ President Gerald 
Ford issued this ban on assassinations in February 18‘^ , 1976, according to 
which “no employee of the United States Government shall engage in, or 
conspire to engage in, political assassination”.^ ®"^ This subsequently became 
known as the ‘Executive Order 12,333’, which was also reissued, by
Bush Authorises Assassinations of Suspected Terrorists by CIA, 12/16/2002. 
http://www.onetermpresident.coni/index.cfni?startitemid=334&categorv=libertv.
Michael N. Schmitt, State-Sponsored Assassination in International and Domestic Law, in 
Yale Journal of International Law. 17, 1992. p613.
See Hague Convention (No. iv) Convention, Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on 
Land. Article 23 (b) http://www.lib.byu.edu/~rdh/wwi/hague/hague5.
Executive order 11,905, United Nations Foreign Intelligence Activities, 
http://resource.lawlinks.com/Content/Legal Reseaich/Executive Orders/1964%20- 
%201992/executive order 11905.htm. Section 5, (g) Restrictions on Intelligence Activities.
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Jimmy Carter, Ronald Regan and George Bush. This order in recent times 
has been violated since September 11‘^ . However, the executive order does 
suffer from a number problems. In the first instance the order does not 
define clearly the concept of assassination. As a result, it is a very 
ambiguous order in terms of what constitutes a political assassination. The 
United States current position seems to be that the executive order does not 
cover terrorists so they are not protected by the order. The Yemen episode 
where “the lethal missile strike killed a suspected leader of A1 Qaeda in 
Yemen was carried out under broad authority that President Bush has given 
the C.I.A” ®^^ shows that it would be permissible to assassinate terrorists. 
This has been the official position of the United States since September 
11* when “President Bush has provided written legal authority to the 
C.I.A. to hunt down and kill the terrorists without seeking further approval 
each time the agency is about to stage an operation”.^®*^ Also, Donald 
Rumsfeld has stated that
it is not possible to defend yourself against terrorists 
at every single location in the world and at every 
single moment. The only way to deal with terrorists is 
to take the battle to them and find them and root them 
out and that's self-defence. We're going after these
David Johnston and David E. Sanger, Threats and Responses: Hunts for Suspects: Fatal 
Strike in Yemen Was Based on Rules Set Out bv Bush. New York Times, 6*' November 
2002 .
James Risen and David Johnston, Bush Has widened authority o f CIA to kill terrorists. 
New York Times, 15 December 2002.
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people and their organisations and capabilities and to 
stop them killing Americans®®^
Thus, it seems that there are circumstances under which certain 
assassinations are permitted. One of the most important things about the 
Executive Order is that it does not define what it means by individuals. As 
a result, it is easy to interpret the Order in order to suit vested interests. It 
had been stated that “Bush can "circumvent the ban and legally carry out 
an assassination," asserted Scharf, now a law professor and director of the 
Center for International Law and Policy at the New England School of 
Law.
He cites four ways it can be done:
1. Bush can declare "the existence of hostilities" and target 
persons in command positions, such as bin Laden, as 
"combatants."
2. He can rationalize a targeted attack on bin Laden as a 
legitimate self-defense operation under Article 51 of the U.N.
Charter, in light of evidence that bin Laden and al-Qaida were 
planning future attacks against the U.S.
3. More, he can narrowly interpret Executive Order 12333 to 
prohibit only "treacherous" attacks on foreign leaders.
4. Or, the president can simply repeal or amend the order -  "or 
even approve a one-time exception to it," he said®®^
David Gow, Bush gives Green Light to CIA for Assassination o f Foreign Terrorists. The 
Guardian 29 October, 2001
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Therefore, there are ways in which the Executive Order can be 
manipulated. Furthermore, there have been occasions when it is known that 
the CIA has been involved in plots to assassinate Cuba’s Fidel Castro, 
Colonel Muammar el-Gaddafî of Libya, and more recently, Saddam 
Hussein of Iraq. Evidence of this can be found when Air Force Chief of 
Staff General Michael Dugan “boasted that if war actually erupted between 
the United States and Saddam Hussein’s Iraq, American planes would 
probably target Saddam, his family, and his mistress”.®®^ Again, with the 
assassination of Gaddafi, it was stated by Reagan that “invoking Article 51 
of the U.N. Charter, characterized the attack on Gaddafi as a legitimate use 
of force in self-defence”.®^® This resulted in questions being raised about 
the order and its legality and it was suggested by senior U.S. Army lawyers 
that “ Executive Order 12333 was not intended to stop the U.S. from acting 
in self defence against “legitimate threats to national security”.®^ ^
This ambiguity with the Executive Order prompted debate about 
whether the order protected leaders of other states or if it is possible for the 
President of the United States to order the assassination of a political 
figure. It is understood that the President can ignore the order and “legally 
carry out the assassination of a foreign leader in four ways. He could:
^  Paul Sperry, Bush can legally order bin Laden assassinated
Ex-State Dept, lawyer says executive order banning such action can be 'circumvented'.
World Daily Net, 10 October 2001.
http://www.worldnetdailv.com/news/article.asp7ARTICLE ID=24861 
Jolinson, op.cit. p401.
Sperry, op.cit. http://www.worldnetdailv.com/news/article.asp7ARTICLE ID=24861 
Sperry, op.cit. http://www.worldnetdailv.com/news/article.asp7ARTICLE ID=24861
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(1) Ask congress to declare war, in which case a foreign 
leader exercising conunand responsibility would become a 
legitimate target;
(2) Construe Article 51 of the United Nations Charter to 
permit the assassinations of a foreign leader based on either a 
right to self defense or a right to respond to criminal activities
(3) Narrowly interpret the order as not restricting the 
President as long as long he does not approve specific plans 
for the killing of individuals
(4) Overrule order, create an exception to it, or permit the 
congress to do the same”.®^^
Hence, not only can the President of the United States legitimise the 
assassination of terrorist leaders, but it is also possible now for the 
President to legitimise the assassination of foreign leaders. Therefore, this 
does beg the question of what is the point of even having an Executive 
Order which can be manipulated in order to suit national interests.
The Hague Convention also suffers from a few drawbacks. This is 
not surprising, since the treaty was first drafted in 1907. The treaty does 
not directly address the issue of political assassinations. The treaty seems 
to suggest that killing people is banned under conditions of war. This is 
because the Convention tries to distinguish between combatants and non- 
combatants. Also, the term ‘treacherously’ is not defined properly.
Johnson, op.cit. p403.
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In addition to the Hague Convention, there are other treaties that 
prohibit carrying out assassinations. Some of these treaties include the UN 
Charter, the Convention of Internationally Protected Persons (New York 
Convention), the European Convention on the Suppression of Tenorism 
and the Charter of the Organisation of African Unity.
The UN Charter was the first charter to have legal prohibitions 
against the use of force. In the Charter, Article 2 (4) states:
All Members shall refrain in their international 
relations from the threat or use of force against the 
territorial integiity or political independence of any 
state, or in any other manner inconsistent with the 
Purposes of the United Nations
This article clearly states that no member state will be involved in any use 
of force against any other state. This Charter does in no way make any 
specific references to assassinations. It is a very vague prohibition 
regarding to whom the law really applies. In one sense this would also 
include not assassinating another head of state, but at the same time the 
prohibition could be applied to a terrorist organisation that poses a threat to 
international peace. It has been pointed out by Anthony Clark Arend and 
Robert J Beck that, in addition to stating the non - use of force, the Charter 
does have four exceptions to the rule. These include force used in self 
defence, force authorised by the security council, that undertaken by the 
five major powers before the Security Council and force undertaken
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against the enemy states of the Second World War.®^  ^As a result there is a 
way in which a state, if need be, can use force against another state, and 
have an excuse for doing it.
As with the Executive Order 12333, the Convention of 
Internationally Protected Persons and the European Convention suffer from 
some problems which raises issues regarding how effective these treaties 
can be in the long term. The New York Convention States in Article 1, that 
for the purposes of this Convention:
internationally protected person" means: a Head of 
State, including any member of a collegial body 
performing the functions of a Head of State under 
the constitution of the State concerned, a Head of 
Government or a Minister for Foreign Affairs, 
whenever any such person is in a foreign State, as 
well as members of his family who accompany 
him®^ "*
An indept analysis illustrates that throughout the convention the protection 
is offered to persons who are abroad. As a result if the person targeted for 
assassination is in his home country, then he is not covered by the 
provision of the treaty. The treaty, however, does specify that it refers to 
protected persons meaning specifically heads of states. This treaty
Anthony Clark Arend and Robert J Beck, International Law and the Use o f Force: Beyond 
the UN Charter Paradigm 31 (1993) in Terrorism and Counter Terrorism, Understanding the 
New Security Environment. Russell D. Howard and Reid L Sawyer (Connecticut: McGraw -  
Hill publishers, 2002) p524.
Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Crimes Against Internationally 
Protected Persons (New York Convention, 1973) 
http://www.usinfo.state.gov/topical/pol/terror/protectpersons.htm.
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therefore does not in anyway offer protection to terrorists. Thus, the 
convention is not a sound foundation for forbidding assassinations.
In the European Convention on the Suppression of Terrorism it 
states that “a serious offence involving an attack against the life, physical 
integrity or liberty of internationally protected persons, including 
diplomatic agents”®^® is banned. Again in this convention there is no 
distinction between an assassination conducted within a state or abroad. 
This convention, however, is strictly to do with suppressing tenorism and 
does not necessarily focus on prohibiting assassinations. Assassination is 
covered under the broad umbrella of terrorism. As a result this convention 
also fails to provide proper laws aimed strictly at eliminating 
assassinations.
Finally, the Charter of the Organisation of African Unity, in Article 
III (5) states its, “unreserved condemnation, in all its foims, of political 
assassination as well as of subversive activities on the part of neighbouring 
States or any other State”.®‘® This seems to be the most coherent ban on 
assassinations that exists today. The Charter however does not specify who 
it is directed towards. Therefore, the Charter could apply to both heads of 
states or terrorist. It clearly states the need to refrain fi*om political 
assassinations by all states.
Thus, the entire debate on having an international law banning 
assassination is a contentious issue. As can be seen from the prohibitions 
that exist that there is room for a more stringent set of laws to be created.
European Convention on the Suppression o f Terrorism. Aiticle (1) 
http://conventions.coe.int/Treatv/en/Html.
Modem History Sourcebook: Charter o f the Organisation o f African Unity, Article III (5). 
httD://www.fordham.edu/halsall/mod/l 9630AU-charter.htiTil.
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With the way things stand at present the United States violating the 
Executive Order makes a mockery of such laws. If a hegemon such as the 
United States can violate laws on assassination, it reflects on the validity of 
universal laws that exist. Furthermore, this kind of action makes way for 
other countries to disregard prohibitions on assassinations. Thus, the 
United States as a result is legitimising assassinations of not only terrorists 
but of foreign leaders too.
Another important aspect that does need to be addressed when 
discussing laws on assassination is the concept of whether the laws prohibit 
assassination under conditions of war. The simple answer to this would be 
that “when a condition of war exists between states, international law 
normally treats transnational assassination as a war crime”.®^  ^The banning 
of assassinations under a state of war was first established during the 
American Civil War. It was revised and disseminated as the General Order 
100 by President Lincoln. The Order stated that:
the law of war does not allow proclaiming either an 
individual belonging to the hostile army, or a 
citizen, or a subject of the hostile government, an 
outlaw, who may be slain without trial by any 
captor, any more than the modern law of peace 
allows such intentional outlawry; on the contrary, it 
abhors such outrage. The sternest retaliation should 
follow the murder committed in consequence of
Louis R. Beres, The Permissibility of State Sponsored Assassination During Peace and 
War in Temple International and Comparative Law Journal. 5 , 1991.p236.
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such proclamation, made by whatever authority.
Civilized nations look with horror upon offers of 
rewards for the assassination of enemies as relapses 
into barbarism®
Once again the Order suffers from definitional confusion. The exact 
meaning of the term assassination is not explained which makes the 
declaration unclear. Another effort was made at banning assassinations 
under conditions of war under the Brussels Declaration, 1874, which states 
that “According to this principle are especially 'forbidden': (a) Employment 
of poison or poisoned weapons; (b) Murder by treachery of individuals 
belonging to the hostile nation or army”.®^  ^ This declaration did not 
directly address the prohibition of assassinations. It refers more to betrayal 
of people in conditions of war. As a result this declaration did not provide a 
sound basis for banning assassinations. This declaration was followed by 
the Oxford Manual in 1880. This was established by Gustave Moynier, 
who states that “it is forbidden to make treacherous attempts upon the life 
of an enemy; as, for example, by keeping assassins in pay or by feigning to 
surrender”.®^® Here again there was no direct implication of banning 
assassinations. The interesting thing is the use of the term “treacherous” 
specially in times of war. The reason for this is explained by Schmitt: as
General Order 100, Article 148, April 24,1863. 
http://franklaughter.tripod.com/cgi-bin/histDrof'misc/genordlQQ.html.
University of Minnesota, Human Rights Library, Project of an International Declaration 
concerning the Laws and Customs of War, Brussels, August 27, 1874. 
hltn://wvvw 1 .umn.edu/humanits/instiee/1874a.htm.
University o f Minnesota, Human Rights Library, The Laws of War on Land, Manual 
published by the Institute of International Law (Oxford Manual), Adopted by the Institute o f  
International Law at Oxford, September 9, 1880. 
http://wwwl .umn.edu/humanrts/instree/1880a.htm.
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treachery was historically “a critical component of assassination”.®^  ^ The 
declaration would have had more importance if it explained the exact 
definition of the term treacherous. This is because “efforts focused on the 
issue of treachery without specifically citing assassination”.®^  ^ Thus, the 
Declarations were not best suited to banning assassinations. In addition, 
there are a number of other prohibitions that exist, such as the US Anny 
Manual and there is also UK version of the manual. Both manuals forbid 
treacherous killing.®^  ^ The main difference between prohibitions on 
assassination in peace time and war time is that the laws usually distinguish 
between combatants and non - combatants. In other words,
the peacetime ban serves to protect individuals 
involved in international affairs. In other words, the 
ban is a recognition that the death of specific 
individuals will upset stability in the international 
system. The war prohibition focuses on the method 
used to kill, not on the legitimacy of the target®^ "^
Thus, the above discussion shows that there are two types of laws 
prohibiting assassinations that are relevant both in peace time and in times 
of war.
Another interesting point is whether political assassination 
committed by state actors against other state actors, such as the United 
States role in trying to assassinate Fidel Castro and Mohammad Qadaffi
Schmitt, op.cit. p633.
Ibid. p630.
For more information see, Sclimitt, p631-632. 
^  Ibid. p633. in footnote 120.
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and non - state actors such as Bin Laden, is leading to a new form of 
sustem in the international political system. Is this going to imply that the 
concept of targeted killing is coming into force? We are already aware of 
the fact that the Israeli government has started a policy of targeted killing 
of terrorist suspects. The interesting thing about this is that “Israelis dislike 
the term assassination policy. They would rather use another extrajudicial 
punishment, selective targeting, or long-range hot pursuit -  to describe the 
pillar of their counter terrorism doctrine”.®^®
Israeli Defence Forces provide conditions under which such actions can 
take place. These include;
There must be well-supported information showing the 
terrorist will plan or carry out a terror attack in the near 
future.
The policy can be enacted only after appeals to the 
Palestinian Authority calling for the terrorist's arrest have 
been ignored.
Attempts to arrest the suspect by use of IDF troops have 
failed.
The assassination is not to be carried out in retribution for 
events of the past. Instead it can only be done to prevent
625625 Luft, The Logic of Israel’s Targeted Killing. The Middle East Quarterly Winter 
2003, Volume X, Number 1. p i.
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attacks in the future which are liable to toll multiple 
casualties.®^®
This policy was encouraged with the hope that this would deter terrorist 
attacks. At the moment it seems that there has been no inunediate success 
in implementing the policy. Although in the short term targeted killing has 
increased attack on the Israeli population, DDF feels that eventually in the 
long term it may weaken the terror networks. Also, this sort of a policy is 
an infringement of the sovereignty of a state. However, in this case, Israel 
could argue that the Palestinian Authority has not been declared a state and 
as a result “from a legal point of view, is not bound by the set of nonns, 
rules, and treaties with which most states comply”.®^  ^ Furthermore, the 
other aspect of targeted killing is that there does not exist any international 
law banning targeted killing in comparison to the laws against political 
assassination. One interesting thing about targeted killing is that it raises 
questions about whether it constitutes an assassination. Therefore in 
generic terms targeted killing is an assassination and if the victim is a 
political figure, the perpetrator has a political motive and there will be 
political consequences, then it is a political assassination.
Amos Harel and Gideon Alon, IDF Lawyers Set Conditions for Assassination Policy, 
Ha’aretz Daily, 4 February 2002,
http://www.haaretzdailv.com/hasen/pages/ShArt.ihtml?itemNo=125404 
“ ’Gal Luft, op.cit.
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Implications
Thus, a number of implications arising from the strengthening or 
weakening of the regime following assassinations can be noted. It can 
surely be said that recent events show that the regime of prohibiting 
assassination is at a turning point. Furtheimore, both domestically and 
internationally this regime has been weakened. The above discussion 
illustrates that there is a need for the regime to be strengthened, and not 
weakened.
A weakened regime indicates that there is a potential for increased 
instability in the international system. The United States as a hegemon in 
the international system has revoked its Executive Order 12,333 banning 
assassinations, which sets a bad example to other states. This manipulation 
of the Order indirectly influences the other international orders that exist 
and makes them less important. This kind of action by a hyper - power also 
gives incentives to other countries to carry out assassinations, and in an 
indirect way, legitimises such actions. This would only fuel further 
instability in the international system. Thus, this is an important area that 
really needs to be addressed by the international community in order to 
create a stable environment.
A brief examination does show that the laws are not perfect and it is 
possible to violate them easily. If anything, the laws need to be 
strengthened in order to create a stable international order. This leaves the 
desire for coherent and strict laws to be formulated with clear definitional
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explanations. This would help reduce the confusion that exists with respect 
to what the laws really mean and to whom they apply. Also, the laws need 
to make a clear distinction between heads of states and individuals who 
pose a threat to the international system: that is whether the laws are 
targeted towards state actors or non -  state actors. Also, one needs to 
address issues such as assassinations in peace time and times of war. 
Furthermore, it is important to make sure that countries such as the United 
States do not violate laws. Since they are the hegemon in the contemporary 
world, it is their responsibility to be a model for the world by obeying laws 
and contributing to stability between states.
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Conclusion
The conclusion will begin by examining the similarities and differences that 
were found in the three case studies in the thesis. The similarities and 
differences will focus on three particular themes. These themes are target, 
ideology and motives and finally the aims. This gives an idea of how targets 
are chosen whether there is any significance of the target, what is the 
importance of ideology and motives and finally what are the aims of the 
assassins.
Target
The target in a political assassination is a crucial factor. This can even be seen 
in the assassinations of the three leaders in this thesis. One thing that is most 
obvious from the assassinations of Sadat and Rabin is the importance of 
religion and political goals In both the assassinations heads of state were the 
victims, which obviously suggests that the assassins were hoping to gain 
political ends. This is due to the fact that political actions are viewed as a 
reflection of the head of states’ desires, and the assassin tends to view him as 
the sole cause of all incorrect political actions. In the case of Islambouli, he 
viewed Sadat as an apostate. This is evident as during his trial he stated the 
"assassination of Sadat was the logical consequence of Faraj's and his
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reasoning about Tartars".Islam bouli saw the Camp David Accords as a 
betrayal by not only the government but more specifically, Sadat. Sadat was 
establishing ties with a country which was responsible for taking away land 
fi*om the Egyptians in 1967. Additionally, Sadat's open - door policies did not 
improve the social and economic conditions in Egypt. In fact, the situation 
went in the opposite direction. The population was marked by unemployment, 
low levels of literacy, poor housing, water problems and high levels of 
poverty. In the economic sphere, there existed inflation, a rising standard of 
living, a decline in agriculture and trade, and debt. Islambouli must have 
experienced all these socio-economic variations. He was a fundamentalist and 
these political developments were articulated by Islambouli as punishments 
for diverting fiom the path of Islam. Also, Sadat's turn towards the West, 
particularly the United States was totally in defiance of religion thus Islamic 
fundamentalism was turning against Sadat. Also, Sadat's asylum for the Shah 
of Iran infuriated the fimdamentalists. Finally, the fundamentalists could not 
envision the accomplishment of their ultimate dream, that is the establishment 
of the state based on the Sharia. Instead, Sadat was responsible for all the 
impoverishment in society. His inclination towards the United States was a 
grave mistake, and if he was a true Muslim, he would never allow the 
interference of a country which was on a mission to destroy Islam. As 
mentioned before, the policies initiated by Sadat were against Islamic ruling, 
and this was seen as the main reason for the suffering of the Muslims in 
Egyptian society. The victory of the 1973 war was the result of God wanting 
the Egyptians to win. It required the use of violence, and because this was in
*^®Gilles Kepel, The Prophet & Pharaoh. Muslim Extremism in Egypt. (Thetford Press Ltd, 1985)
p211.
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compliance with religion, it was justified. Furthermore, the 1979 Camp David 
Accords were against Islamic doctrine, as it was establishing relations with its 
enemy and if Sadat pursued this, he was not following the tenets of Islamic 
religion. Islambouli thus saw all the political developments from a religious 
perspective which provided the motivation for Sadat's assassination. At the 
same time, Islambouli had a personal motivation and this was the arrest of his 
brother prior to Sadat's death. Islambouli clearly established the difference 
between being an apostate and an unbeliever. Although both are evil, it is 
necessary to get rid of evil enemies before turning the attack on external 
enemies. All in all Sadat did not establish what is considered the desire of 
most Egyptians, an Islamic state based on the Islamic law, the Sharia. On the 
other hand, Amir's choice of target was definitely bound to be Rabin, largely 
due to the most important political event the 'Peace Process', to affect the 
region in over a decade. Amir was regarded as "one of the most single 
m i n d e d " . D u e  to his religious upbringing he began to identify with the 
Peace Process in religious terms. This move by the government was seen as a 
definite diversion from the path of religion because " there is no question that 
the political left, whose primary leader was Rabin himself, used rhetoric 
which profoundly disenfranchised the persons and aspirations of the religious- 
political r i g h t " . T h e  war of 1967 marked a special religious event. It 
marked the return of the biblical land which was meant to be a part of Israel. 
Most importantly the victory of Israel was a result of God’s wish. By 
participating and signing the treaty, Rabin was defying God and giving away 
land which was given to Jews by God. This was Amir's vision, and the only
“ ^Yigel Amir; inside the mind o f a killer. U.S. News and World Report. 20/11/1995. 
The Assassination o f Yitzhak Rabin. http://shamash.org/mail-jewisli/Rabin/8okol.txt
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practical solution he saw in order to end the Peace Process was to assassinate 
the main person involved. Similarly, the assassination of Rajiv Gandhi 
happened to be the logical choice of target by the Tamil Tigers as he was 
responsible for the installation of Indian peace keeping forces in Sri Lanka. In 
the initial years, Gandhi supported the LTTE as they were all of Tamil origin. 
He pumped a lot of money into the LTTE cause. Suddenly things changed 
and Gandhi seemed to befriend the Sri Lankan Government. He banned all 
LTTE activity that was being carried out in Tamil Nadu. All this did not go 
down well with the LTTE. The final straw came with the deployment of the 
Indian peace keeping forces in Sri Lanka. Thus, in this case the target was 
chosen purely for tactical reasons. Gandhi was the person they held 
responsible for interfering in Sri Lankan affairs. This assassination was not 
committed for any religious reasons. Thus, the intrinsic connection between 
politics and religion is evident in the assassination of both Sadat and Rabin.
Ideology and Motives
Ideology played an important part for Sadat’s assassin and Rabin’s assassin. 
In Sadat’s and Rabin’s assassinations ideology provided the motive for the 
assassination. That is, ideology and motives have an intrinsic connection. 
Therefore, they both need to be examined together. The role of ideology did 
not really exist in Gandhi’s assassination. The reason for this is that religion 
had a huge influence on both Sadat’s and Rabin’s assassination, as opposed to 
Gandhi’s assassination where the influence of religion was non - existent.
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With regards to ideology, for Islambouli politics and religion were 
very strongly linked. He witnessed a phase of transition which characterised 
Egyptian society for example, the change from socialism to capitalism, and 
new economic policies being introduced. He was characterised as a 
fundamentalist and the roots of fundamentalism go far back in society an 
organisation like the Muslim Brotherhood made fundamentalists a strong 
force in society. As a result of his association with the al Jihad group, a 
splinter organisation of the Muslim Brotherhood, Islambouli's ideology was 
heavily influenced by Muslim Brotherhood main ideologues like Sayyid Qutb 
and Abd al Salam Faraj. Due to the policies in Egyptian society, Islambouli 
felt that society was in a state of Jahiliyya, or ignorance, as proclaimed by 
Qutb. This he attributed to the increased foreign influence in society which 
pushed Islam in the corner. This state of Jahiliyya was created because of 
reforms introduced by Sadat in society. This created the need to destroy the 
existing system of ignorance in order to build an Islamic state. Qutb 
proclaimed that obedience to a ruler was dependent on the establishment of 
the Sharia by the ruler. Though the Sharia was made the main source of 
legislation, society still did not comply totally in accordance with the law. 
This created another reason for further discontent. Therefore, in such an 
environment, it was necessary for a dedicated Muslim to wage a Jihad or 
Holy War against the sinful person or society. "The underlying notion of war 
against such evil enemies, domestic and external is distilled in the 
quintessential notion of Jihad".®^  ^ Sadat was the cause of such unrest in 
society and a hindrance to the Muslim people’s desires, and Islambouli saw
“ hsraeli Raphel, “Islamikaze and their Significance”, in Terrorism and Political Violence Vol. 9, 
No 3. pl09.
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the need to assassinate him. In this respect Sayyid Qutb represents the 
messianic component of the true Islamic fundamentalist ideology, 
emphasising the return of the Messiah and escape from Jahiliyya. Faraj made 
it clear that Sadat was an apostate as he accepted all foreign influences, and 
most importantly, established ties with an enemy, and therefore a Jihad 
waged against him was justified. As Islambouli stated, ’T am guilty of killing 
Sadat...I am proud of that. This is a religious case".®^  ^Fuifhermore, once an 
Islamic state was established it would pave the way for the coming of the 
Messiah. Thus, the main guiding factor for Islambouli to assassinate Sadat 
was Jihad or Holy War. Faraj claimed that Jihad inevitably included fighting 
and the shedding of blood. He further maintained that the, "Quran and the 
Hadith are fundamentally about warfare"®^ ,^ thus outlining an innovative 
inteipretation of the Quran typical of contemporaiy Islamist groups. This 
illustrates a strong opposition to any non violent means to achieve the desired 
end. Islambouli, therefore, relied on the Quran and the Hadith which he 
interpreted to suit his actions. He therefore claimed that the Quran and Hadith 
motivated him to assassinate Sadat, as this was Jihad. At the same time 
Islambouli must have considered himself to be a martyr which is generally a 
concept furthered by religious leaders. The end of dying in the fight for 
religion constitutes a privilege and honour for believers. The role played by 
religious leaders in influencing Islambouli is prominent as a result of their 
ideology, which in turn influences motives. Islambouli had been motivated by 
the ideas of Sayyid Qutb and Abd al-Salam Faraj, both of whom were very 
violent in their teachings. Islambouli’s motive, "to carry out God's orders is
am proud of killing Sadat says accused. 1/12/1981. Indian Express (New Delhi! 
*^ I^sraeli, op.cit p 110-111.
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to build the Islamic state. We do not insist on this or that;... the mere fall of the 
infidel regime will bring everything within the reach of the M us l i ms " . T he  
very notion of Jihad promoted the idea of shedding blood. Jihad is necessary 
to establish, in the end, an Islamic state, and eventually an Islamic global 
society. This would also purify society through Islamisation. Another 
important motive was to hasten the return of the Messiah, which would 
happen only if an Islamic state were to be established, and Sadat stood in the 
way. Therefore, his political ideals combined with the religious goals 
motivated Islambouli to assassinate the President. However, at the same time 
Islambouli was affected by personal matters, that is the arrest of his brother 
prior to the military parade. He was infected with the desire for revenge.
With regard to Amir, the political dimension was totally vested in the 
Peace Process. The notion of giving away land for peace was totally against 
religious doctrine as this included giving away biblical land promised to them 
by God. The victory in the 1967 war, and the conquering of land, marked the 
process of redemption and it was only a matter of time before the Messiah 
would come. Thus, Israeli messianic views soared after the 1967 victory by 
reclaiming land belonging to Eretz Israel.®^ ® Rabbi Meir Kahane cited the Six 
Day War as proof that God wanted to speed up the redemption process.®^ ® But 
with the Peace Process this process of redemption would be stopped. Rabin 
was preventing this and had to be removed. Amir also wanted the state to be 
established according to the Halakha, the Jewish law. Rabin's death was a 
significant result of the Peace Process. The Six Day War provided evidence to
“ '’Kepel, The Prophet and the Pharaoh, op.cit. p204
*^^Juergensmeyer, The New Cold war? Religious Nationalism Confronts the Secular State, op.cit. 
p65
^*Sprinzak, Mimetic op.cit. p53
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illustrate that God wanted to restore Eretz Israel. With the Peace Process, it 
seemed that Eretz Israel was going to be destroyed. It involved conceding 
biblical land, which was against Jewish religion, and the land was meant to 
be a part of Israel. Thus, any man who stood in the way of Israeli control over 
biblical land was a traitor, and had to die. Amir saw the Peace Process as not 
an attempt to establish peace but rather a means to start war. He must have 
thought of the Peace Process as something that might lead to another 
holocaust. Rabbi Meir Kahane was responsible for influencing people with 
such violent feelings. He always preached that "Arabs were dogs, as people 
who multiply like fleas who must be expelled from Israel or eliminated".®^  ^
Arabs were in the wrong place at the wrong time and it was necessary to get 
rid of them. Rabin was planning to give land to them. The process of 
redemption that had started with the victory in the Six Day War was now 
going to be prevented. It becomes evident that Amir was greatly motivated by 
the ideologies of rabbis, which effected his consequent action. Kahane also 
claimed he did not hate the Arabs, rather the problem "was not that they were 
Arabs but that they were non Jewish living in a place designated by God for 
the Jewish people from biblical times".®^  ^The Palestinian violence is viewed 
by Kahane as a further means of humiliating the Jews. This hatred for non- 
Jews was responsible for the use of violence. Amir felt it was his duty to 
assassinate Rabin, as ordered by God. Amir also was motivated by the Torah 
and the Halakha which prophesies that the Torah provides the sacred 
legitimacy to the ideology and violent means advocated by fundamentalist 
leaders. Thus, "the holiness of Erezt Israel [Land of Israel] is held above
“ ’Hoffman, op.cit p 101. 
“ ®Juergensmeyer Mark, op.cit. p66.
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every other value, especially that of democracy, which is seen as a Westerner 
’Hellenistic' impor t" .Mot ives  have a strong connection with ideology and 
here again it is the ideological teachings that influenced the assassin to 
assassinate the leader. Amir was totally against establishing any sort of peace 
especially if it involved giving away land. He was greatly motivated by the 
ideologies preached by ideologues like Kahane and Kook. Kahane repeatedly 
expressed his disregard for the Arabs and stressed that the biblical land was 
given by God and it was theirs. Now Rabin was giving a part of their heritage 
to their greatest enemy, the Arabs. Furthermore, this would prevent the 
coming of the Messiah. This had to be stopped and it inevitably involved the 
assassination of Rabin.
As mentioned before the Tamil Tigers did not have a strong religious 
ideology. The main reason for the assassination of Rajiv Gandhi was that he 
was the most important target. In summation, political events are inherently 
against religious doctrine. At the same time both fundamentalist groups tried 
to gain political legitimacy by participating in elections, as they knew that 
ideological expectations could not be fulfilled without political legitimacy. 
Religious texts provided the ideologies with justification. The ideologies are 
imparted by religious leaders, which increases their importance. Again the 
motive behind Gandhi’s assassination was political as it included stopping 
Indian influence in Sri Lanka and revenge for Gandhi’s policies.
Aims
V igal Amir: inside the mind of a killer, U.S. News and World Report. 20/11/1995.
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The ideology behind the assassinations possessed some explicit aims. Their 
aims were definitely tainted with political and religious factors as for the 
Muslim fundamentalists, and Islambouli, the establishment of a global state of 
religious (Islamic) harmony is the ultimate desire. However, Muslims realise 
that the establishment of a global Islamic state is overly - ambitious and they 
tend to concentrate on Islamisation at a national level as a primary goal. This 
required a strict adherence to Islamic law, which Sadat was not following. In 
other words, "while the general trend of returning to Islam aims to correct 
society in a step by step fashion and to instil the values of the religion as away 
of life, the extremist Islamic organisations have turned the phenomenon into a 
lever to fulfil political aims - whether through democratic process in order to 
gain power by legal means, or through terrorism and other illegal means". '^^  ^
The attempt has been to purify society, that is to get rid of the state of 
Jahiliyya which prevents the fulfilment of the goal. This could only be 
established if groups like the Muslim Brotherhood acquired political 
legitimacy. This meant that only if political legitimacy was acquired could 
religious ideology then be fulfilled. Thus, there is a well established 
connection between politics and religion which is needed in order to create 
Islamic state, and in the long run establish a Islamic global society. However, 
Sadat stood in the way of this, as on a number of occasions he arrested 
Muslim fundamentalists. For example, just prior to his assassination he 
arrested 1500 fundamentalists, thereby trying to diminish their political 
image. Sadat was the obstacle in fulfilling these goals. He was not a pious 
Muslim which is a requirement to head a Islamic state. Therefore, in order to
Threat of Islamic Fundamentalism. Background Material, gopher://www.israel-info.gov.il
p2.
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achieve their aims it was necessary to assassinate Sadat, Thus in simple 
words, Islambouli was trying to break away from Jahiliyya and the Amir was 
trying to get back on the path to redemption.
Amir and Jewish fundamentalists wanted a state governed by the 
Halakha. They did not see Rabin as establishing Jewish state. The most important 
aim governing the assassination of Rabin was to stop the Peace Process as it 
entailed the conceding of land given to them by God. Therefore, an important 
point was to prevent the Arabs from gaining land which was not rightfully theirs. 
Even God apparently did not want this and commanded Amir to assassinate 
Rabin. Furthermore, Amir believes in a messianic component, that is he believes 
in the coming of the Messiah. The 1967 war was a signal that the process of 
redemption has begun. This desire to bring about the Messiah’s coming is an 
important aim for most Jews. For example, this can be seen when plans were 
made to destroy the Mosque on the Mount in order to build the third temple, 
which will hasten the way for the Messiah to come. Rabin with his Peace 
initiative seemed to be preventing this, and with his death, maybe the Messiah 
would not be prevented. Rajiv Gandhi’s assassination had very practical aims. 
The LTTE deemed it necessary to assassinate him for practical reasons. Their 
main aim was the ending of any further Indian involvement in Sri Lankan affairs. 
Another important aim for the LTTE was revenge. They wanted to punish Gandhi 
for the change of his policies. Thus these purposes would be fulfilled with the 
assassination.
In conclusion thesis has illustrated the complicated nature of the study 
of political assassination. In setting out the main objectives of the thesis, the 
introduction examined the long history of political assassination and sought to
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offer some way of interpreting the definitional debates that have affected the 
study of political assassination, along with other related areas, such as terrorism. 
Since there is an inclination to equate political assassinations with terrorism this 
thesis has attempted briefly to examine and understand the phenomenon of 
terrorism as well, in order to more clearly delineate the differences between the 
two. Furthermore, the discussion on the definitions of political assassinations 
involved analysing several classifications of political assassinations in order to 
gain a better understanding of the concept. The thesis identified and elaborated 
one particular classification and then used it as the best classification. However, 
the classification required some modification in the light of the cases examined. 
Finally, the introduction laid out the structure of the thesis and stated the three 
main questions that were to be analysed in the thesis. These were:
• Can the assassinations analysed in the thesis be categorised as political
assassinations?
• Can the justifications that are analysed justify the political
assassinations in this thesis?
• Are political assassinations ever successful as a political strategy or
are they only successful as existential acts?
Chapter Two then moved on to normative questions, examining normative 
justifications given for political assassinations. The chapter concentrated on 
three particular justifications that are offered. The first is instrumental 
justification. This analyses the consequentialist approach. The second 
justification is non -utilitarian justification. In this section, moral justifications
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are sought across many traditions such as the Christian, Indian and Chinese 
traditions. Finally, what this thesis calls ‘terroristic’ justification was 
examined, through the writings of various largely religious thinkers ranging 
from Sayyid Qutb to Rabbi Meir Kahane. A second hypothesis was advanced 
here, to the effect that all such justifications fail and that the only possible 
justification amounts to an existential wager on consequences, but one which is 
neither susceptible to the normal criteria of consequentialist judgement nor 
open to the moralising argument of either Just War or terroristic justifications.
Chapters Three, Four and Five then discussed the case studies which 
help to test both the explanatory and normative hypotheses. The chapters cover 
the political assassination of Anwar Sadat of Egypt, Yitzhak Rabin of Israel 
and Rajiv Gandhi of India. In all the chapters the intention has been to set the 
background for the assassinations, and to describe the motivations for the 
assassinations, the actual assassination and finally the consequences of the 
assassinations. The latter half of the chapter then examined the three questions 
with regard to each case, and found answers to the questions.
Having analysed the explanatory and normative aspects of the cases 
Chapter Six examined what the state of political assassinations are for the 
contemporary world. It analysed the legal aspects surrounding political 
assassinations and what the future may bring if this phenomenon is not studied 
properly.
The thesis clearly identified the definitional problems that exist in 
defining terrorism, tyrannicide and political assassinations. There is a close 
link between them, but they each are a distinct act of political violence. 
Furthermore, there are pros and cons to every definition and it is hard to pin
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point any particular definition as being the right definition. Regarding 
political assassinations the thesis found that it is a killing can be categorised 
as a political assassination if it involves the three specific elements of a 
prominent political figure, a political motive and a potential political impact 
of the death. This has been proposed by Kirkham, Levy and Crotty and seems 
to identify the particularly important aspects of political assassination. 
Additionally, the thesis found a classification for political assassination that 
was also produced by Kirkham, Levy and Crotty. Each case study was 
analysed through the classification, and it illustrated again that the three 
elements are an essential part of a political assassination.
This thesis concluded that it is hard to strictly classify an 
assassination as falling into any one particular category. The thesis aigues that 
for any assassinations to be classified as political assassination, it should 
definitely contain all the aspects of an elite substitution. This is because elite 
substitution when altered contains the three important elements needed for a 
political assassination. That is, the assassin will target a particular political 
figure because of specific political motives and the assassination will lead to 
certain political consequences. This was the case in all the political 
assassinations discussed above. The other types mentioned by Kirkham, Levy 
and Crotty in definitions provided may, or may not, be partly political 
assassination. For example, the assassin in each of the assassinations saw the 
victim as a tyrant due to the policies they were pursing, and their 
assassinations would hopefully end these policies, or maybe to a lesser degree 
the assassination would at least draw attention to the assassin’s cause.
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Thus, with special reference to the assassinations examined in this 
thesis, it seems to me that all three assassinations are perfect examples of 
political assassination. As explained before, a political assassination must 
have three essential components which are that the target should be a 
prominent political figure, there must be a political motive for the 
assassination and there should be a potential political impact of the 
assassination. In each of the cases mentioned above, all these essential 
components existed. All three were prominent political figures. Thus these 
assassinations can be regarded as political assassinations.
In conclusion, according to consequentialist/utilitarianist debate, all 
three political assassinations could not be justified. Wliat is interesting is that 
the conclusion reached was only possible as these were political 
assassinations that did take place and was able to examine the events leading 
to the assassination and the consequences of the assassinations. Therefore, it 
was easy to arrive at the conclusions. The implications of this is that it is 
possible to find out whether assassination is justified, or not, only when the 
entire event is completed. With regard to the political assassinations of Adolf 
Hitler or maybe President Robert Mugabe, according to a consequentialist 
argument it could be argued that it is justifiable to assassinate them. This 
decision would be based on analysing the current situations in the respective 
countries which might suggest that assassinating such persons would improve 
conditions in the countries and for their people. This is a complex 
consequentialist argument. However, according to utilitarianism, the political 
assassinations cannot be justified, as there is no way of telling whether the 
consequences of the political assassinations would mean greater utility for the
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countries and their people. Thus, although strictly speaking according to the 
arguments of consequentialist political assassinations cannot be justified, 
however, in principle under complex consequentialist argument it cannot be 
ruled out.
According to Just War percepts the three assassinations were not 
justified. All three assassinations did not fulfil the requirements of Just War 
and, therefore, the political assassinations cannot be justified. When it comes 
to a political assassination it seems unlikely that all six requirements of Just 
War could be fulfilled.
Just War specifically has certain requirements for violence to be 
morally justified. In other traditions like those of India and China, it is 
apparent from the previous chapter that moral justifications for violence also 
exist but the context of justifications is that of a king and his kingdom. On the 
whole, the impression is that use of force can be morally justified when it is 
used for self-protection. In both the cases it is evident that the use of force in 
order to protect the King and his Kingdom was therefore justified. There is 
extensive detail in both the ‘Arthasastra’ and ‘The Art of War’ about what 
methods of violence can be used in order to protect the King and his society. 
This morally justifies the use of force.
Most assassins want their action to be legitimised. This mostly 
reflects on their personal insecurities. They want to know that others will 
support their action and therefore the groups that assassins belong to become 
very integral to their commitment. As Yehuda states “the group provides the 
individual with moral support, motive, justification, material means, ideology.
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and often physical refuge as well”.^ "^  ^ It seems that terroristic justifications do 
not justify political assassinations. There are always going to be resentments 
regarding countries policies. This does not provide the opportunity for 
unhappy people to assassinate whoever they feel is responsible for their 
actions. Furthermore, as seen from the discussion in an earlier chapter, there 
are instances such as the assassination of Rajiv Gandhi when an assassination 
does not have any religious justification for carrying out such an act. Thus, 
terroristic justification cannot justify political assassination; it however does 
justify such an act to the perpetrator.
Thus, although none of the assassinations succeeded in the utilitarian 
and non - utilitarian defences all three cases of political assassination 
examined in this thesis succeeded as existential acts. The three assassins 
Islambouli, Amir and Subha fully understand the true meaning of the word 
assassin. All the assassins were very sure in their minds what their course of 
action was going to be. The assassins were also aware that it was inevitable 
that their actions would either mean death while carrying out the act, or once 
they were arrested. This however did not distract them from their mission. So 
far as the targets of the assassination are concerned, Islambouli and Amir 
were clear about who they wanted to assassinate and therefore planned and 
trained with this specific purpose in mind. Subha, on the other hand, was 
trained in the art of being an assassin but her target was unknown to her till 
the last minute. Despite these differences between the assassins they were 
individually very committed to their jobs. The assassins were fi*ee moral 
agents who knew the task that they were undertaking and claimed
Yehuda, One More.. p71.
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responsibility for their actions. Therefore, all these factors definitely prove the 
point that political assassinations do succeed as existential acts.
Finally, after having analysed the explanatory and normative 
aspects of political assassination, analysing the policy illustrated that the 
assassinations of political leaders in the contemporary world is an important 
thing which needs to be understood and dealt with. The brief examination of 
policy does show that the laws are not perfect and that it is possible to 
violate them easily. If anything, the laws need to be strengthened in order to 
create a stable international order. This would require coherent and strict 
laws to be formulated with clear definitional explanations. This would help 
reduce the confusion that exists with respect to what the laws really mean 
and to whom they apply. Also, the laws need to make a clear distinction 
between heads of states, and individuals who pose a threat to the 
international system. That is, whether the laws are targeted towards state 
actors or non - state actors. Also, one needs to address issues such as 
assassinations in peace times and times of war. Furthennore, it is also 
important to make sure that countries such as the United States do not 
violate laws. Since they are the hegemon in the contemporary world it is 
their responsibility to be a model for the world by obeying laws and 
contributing to stability between states.
In conclusion, there is an important need to understand this 
phenomenon of political assassination if there is to be an effort to counter 
political assassinations. This issue opens the door for further questions in 
the field. What does the current status of political assassination mean for the 
future of international law? Will its current status mean that in the future the
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international community will witness more political assassinations? Is this a 
step towards an era of targeted killing?
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